The Reversal of the Mission: The Influence of Religious Leaders on Sociopolitical Attitudes

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Abstract

This paper explores how religious leaders influence the religious and political attitudes of their communities. To do this, I build a novel dataset containing the universe of Catholic priests appointed to their parishes in rural Spain between 2000 and 2019. I leverage the quasi-natural experiment by which foreign-born priests are allocated to parishes and use a staggered difference-in-differences design to identify their influence on their communities. I show that foreign-born priests, whom I find more devoted to their cause, are effective in revitalizing local religiosity, evidenced by an increase in Catholic marriages and fertility, while fewer divorces. Politically, they increase electoral mobilization, shift communities toward Catholic-aligned positions, and reduce support for openly xenophobic parties. These effects are driven by their broader community engagement and their role in reinforcing in-group cohesion among native Spaniards. These findings highlight the significant role of religious leaders in shaping local sociopolitical attitudes.

Keywords: Catholic Church, Family Formation, Fertility, Missionaries, Political Influence, Religious Revival

JEL Classification: D64, D72, J61, O43, Z12, Z13

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1 Introduction

Religion is an integral part of the lives of many, constituting one of the dominant identity structures. In 2015, 78% of the world's population reported following a denomination (Brown and James, 2019).[1] The religious leader is the central figure in charge of transmitting their values. These individuals act as intermediaries between their institution and laypeople, providing their supporters with moral teachings, offering advice on practical and spiritual matters, and holding a venerated position within the local community (Richerson and Christiansen, 2013).[2] However, how effectively religious leaders convey their messages, especially in increasingly secular societies, is far from trivial.

Over the past decades, the Western World has challenged that religious predominance. These countries have undergone an extensive secularization process resulting in decreasing social support for religious practices, from 62% in the 1980s to 53% in 2018 (EVS, 2021), and lower enrollment in the priesthood. Consequently, Western Christian churches have resorted to attracting foreign-born religious leaders to overcome the lack of native leaders, which has been coined as "the reversal of the mission". The extent to which these foreign-born priests, characterized by their high devotion and outreach, can transmit their social values is central to understanding religious persistence.

In this paper, I investigate whether the arrival of foreign priests to rural Spanish parishes has shaped local sociopolitical attitudes. During the study period, the Spanish Catholic priesthood suffered a significant compositional change, from completely native in 2000 to up to 14% of foreign-born priests in 2019. I provide novel evidence that the arrival of these foreign-born priests, whom I find to be more devoted to their cause, has revived local religiosity, measured by an increase in Catholic marriages and fertility, and a reduction in divorces, and influenced political opinions toward conservative positions. That influence has favored a stronger in-group cohesion among the native population, while not affecting the local immigrant population. These findings have important implications for policy-making as they highlight that the composition of the priesthood has a real impact on today's sociopolitical attitudes and demographics.

I conduct rigorous data collection to estimate the influence foreign religious leaders have on their local communities. First, I collect data on the universe of priest appointments to parishes in rural Spain between 2000 and 2019. I extract this information from the diocesan periodical bulletins retrieved from the Spanish Episcopal Conference's internal archives. Second, I use the yearbook of each diocese to obtain detailed information

[1] According to Pew Research Center (2015), the share of the world's population following a denomination is projected to grow by 2050 to 86.7%.

[2] In fact, as of 2018, 62% of the world's population reported completely trusting religious leaders (GfK Verein, 2018).

on the priests' demographics, including their country of birth, order, age, tenure, and education. I further complement these data with a phone survey, in which I ask priests for their political opinions and work habits. Finally, I merge the previous sets of information with the universe of Spanish parishes to identify those municipalities that had a change of religious leader, allowing me to trace the influence of foreign-born priests on natives' preferences. My final sample includes detailed information on the employment record of 2587 priests working in 4020 different municipalities for the 20 years of study.

I leverage the plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of the arrival of foreign-born priests to local Spanish parishes to identify their differential impact on their community. To do this, I use a staggered difference-in-differences approach. This strategy allows me to account for time-invariant municipality characteristics and seasonality confounders. Following recent developments in the literature on staggered two-way fixed effects, I implement the stacking approach proposed by Cengiz et al. (2019) to ensure that the treatment effects are estimated using only clean comparison units. In this setting, I define a municipality as treated if it ever had a foreign-born priest in charge of its local parish and a municipality as control if it did not. In my sample, all municipalities have assigned at least one religious leader.

I first document, using the results from my survey, that foreign-born priests are younger and more missionary-oriented than their local counterparts. Despite that, foreign-born priests are comparable to local priests regarding their political leanings, such as their social conservatism and hierarchical preference, and work habits, such as their working hours and the type of church-related activities they participate in.

I find that foreign-born priests are more effective than their local counterparts in convincing people into two of the main pillars of the Catholic Church: marriage and family creation. Only one year after the arrival of a foreign priest, the local community experiences an increase of 0.1 Catholic weddings, corresponding to a 6% increase in the mean number of Catholic weddings held in the sample. As time passes, such influence increases. Six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, these municipalities have 21% more Catholic weddings than those with a local priest. That increase comes at the expense of civil-only weddings, which decrease by 13%. Similarly, six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, the community experiences an average increase of 0.65 new births per year, representing a 10% increase in the mean number of births, while at the same time, there is a significant reduction in the number of divorcees in the affected communities (9%). Overall, these results suggest that foreign-born priests play a significant role in reinforcing Catholic values among the local population, fostering a traditional approach to family formation.

While foreign religious leaders might influence their parishioners back to the church,

their leadership could also reach other religiously-relevant outcomes. For this, I look at local political preferences. I show that the arrival of a foreign priest to the community changes its voting behavior towards more traditionally conservative positions. Six years after the arrival, municipalities with a foreign priest cast 1.4% more votes in favor of conservative parties (i.e., Catholic-aligned parties), representing a 3.5% average increase in the conservative spectrum. This increase comes at the expense of left-leaning parties, which favor the separation between the Spanish state and the Catholic Church, and radical right parties, which are openly antagonistic towards minorities. Overall, this evidence has important implications for policy-making as foreign religious leaders might act as a deterrent to the open support for xenophobic positions.

In terms of heterogeneity in impact, I show that the ethnic composition of the municipalities matters. I find that the influence exerted by foreign priests is driven by ethnically diverse municipalities, where they bring their parishioners back to Catholicism. That substantial influence comes from the influence exerted on the native population, while not on the immigrants. I find no effects on ethnically homogeneous municipalities. Overall, these results reinforce the idea that foreign-born religious leaders effectively promote in-group cohesion among the native population, irrespective of the cultural proximity to local immigrants.

Then, I investigate which priests' characteristics help at explaining the results. I find suggestive evidence that priests' age, tenure, country of study, and origin, do not play a differential role vis-à-vis foreign-born religious leaders' influence. These results suggest that foreign-born priests' influential behavior comes from unobserved characteristics common to all foreign-born priests, such as their inherently higher motivation and devotion, rather than from cultural and language proximity to the local communities.

Finally, I examine the mechanisms through which priests influence their parishioners. I find that masses function as a public good, serving as the main channel through which foreign priests influence parishioners' political views. However, changing social values requires from a more individualized approach. Accordingly, only foreign priests who reside within the community, where they presumably foster stronger social ties and offer social and religious services, are able to effectively promote traditional family values.

I perform four exercises to check the validity of my empirical strategy. First, I provide suggestive visual evidence that the parallel trends assumption is not violated and perform a placebo test in municipalities that have not yet received a foreign priest, using a fictitious arrival date. The results strongly reject the presence of pre-existing trends in these not-yet treated municipalities. Second, I check whether there are underlying differences between those municipalities that never had a foreign priest and those that had at least one between 2000 and 2019, finding some significant differences across municipality types.

Consequently, I replicate the main analysis using a subsample of matched municipalities based on their 2001 Census characteristics, obtaining comparable results. Third, I test whether the arrival of a foreign-born priest triggered a migration shock, which could alter the local demographic composition. I find no evidence in that respect. These patterns are consistent with the evidence presented in Section 2, according to which the replacement of priests is mainly driven by supply-side factors, such as the availability of newly ordained priests and the death or retirement of incumbent priests. Finally, I address the potential concern that the effects might be driven by strategic placement of foreign-born priests by certain bishops. To mitigate this, I replicate the main analysis while systematically excluding one diocese at a time, and finding consistent results. Overall, my robustness checks confirm that my identification strategy is sound and effect estimates are internally valid.

My contribution is twofold. First, I build a very rich dataset containing the universe of Catholic priests' appointments in rural Spain between 2000 and 2019 and complement it with novel archival and survey data on the priests' characteristics. Second, I leverage the quasi-natural experiment by which foreign-born religious leaders are allocated to Spanish parishes to identify their influence on their communities. I show that foreign-born religious leaders, whom I find to be more devoted to their cause, revive local religiosity and influence political opinions toward Catholic-aligned positions. They achieve that prevalence by promoting in-group cohesion among native population, while not mobilizing culturally and religiously similar immigrants. My results support the hypothesis that foreign leaders are influential traditional community builders.

This paper contributes to and builds on three different strands of the literature. First, this work contributes to the literature on leaders' influential behavior determinants, which harks back to Carlyle (1840). Previous research has focused on explaining how leaders' identity characteristics, such as gender (Broockman, 2014; Bhalotra et al., 2018; Ladam et al., 2018; Baskaran and Hessami, 2018), ethnicity (Burgess et al., 2015; Sakong, 2021), religiosity (Bhalotra et al., 2014, 2021), charisma (Assouad, 2020; Wang, 2021), social interactions (Becker et al., 2020; Pulejo, 2024; Lanzara et al., 2024), and political views (Broockman and Butler, 2017; Butler and Hassell, 2018), shape their constituents' preferences and behavior. I focus on an often overlooked authority figure, local religious leaders. Religious leaders differ from those previously studied as they are appointed following a top-down process in which their communities have minimal involvement. Three notable exceptions are Engelberg et al. (2016), which shows that high-performing Methodist pastors are key in explaining church attendance; Tuñón (2024), which shows that left-leaning Brazilian bishops were able to mobilize their network towards economically progressive but socially conservative positions; and Bassi and Rasul (2017), which shows that papal

visits influenced the timing of births via religious persuasion. I contribute to the literature by showing that the arrival of foreign priests, characterized by being more devoted than their local counterparts, promotes Catholic-aligned values such as higher fertility and marriages and mobilizes voting behavior towards more conservative positions. Since religious leaders mediate in the transmission of values and the persistence of the local culture, this paper also relates to the literature on cultural transmission (Bisin et al., 2004; Alesina et al., 2013; Guiso et al., 2016).

Second, my paper relates to the broader literature on the societal impacts of religiosity, which goes back to Weber (1920). Some recent studies have provided compelling evidence that religious practices have long-lasting implications on individual outcomes and behaviors, such as economic outcomes (Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015; Montero and Yang, 2022; Heldring et al., 2021; Bryan et al., 2021; Drelichman et al., 2021; Hasan et al., 2024), human capital (Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Calvi et al., 2020; Squicciarini, 2020), and pro-social behaviors (Clingingsmith et al., 2009; Schulz et al., 2019; Gagliarducci and Tabellini, 2022; Buccione, 2024; Sola, 2024).[3] This paper looks at religiosity from a yet unexplored angle, that one of its local religious leaders. I contribute to this literature by causally studying how changes in the current composition of the local priesthood can lead to religious awakenings and changes in the parishioner's sociopolitical views.

Finally, I contribute to the study of the consequences of secularization. Previous literature has found mixed evidence on the relationship between socioeconomic prosperity and a country's secularization (Barro and McCleary, 2003; Lozano, 2017; Cantoni et al., 2018; Andersen and Bentzen, 2022). I contribute to the literature by examining how the "reversal of the mission", a direct consequence of Europe's secularization, helps revive local religiosity, highlighting the important role of supply-side factors in explaining European secularization. Since most foreign religious leaders preaching in Europe share a missionary trait, this paper also relates to the literature on the long-lasting effects of exposure to missionaries (Bai and Kung, 2015; Waldinger, 2017; Valencia Caicedo, 2019; Calvi et al., 2020; Becker and Won, 2024).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the Spanish religious background and how dioceses manage their own resources. Section 3 presents and describes the data. Section 4 exposes the empirical strategy followed. Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 explores the mechanisms at play. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

[3]For more detailed literature reviews, see Iannaccone (1998); Iyer (2016); Becker et al. (2021).

2 Institutional Setting

2.1 Spanish Religious Context

In Spain, Catholicism has traditionally been considered a state religion.[4] Despite that, in recent years, a rapid process of secularization has challenged this scenario. Figure 1 reports the evolution of religiosity between 2000 and 2019. Figure 1a shows that the proportion of Spaniards who self-identify as Catholic has slowly decreased from 82% in 2000 to 63% in 2019. However, that share may include many culturally religious but non-practicing individuals. Figure 1b shows the evolution of church attendance between 2000 and 2019. It depicts that while a large majority of Spanish people self-identifies as Catholic, as of 2019, only 35% of them frequently attend church (i.e., 22% of the whole population). That drop in religiosity is largest among the younger generations. While in the 2000s, 25% of all young people reported attending church, in 2019, only 6% attend often.

The evolution of the Spanish priesthood has taken a similar route. At its peak in 1961, the Spanish Church was composed of more than 35,000 priests, which represented the 10% of all priests worldwide, and had around 900 new priests ordained yearly.[5] This environment favored the missionary outflow of more than 25,000 individuals, representing, at that time, the 25% of all Spanish clergy (Suárez Fernández et al., 1991). However, since then, religious calling has been steadily decreasing.[6] Figure 2 displays how the ordainment of priests has evolved during recent years, showing that Spanish seminaries have been continuously losing vocations throughout the study (from 227 priests ordained in 2001 to 124 in 2019). This limited religious calling has led to the need to attract foreign-born priests, resorting to what has been coined as the "reversal of the mission" (Ojo, 2007).[7] As of 2019, 20% of all new seminarians were foreign-born. This situation has created a unique scenario, especially in Spanish rural areas, characterized by their aged population, high religiosity, and high ethnic homogeneity.

[4]The creation of the Spanish nation-state was heavily influenced by the historical power the Catholic Church had in the Spanish territories. This influence has shaped the current understanding of Spanish society, culture, and politics (Suárez Cortina, 2014).

[5]These values have been calculated using the 1956-1965 Pontifical Yearbooks.

[6]Numerous reasons have been stressed for having promoted the decay in religious callings, such as the increasing secularization of the Spanish state, the rigid and antagonistic positioning of the Spanish bishops to church modernization following the II Vatican Council, and the decreasing fertility rates (Menéndez Pidal, 1996).

[7]The process of attraction of non-Western missionaries to the West has been recently documented in several countries, such as Germany (Währisch-Oblau, 2009), the Netherlands (Koning, 2011), the United Kingdom (Woodhead and Catto, 2012; Burgess, 2019), and the United States (Kim, 2015).

2.2 Diocese Management

The Spanish Catholic Church is characterized by a decentralized structure, with all decisions taken at the diocese level. A diocese is an administrative unit, similar in size to a civil province, that manages all the religious activities held in its territory, ranging from the appointment and ordainment of priests to how collected funds are allocated. Each diocese is guided by a bishop. As of 2019, there are 69 territorial dioceses, coordinated by the Spanish Episcopal Conference, and comprise around 23.000 parishes and 17.000 priests.[8]

Dioceses manage their resources following an autocratic approach. Every diocese has its own seminary where future priests study. The process to become a priest, homogeneous to all dioceses, takes around 8-9 years, and includes the study of Philosophy and Theology and the pastoral training. Upon finishing their studies, priests are ordained by their diocesan bishop, forming a perpetual relationship with the ordaining diocese.[9] These bonds help dioceses maintain a loyal number of vocations in the territory.

Bishops are the actors in charge of allocating priests to their corresponding parishes. The process works as follows. First, preceding religious leaders are moved out of their parish in the event of death, retirement (Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 537), or by forza maggiore, always after an extended stay in the parish.[10] When assigning a new priest, bishops consider the parish demographic and religious characteristics and the priest's pastoral and religious attributes.[11] Throughout the process, religious leaders have de facto no power to object to a bishop's decision (Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 1748).[12] Once at the parish, priests have complete discretion on their engagement with the local community (Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 530).

In the event of missing vocations, dioceses can opt for two different formulas. First, dioceses could choose to aggregate parishes, providing multiple parishes to a unique priest, called "administrator", or many parishes to several priests, called "in solidum". While the former strategy gets used as a temporary solution in finding a permanent priest (Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 539-540), the latter approach has become a prevalent strategy,

[8]For an updated figure, see https://www.conferenciaepiscopal.es/iglesia-en-espana.

[9]A popular saying among Spanish deacons exemplifies that commitment: "If in God you trust, there will be no regret" (in Spanish, *Si en Dios confías, no hay arrepentimiento).*

[10]Spanish dioceses are requested to promote the continuity of priests in their corresponding parishes for at least six years. See Art. 4 of the C.E.E Official Bulletin - July 1984, inspired in Code of Canon Law (1983), § 522.

[11]Anecdotal evidence from various talks with priests and bishops suggests that the main factors influencing priests' appointments are the parish's demographic characteristics. No noticeable attention is paid to other sociopolitical factors at the local level. In the analysis, I control for population and the number of previous priests appointed to a given parish to account for its desirability.

[12]Qualitative evidence, collected via a phone survey, shows that priests have little saying in their own appointment process.

especially in rural areas. Between 2000 and 2019, 16% of all municipalities in my sample have had at least a priest "in solidum". This approach is mainly used in parishes governed by foreign-born priests (23%) when compared to those led by local priests (10%). In my analysis, I control whether a given municipality has a priest "in solidum" to account for that difference.

Second, bishops could also work on attracting priests from other dioceses to attend their local seminaries and preach in their territory. These contacts between demanding dioceses and supplying dioceses are conceived as a long-standing relationship by the two dioceses, nurtured by the established presence of Spanish missionaries in the offering dioceses. Spanish dioceses leverage these connections to overcome their decreasing native religious calling. In practice, local bishops contact their foreign counterparts asking for vocations. Then, foreign bishops proceed by contacting those religious members in their dioceses interested in becoming missionaries. Finally, these members decide whether to accept the pastoral call and, if so, move to Spain. Upon arrival, they are treated as equals to nationals, having to attend the local seminary if they are not yet ordained and subsequently preaching under their new diocese. Additionally, foreign-born priests once in Spain hold no formal obligations towards their home diocese. According to Lara (2021), the main reason that motivates foreign-born priests arriving in Spain is to help under provisioned dioceses.

3 Data

This paper uses matched priest-municipality data that spans the period from January 1st, 2000, to December 31st, 2019. I complement this with information from a priest survey and administrative data on municipalities' characteristics. This section describes sources and methods of data collection.

3.1 Priests' Appointments

I use a novel collected dataset containing the universe of priests' appointments to parishes in rural Spain between January 1st, 2000, and December 31st, 2019. My dataset contains parish-month level information on all 8533 priest appointments that occurred in 4020 municipalities for those 20 years. The final sample includes all those municipalities with a single population center and parish to avoid any within-municipality self-selection into parishes. This sample comprehends 72% of all parishes and 93% of all municipalities of the target dioceses.

This data was collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference's archive (hereafter,

SEC). The data gathering worked as follows. First, I use the periodical bulletins published by each diocese (in Spanish, Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico) and regularly submitted to the SEC. These bulletins, which aim at providing a complete screenshot of the diocese, include information ranging from the events in which the bishop participated to detailed parish-level information. I extract from each monthly bulletin information on the priests' appointment process, including the priests' names, the exact working positions, the date when those appointments occur, and the parishes they are assigned. Then, I scrape the list of parishes each diocese has from the SEC's website and aggregate it at the municipality level using the catalog of population entities available at the Spanish Statistical Office. Lastly, I merge the dataset containing all priests' appointments with the universe of Spanish parishes to identify which municipalities had a change of religious leader and when that change happened. Table A1 shows the total number of parishes and municipalities each diocese has and those included in my final sample.

3.2 Priests' Characteristics

3.2.1 Priest Demographics

I collect detailed priests' demographic characteristics using multiple sources from the Spanish Episcopal Conference's archive. First, I collect information on the priests' country of origin and religious order. This data is scattered over different sources ranging from the dioceses' yearbooks to interviews conducted by the national newspaper, Ecclesia. I use the full name of each priest to accurately identify them from the multiple sources available. When compared to survey responses, I find a 1.4% and 5.4% error rate in nationality and religious order coding.

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the priests' nationality. While the average priest is of Spanish origin, 13.3% of the priests in my sample was not born in Spain. Among those other countries of birth, Colombia is the largest supplier, with 5.7% of all priests, followed by Mexico with 1.6%. However, their distribution in the territory is far from homogeneous. Figure 3 maps all municipalities used in the study, identifying those that ever had, and never had, a foreign priest. We can observe how the distribution of foreign priests is not homogeneous across the Spanish geography, being highly influenced by the dioceses' pool of native religious calling. Table A2 puts into numbers such heterogeneity, showing that some dioceses never had a foreign priest, such as Osma-Soria, while others use this formula more intensively, such as Tarazona. Finally, Table 2 provides the summary statistics on the differences between those municipalities that received at least a foreign priest after January 2000 and those that never received one. For instance, ever-treated municipalities have, on average, fewer young people and singles, fewer temporal

workers, and a higher share of immigrants than never treated municipalities.

Second, I collect information on the priests' education from each dioceses' periodical bulletins. Using these books, I extract the flow of religious celebrations that took place in each diocesan seminary at any point in time between 2000 and 2019. I use the full name of each foreign priest to identify whether they studied in a Spanish seminary before preaching. I use this information to identify which foreign priests took part in local seminaries as a proxy for partial cultural assimilation.

Finally, I collect information on the priest's birthdate and ordainment. In particular, I use the ordainment date to construct a measure of working tenure, as religious members, once ordained, are considered priests in full responsibility, and most cases, entrusted with leading a new parish. This information was retrieved from the diocese's yearbooks and websites. Unfortunately, not all dioceses provided this information to the Spanish Episcopal Conference. Table A3 shows that the dioceses providing data have fewer foreign priests, fewer members of religious orders, and more priests educated in a local seminary.

3.2.2 Priest Survey

I collect a survey on individual priests working at the dioceses under study. This survey aims at understanding which characteristics define the current Spanish priesthood. In particular, I am interested in learning which personal, sociopolitical, and work-related traits foreign and local priests differ.

The data gathering worked as follows.[13] Before the survey release, I manually collected the personal contact details of all priests present on each diocese's website and diocesan yearbooks. I use all information available on these sources as of April 2022. The sample of potential priests was 1288 priests. The survey release followed a two-stage process. First, phone numbers are contacted based on a random rank.[14] Individuals in the sample were contacted up to five times, at different times and with multiple phone numbers, both from mobile and landline devices. The phone survey was collected from May to June 2022. Then, once the phone survey was over, I sent an email survey with the same questionnaire to all those priests for whom I had their contact details but could not reach via phone call. This online survey took place from early July to mid-August 2022. Weekly reminders were sent throughout the process. A total of 257 individuals completed the survey, of which 87% did it by phone. Table A4 shows for each diocese the distribution of all priests, potential priests, and surveyed priests, differentiating by their foreigner status.

[13]Each survey takes an average of 8.6 minutes to complete. Phone surveys were conducted by the principal investigator together with the support of three research assistants. The survey received ethical approval from the Ethics Committee at the European University Institute (available upon request).

[14]In the event of not finding the person indicated in the phone book but another person, I attempted to obtain updated contact details for the priest in my sample.

The survey had a 20% response rate. Table A5 compares surveyed priests to all other priests, showing that the surveyed priests are less likely to belong to a religious order and more likely to have studied in a local seminary. Similarly, they are younger and less tenured than non-surveyed priests. I find no significant differences regarding the priests' country of birth.

The survey is composed of three blocks of questions. The first block includes questions on the priests' characteristics, such as age, ordainment year, nationality, reasons to come to Spain, and working experience abroad. The second block incorporates the political views of priests. I elicit individuals' political opinions by using a list of politically relevant and highly polarized statements and asking the participants to state how much they agree or disagree with them. Then, I summarize those scores into two broad categories measuring individuals' social and economic conservatism. I further identify those priests that prefer not to question the Pope's ruling. I do so, as in L.A. Times Archives (2002), by asking participants about their opinion on the moral views of both Pope Francis and Benedict XVI. In the last block, I ask priests about their working habits, including questions on church attendance, hours spend preaching, and the level of local involvement. At the end of the survey, I pose an open question to participants to understand which other challenges they face in their parishes. Qualitative evidence shows little to no local repudiation based on the priest's country of birth.[15] Section C in the Appendix includes all the questions administered.

Table 3 describes all the characteristics collected for my sample of priests. In Panel A, we can observe that 13% of the overall sample of priests are foreign-born, 90% are diocesan, and 89% studied in a Spanish seminary. Panel B shows the information contained in each diocese's yearbooks. We can see that the average priest is 63 years old and has 36 years of working experience. Panel C presents the information collected in the survey. We can observe that 20% of the priests working in Spain, as of 2022, have had previous missionary experience, ranging from short stays to long-standing missionary expeditions. The average priest reports to be slightly more socially and economically conservative than average, often discussing political issues with his parishioners but not questioning the moral views of the Catholic Church. Furthermore, priests estimate that around 23% of their parishioners regularly attend the Sunday sermon, spending 10 hours a week officiating masses. Priests play a central role in their communities, participating in numerous projects, with special emphasis on social care and family planning activities, and maintaining a good relationship with the local governments.

Comparing foreign priests to their local counterparts, we can observe how foreign-born

[15]Only one of all foreign priests surveyed admitted having faced racism during the first year he spent in Spain. Even in that situation, his bishop did not change his working parish, reinforcing the idea that bishops do not entirely internalize local circumstances when deciding the allocation of priests.

priests are 13 years younger and have a higher probability of being part of a religious order and of being missionaries. Furthermore, foreign-born priests are more optimistic about the current economic situation both when compared to Spanish-born priests and to the general population.[16] No differences are found concerning their political ideology and working habits. These differences are consistent with the evidence presented in Section 2, according to which foreign-born priests' main trait is their missionary inclination.

3.3 Outcomes of Interest

3.3.1 Religious Attitudes

I measure (social) religiosity by using one of the couples' most important events, their wedding. More precisely, I use data from the Spanish Statistical Office containing the number of weddings celebrated by the residents of a given municipality and year. This source allows me to classify weddings by the rite followed, namely whether they are civil-only weddings, they follow the Catholic rite, or they follow a non-Catholic rite. Figure 4a displays their evolution over the period of study. It depicts the Spanish secularization process, with a decrease in religious encounters, from 80% of all weddings in 2000 to a mere 20% in 2019.

However, marrying by the Catholic rite might be partially influenced by the inherent traits of the officiant priest. To provide further evidence of foreign priests' role in bringing people closer to Christianity, I look at fertility. This measure is a relevant proxy for religiosity given the long-standing support of the Catholic Church to family-driven and natalist policies (McKeown, 2014). In fact, according to the 2018 Spanish Fertility Survey, practicing Catholics have an average of 1.33 children, non-practicing Catholics have 1.07 children, and non-believers have 0.68 children. More precisely, I use a database provided by the Spanish Statistical Office containing the number of births in a given municipality and year. Figure 4b displays the distribution of the average number of births per municipality over the study time. It clearly shows how during the period pre-2008 financial crisis, the number of births per municipality was smoothly increasing. However, since then, it has been steadily decreasing, reaching its lowest level at the end of the study period.

To further analyze the influence of foreign priests in fostering adherence to Catholic values, I examine marital divorces. This metric serves as a useful proxy for social religiosity, given the historically strong opposition of the Catholic Church to divorce. According to the December 2019 Spanish Sociological Barometer, divorce rates widely vary by reli-

[16] Question 19 is also asked in the Spanish monthly political polls collected by Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (CIS). Individuals surveyed as of May 2022 ranked their economic situation to be 3.665, comparable to the valuation of the local priests.

gious affiliation: 2.2% among practicing Catholics, 5.4% among non-practicing Catholics, and 5% among non-believers. More specifically, I measure the stock of divorced individuals at the municipal level for each year. This measure is derived from tax declarations obtained from a random sample comprising 10% of the Spanish population, as provided by the Ministry of Finance. To enhance the robustness of this measure, I also analyze the opening of new divorce cases at the judicial district level, yielding comparable results. As illustrated in Figure 4c, the number of divorced individuals has increased sixfold over the period under study.

3.3.2 Political Behavior

I use voting data for all national and European elections held in Spain between 2000 and 2019. More specifically, my sample contains the national elections held in 2000, March 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016, and April and November 2019, and the European elections held in June 2004, 2009, 2014, and May 2019. This information was retrieved from the Spanish Interior Ministry database and has been aggregated at the municipality level.[17]

I first classify all political parties that ever run for the national or European parliament into two broad categories: right-wing and left-wing parties. To do so, I use the information reported in their public register and online sources. I follow this bipartisan approach as it represents the predominant political culture in the study period. Additionally, such categorization exemplifies the support of the Catholic Church. On the one hand, right-wing parties advocate for preserving the status quo, with Catholicism having an active role in society. On the other hand, left-wing parties advocate the real separation between the Spanish state and the Catholic Church. Figure 4d illustrates the evolution of these categories over time. It highlights that the municipalities in my sample are consistently more right-wing leaning. Table A6 in the Appendix exemplifies the main political parties considered in each category.

I then proceed by sub-classifying those parties in the right-wing sphere, differentiating those belonging to the conservative aisle from those on the radical right aisle. These two ideologies differ primarily in their approach toward minorities. While conservative parties take a status quo approach, embracing prevalent covert intolerance, radical right parties follow an antagonist approach, publicly displaying minorities as a threat to Spanish traditions (Olivas Osuna, 2021). Figure 4e illustrates the evolution of these subcategories over time, showing how radical right parties have gained political momentum in recent years at the expense of conservative parties. Table A7 in the Appendix exemplifies the main political parties considered in each category. Lastly, Figure 4f shows the evolution

[17] I focus only on national and European elections, while not on the regional and local administrations, to avoid cross-municipality differences in candidates.

of the abstention rate over the period of study.

4 Empirical Strategy

In the first empirical exercise, I examine the extent to which the arrival of a foreign priest to a given parish influences his constituents' sociopolitical and religious attitudes using the following model:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta Foreign_{it} + \gamma_i + \omega_t + \Psi X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where Y identifies the outcome of interest, as described in Section 3, for a municipality i and a year-month t. The key independent variable *Foreign* identifies whether a given municipality ever had in the past a foreign-born religious leader. I control for municipality characteristics, X_{it}, such as population, population squared, the number of previous priest appointments, and whether the current priest is sharing his office with other priests (in solidum). As explained in Section 2, I use these controls as bishops look at them in deciding the priest-to-parish allocation process. I include municipality fixed effects, γ_i, which allows me to account for time-invariant variation across municipalities; and year-month fixed effects, ω_t, which mitigate that results are confounded by secularization (e.g., periods in which people have lower religiosity levels may also lead to lower native religious calling, thus a higher propensity of having a foreign religious leader). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Under conventional two-way fixed effects assumptions, β measures the average effect of having a foreign priest in a municipality in a given year-month compared to municipalities with a local priest. However, as recent developments in the estimation of staggered difference-in-differences designs have shown, the average treatment on the treated is a weighted sum of different ATTs, with potentially even negative weights (De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2021). To overcome such limitation, I use the stacked difference-in-difference approach proposed by Cengiz et al. (2019).[18] This approach transforms my staggered setting into a two-group by two-period design, aligning observations relative to the time of the event. I estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{i,t}(\mu) = \sum_{\mu} \beta_\mu Foreign_\mu + \gamma_i + \omega_t + \Psi X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \qquad \text{for } \mu \in \{-Q, \ldots, +P\} \tag{2}$$

where i refers to municipality, t to time, and μ to the relative time-to-event. Q and

[18] For completeness, Section B in the Appendix compares the influence of foreign-born religious leaders depending on the estimation method used, obtaining comparable results to my main specification.

P refer to any arbitrary time window to and since the event, respectively. Outcomes are normalized to $Y_{i,t}(\mu)$ - $Y_{i,t}(-1)$, using the year prior to the arrival of foreign-born priests as comparison baseline.

As in the conventional difference-in-differences framework, the main identification assumption is that both treated and control municipalities would have had a similar outcome in the absence of a foreign priest's arrival. The main concern is whether there exists self-selection into treatment, leading to differential pre-trends between treated and control municipalities. As shown in Section 2, the timing of the treatment should be uncorrelated to the evolution of outcomes over time in treated and untreated municipalities, given that bishops do not strategically select priests based on the municipality's sociopolitical leanings. Furthermore, the top-down nature of the decision prevents parishes from voicing their preferences, thus facilitating priest assignments to be uncorrelated with municipality characteristics.

I provide two crucial exercises to prove that in the event of no treatment, both control and treated municipalities would have behaved similarly. First, I conduct a placebo test by examining the change in a given outcome variable exclusively within municipalities that have not yet received treatment, in my case, those that will receive a foreign priest at a later stage. This test employs a randomly assigned shock, in this case, the fictitious arrival of a foreign priest. Tables A8 and A9 in the Appendix shows that none of the main outcomes used in this paper is significant when subjected to the fictitious treatment, provide strong evidence against the presence of underlying trends not-yet-treated municipalities. Second, I replicate the same analysis using a matching-on-observables approach, as this method allows me to account for the fact that treated and control municipalities may be structurally different at baseline. I use a propensity score matching algorithm with two neighbors and no replacement on a list of municipality characteristics available in the 2001 Spanish Census. Section D in the Appendix includes a detailed description of the propensity score matching procedure, together with the replication of all baseline results only using the sample of matched municipalities. I find no significant differences between using the full sample and only matched municipalities.

A second issue relates to the stable unit treatment value assumption. This assumption implies that the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality does not influence its control municipalities' potential outcomes. In this setting, I would violate this assumption if the arrival of the foreign-born priest would motivate individuals from other parishes to attend the foreign-born priest's masses. To tackle this concern, I use only municipalities with a single population center and parish to avoid any within-municipality self-selection into parishes. However, individuals could still commute between municipalities to attend a foreign priest's mass. This concern is minimized by the Spanish population density

structure, which is defined as highly concentrated. That means that individuals are not widely spread over the territory but live only at core population centers built around a parish, making it improbable to commute to another municipality.[19] Similarly, I would violate the SUTVA assumption if the arrival of a foreign priest would influence individuals' decision to migrate to the municipality. I test whether those municipalities with newly arrived foreign priests enjoyed a differential migration pattern. Figure A1 shows that the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality does not influence individuals' migration decisions. Similarly, Tables A10 and A11 in the Appendix show that my main results are not sensitive to the introduction of spatially corrected Conley standard errors.[20]

A third issue pertains to any other plausible interpretation of the main variable of interest, *Foreign*. While *Foreign* identifies whether a religious leader was foreign-born, it might also capture how important the arrival of a new priest is in the community. Table 4 tests that hypothesis, showing that only foreign-born new priests significantly influence their communities. In fact, the replacement of religious leaders by other local priests is detrimental to religious spread. That finding is in line with the characteristics defining local priesthood, as seen in Section 3. In this study, I focus on the arrival of foreign-born priests, which could be interpreted as a lower-bound effect, given that the replacement of religious leaders, per se, worsens religious influence.[21]

5 Main Results

5.1 Influence on Religiosity

I start by looking at whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a given municipality changes its local religiosity. As explained in Section 3, I measure social religiosity by using the number of Catholic weddings and the number of births.

Whether and how foreign priests shape social religiosity is far from trivial. On the one hand, we could expect that the arrival of a foreign priest to a community might deter individuals from following the Church's directives. In fact, the decision to move into and out of a religious group might be more influenced by the need for belonging than believing itself (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985). In this case, this would mean that

[19] In fact, if we were to divide Spanish geography into 1km^2 cells, only 12.5% of these cells would be inhabited, compared with 68% in France and 57% in Italy. These ratios are computed using the 2011 GEOSTAT 1km2 population grid dataset.

[20] For completeness, Figure A2 shows that foreign-born priests, when working in dioceses with a higher presence of foreign-born priests, do not influence their communities more than when working in dioceses with a lower presence of foreign-born priests. Similarly, Figure A3 shows that the effects are not driven by any individual diocese.

[21] In the same line, Table A12 in the Appendix shows that the frequency of priest replacements is not correlated with municipality baseline characteristics.

locals, when deciding their type of wedding, might factor in positively having as officiant priest the Spanish one they grew up with. That would result in fewer Catholic weddings in those municipalities led by a foreign priest. On the other hand, foreign priests might be inherently more effective than local priests in conveying Catholic teachings. In fact, foreign priests in my sample are two times more likely to be missionaries than their local counterparts. In this case, this would imply that parishioners would relate to their church more intensely, possibly overcoming the "loss" of their old-standing local priest and resulting in more Catholic celebrations.

Figure 5 displays the evolution of weddings at the local level following the arrival of a foreign religious leader. Important to notice is that weddings, especially in municipalities with few residents, are regarded as a rare event given the demographic dynamics. On average, the municipalities used in the sample have 2.8 weddings per year, but more than 50% of the municipalities do not have any weddings in a given year. Subfigure 5a highlights that the arrival of a foreign-born priest to the municipality leads to an increase in the number of weddings following the Catholic rite. The change in nuptial celebrations after the arrival of a foreign-born priest is explained by the relative availability of churches in rural Spain, allowing for the observed short-term effect. Six years after a foreign priest's arrival, treated municipalities have significantly 0.35 more Catholic weddings than those with local priests. That represents a 21% increase in the average number of Catholic weddings. Such an increase comes at the expense of civil-only weddings. Subfigure 5b shows how, six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, the municipality holds 0.17 fewer civil-only weddings, representing a 12.75% decrease in the average number of civil-only weddings. Taking both wedding types together, subfigure 5c shows that those municipalities with a foreign-born priest experienced a weakly positive increase in the total number of weddings. Moreover, subfigure 5d shows that the arrival of foreign priests does not affect the celebration choice of individuals from other denominations.

However, marrying by the Catholic rite could still be entirely influenced by the inherent traits of the officiant priest and not so much by local religiosity. To provide further evidence on this matter, I look at local fertility. As explained in Section 3, fertility is a good proxy for social religiosity, given the Catholic Church's strong emphasis on traditional family creation. Figure 6 shows how the number of local births starts growing upon the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality. Six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, the village experiences an average increase of 0.65 new births per year, representing a 10% increase in the average number of births. While small in magnitude, that figure has an important economic significance for the municipalities analyzed, as their aging population and economic decline characterize them.

Similarly, the influence of foreign priests on traditional family formation may not only

be present in the initial stages of development, but may also have lasting effects on family stability. I test this hypothesis by examining whether the arrival of foreign priests in local communities affects the number of divorcees, using a random sample comprising 10% of the Spanish population. Figure 7 shows how, following the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality, there is a decline in the number of divorcees. Six years post-arrival, the community experiences a reduction of 0.32 divorcees (3.2 divorcees when extrapolated to the entire Spanish population), corresponding a 9% decrease in the average number of divorcees. Similarly, Table 5 shows that having a higher share of foreign-born priests within the judicial area is associated with a lower number of newly initiated divorce cases. This evidence suggests that the decline in the stock of divorcees reflects increased family stability, rather than a reshuffling of divorcees into new partnerships.

Overall, these results suggest that foreign priests are more effective than their local counterparts in convincing people into two of the main pillars of the Catholic Church, namely stable marriage formation and family creation. However, whether and how foreign priests influence their parishioners on non-religious matters is still under question.[22]

5.2 Influence on Electoral Outcomes

In this section, I study whether the arrival of a foreign priest changes the voting behavior of its parishioners. As explained in Section 3, I first focus on the right-left dimension as it divides parties into church supporters and detractors, respectively.[23]

Whether and how foreign priests shape local political preferences is far from trivial. On the one hand, one could expect that the arrival of a foreign-born priest would help the community to realize that foreigners can be part of the "local elite" and become a bridge between immigrants and natives in the municipality as theorized in Allport et al. (1954). In such a case, we would observe that those pro-immigration parties, identified more prominently in the sample as left-leaning (Volkens et al., 2021), would benefit from the arrival of a foreign priest. On the other hand, foreign priests might be inherently more religious and charismatic than their local counterparts, which could lead to a higher vote share for right-wing parties, given their Church-friendly positions. A third viable option is that religious leaders no longer have societal relevance, given the increasing secularization shown in Section 2. This would ultimately imply that their demographic attributes would no longer play an active role in shaping natives' political behavior.

[22] In line with those findings, Table A13 shows a positive association between the proportion of foreign-born priests in a diocese and church donations, while a negative relationship with overall (non-religious) donations. However, these effects appear to be specifically attributable to the presence of foreign-born priests, as their removal leads to a partial reversion toward secularization (see Table A14).

[23] For completeness, Figures A4, A5, A6, and A7 in the Appendix show that foreign-born priests do not have a significantly effect on the spending preferences and economic prosperity of their communities.

Figure 8 displays the political evolution of left and right-leaning parties following the arrival of a foreign priest to the community. Subfigure 8a presents the vote share for left-wing parties and shows how the appointment of a foreign priest slowly changes individual political preferences away from the left. Six years after the arrival of the foreign priest,[24] treated municipalities are 1.4% less likely to vote for left-wing parties, representing a 3.5% decrease in the average voting share for the left. Such decrease is captured by right-wing parties, which see a significant increase in their voting share of 1% (See Figure 8b).

However, such influence towards traditionalist parties might hide a compositional effect in which minority integration could play a role. I subdivide the right aisle into conservative and radical right parties to explore that dimension. Figure 9 shows how parishioners slowly move towards conservative positions and away from radical right ones upon the arrival of a foreign priest. Six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, the village votes 1.5% more to conservative parties, representing a 3% increase in the average voting share for conservative parties. Contrarily, the arrival of a foreign priest to the parish mobilizes his parishioners away from extreme positions and decreases the voting share of these parties by 0.6%, representing a 23% decrease in the average voting share for radical rights parties.

A secondary channel explaining that electoral shift would be the change in the voters' composition. On the one hand, one could expect that foreign-born priests, given their stronger religious influence in their communities, might move their parishioners to rely more on the Church than the state. Thus, deciding not to participate in the elections. On the other hand, the presence of these priests could have quite the opposite effect, as their influence might increase their communities' cohesion and political positioning. Thus, increasing their voting participation. Figure 10 corroborates the latter argument. It shows that foreign-born religious leaders consistently mobilize their communities into electoral participation.

Overall, these findings reflect the dual identity of foreign priests, defined by their religiosity and foreignness. The results show that foreign priests effectively shift their parishioners toward positions more closely aligned with Church teachings – politically represented in Spain by conservative parties – while simultaneously distancing them from openly xenophobic positions, typically associated with radical right parties. A key channel through which this influence operates is political mobilization: foreign priests promote increased electoral participation among their parishioners, thereby reinforcing democratic engagement along Church-aligned values.

[24] Given that the elections are held on average every 18 months, the six years window corresponds to four elections after arrival, including its contemporaneous one.

6 What Is Driving the Effects?

6.1 Municipality Heterogeneous Effects

In this section, I explore how municipal characteristics act as modulators of the influence foreign-born religious leaders have on their parishioners.[25]

I begin by investigating whether local immigration plays a role in the influence of foreign priests. To do so, I use the 2001 Spanish Census to identify those municipalities with an above and below the median number of foreign-born individuals. This allows me to differentiate between those municipalities with frequent contact with immigrants from those with little to no contact. On the one hand, we could expect municipalities with a long tradition of immigration to be more receptive to foreign-born priests as previous immigrants might ease the initial contact. Moreover, the immigrant population in these communities might act as the initial stepping stone into the parish, allowing the priest to reach the whole community. On the other hand, natives might not necessarily see foreigners positively, reject the arrival of a foreign priest, and move away from the church. This could happen in high-immigration municipalities, where natives might feel that their culture is challenged, and in low-immigration municipalities, where locals might hold stereotypical prejudices toward foreigners.

Figure 11 shows how the arrival of a foreign-born priest affects their parishioners depending on the community's local immigration status.[26] We can see how foreign-born religious leaders are more effective in guiding more ethnically diverse municipalities, especially in bringing these parishioners back to the church. However, foreign priests do not differentially influence individuals' political ideology, especially regarding radical right parties. These results suggest that foreign-born priests bring new parishioners to the church in diverse municipalities, but they influence their communities' political views irrespective of the local composition. Thus, it does not support the contact hypothesis theory (Allport et al., 1954).

The previous results highlighted that foreign priests were more effective in more diverse communities. However, whether foreign priests could be an effective tool in helping minorities integrate into their communities is still under question. To provide evidence in that respect, I use the 2001 Spanish Census and identify those municipalities that had Latin American and Maghrebi communities in 2001. I focus on those two subgroups as

[25]For completeness, Figures A8 and A9 in the Appendix show that foreign priests do not differentially influence their parishioners along the presence of local religious grass-root movements, and local education. On the contrary, Figure A10 shows that foreign-born priests are especially effective in bringing people to the church when placed in more demographically vibrant municipalities.

[26]Throughout all heterogeneous effects, I look at the influence six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, as the Spanish Church's policy is to maintain religious leaders in their parishes for at least that duration.

they constitute the most significant subgroups of immigrants living in Spain, amounting to 0.39% and 0.25% of the Spanish population in 2001, respectively. Furthermore, while Latin American immigrants are culturally and religiously close to Spanish-born people, Maghrebi immigrants are not, having been historically portrayed as the "others" (Martin Corrales, 2002). Figure 12 displays the influence of foreign-born priests on those municipalities with long traditions with Latin American and Maghrebi populations. We can observe how foreign-born priests are equally effective at influencing those communities with a long tradition of Latin American and Maghrebi communities. These results suggest that foreign-born priests effectively mobilize their native followers towards closer communities around traditional values in ethnically diverse parishes but do not accommodate culturally and religiously similar immigrants.

I then examine whether foreign priests influence their parishioners differently depending on the local political background. To that end, I identify which municipalities have a historically conservative profile and which ones do not. I use voting data for all national and European elections between 1975 and 1999 and classify municipalities as conservative when they voted more for right-wing parties and non-conservatives when they voted more for left-wing parties. Figure 13 shows how the presence of a foreign priest in a community affects its parishioners along with the community's political background. We can see that local political ideology does not affect the religious influence of foreign priests. However, that is not the case when it comes to political matters. First, we can see that foreign priests guide towards more conservative positions those parishioners in municipalities that were historically liberal. Second, we can also observe that such political influence is reverted when it comes to the extreme right. Foreign-born priests influence their parishioners away from radical-right positions, especially in those historically conservative municipalities. Lastly, foreign-born priests are equally effective in mobilizing their parishes towards voting, irrespectively of their past political positioning. Taking all results together, they suggest that foreign priests effectively gain votes for the conservative parties, mainly at the expense of left-leaning parties in liberal strongholds.

Finally, I examine whether the local economic situation influences how foreign-born priests interact with their communities. To do so, I use the 2001 Spanish Census to identify those municipalities with above and below-median unemployment rates. This classification is crucial as religion could be perceived as a good of last resort, especially appealing in municipalities with worse economic outcomes. Figure 14 shows that foreign-born priests are more effective than their local counterparts in bringing people to the church, especially in municipalities with more economic needs. These results suggest that foreign religious leaders are better at promoting the social support of the Catholic Church.

Overall, these results shed light on which parish characteristics are crucial in understanding the effective influence of foreign-born priests. In this section, I have shown that foreign-born religious leaders are particularly influential in ethnically diverse municipalities, promoting closer communities around religious values; promoting a conservative, and traditional mindset, away from liberal and extreme-right positions; and standing by those communities in more need.

6.2 Priest Heterogeneous Effects

In this section, I explore which of the priests' characteristics act as modulators of the influence exerted by foreign-born religious leaders.[27]

I first examine whether foreign-born religious leaders differentially influence their communities depending on whether they were ordained in a Spanish seminary. We could expect that studying in a Spanish seminary teaches priests specific theological approaches and the Spanish cultural idiosyncrasy, which could lead to some partial cultural assimilation. Whether such assimilation is favorable or not for the priest's endeavors is far from trivial. On the one hand, the know-how of the local culture could be beneficial to access the whole community, thus promoting Catholic teachings more effectively. On the other hand, a complete adaptation of the foreign priest to the local culture could also prove detrimental as it could ultimately lead to losing the religious drive that brought them to Spain. Figure 15 shows whether the presence of a foreign priest in a community affects its parishioners depending on whether the priest studied in a Spanish seminary. I find no significant differences in any of the outcomes of interest, suggesting that studying in a Spanish seminary, as opposed to studying in a foreign seminary, is used more as a decoy to attract foreign priests but having no significant impact on their role as religious leaders.

I further look at whether the nationality of foreign priests matters. To that end, I differentiate foreign priests between those born in a Latin American country and those born elsewhere. I follow this dichotomous approach for a couple of reasons. While Latin Americans share with Spaniards their language and rich cultural, religious, and historical similarities, those priests born elsewhere will likely only share the religious aspect. This fact might help Latin American priests integrate more effectively into the local communities as opposed to those coming from other countries, which could have a deeper influence

[27]For completeness, Figures A11 and A12 show that the tenure and age of foreign religious leaders are not significant determinants when compared to the average Spanish priest. Similarly, Figures A13 and A14 show that foreign religious leaders do not exhibit greater influence than their Spanish counterparts in terms of tenure and age profile, respectively. On the contrary, Figure A15 shows that foreign-born priests who are members of a religious order are more effective in revitalizing religiosity than their local counterparts.

on the community. Figure 17 shows how priests born in Latin America and elsewhere influence Spanish parishioners, respectively, as opposed to having a local priest. We can see that foreign-born priests do not differentially influence their communities concerning their country of birth.[28]

Overall, I show that cultural and linguistic similarity to the local population is not a key determinant of foreign-born priests' influence. Additionally, I find that neither age nor tenure appears to predict foreign priests' effectiveness. These results suggest that the influence foreign-born priests have on their communities comes from unobserved characteristics common to all foreign-born priests, such as their inherently higher motivation and devotion. This interpretation is in line with recent sociological evidence on the role of the Ghanaian Adventist Church in the Netherlands (Koning, 2011) and Korean protestants in the United States (Kim, 2015).

6.3 Preaching the Sermon vs. Living with the Preacher

Lastly, I investigate the mechanisms through which foreign priests influence their parishioners. Specifically, I examine the role of proximity to a foreign priest – particularly having a foreign priest as a neighbor – in shaping their influence.

Whether and how proximity to a foreign priest shapes local preferences is far from trivial. On the one hand, one might expect that the main attribute of these religious leaders is their relatively greater devoutness, which enables them to convey their message more effectively during mass compared to their Spanish counterparts. If this is the case, the influence exerted by foreign priests on their parishioners would not depend on their place of residence. In other words, the provision of mass as a public good, accessible to all parishioners, would be the primary mechanism driving our baseline results. On the other hand, foreign religious leaders might also be better at building personal relationships with their parishioners to a greater extent than their Spanish counterparts. If this holds true, then their influence would derive from more direct and frequent interactions with the local population rather than solely from the public provision of mass. In this case, their impact would be contingent on their proximity to the parishioners, suggesting that social ties and personal engagement play a crucial role in shaping religious influence.

To study that question, I define a municipality as the home of a priest if it is the most populated village under his pastoral care, while the remaining municipalities in

[28]For completeness, Figures A16 and A17 show suggestive evidence that priests' ideology and hierarchy-leanings are important in explaining foreign-born religious leaders' influence, respectively. However, these estimates are based on the priest's survey, which, while informative, may have some limitations due to a smaller sample size.

his jurisdiction are classified as visiting parishes.[29] Figure 18 presents the results to that question. First, we can observe that the primary mechanism through which foreign priests influence the political views of their parishioners is through their masses, as their impact remains comparable regardless of whether they maintain close personal contact with parishioners. However, the priest's place of residence becomes relevant when it comes to the provision of private goods. Specifically, foreign priests appear to be effective in changing individuals' socio-religious values only when they reside in the same location as their parishioners. In particular, cohabiting with a foreign priest promotes a more traditional approach to family formation, which is, at least in part, facilitated through frequent interactions with the religious leader. Qualitative evidence from my survey data supports this observation: priests were more likely to report being predominantly available in their main parish of residence and to provide additional services there upon demand. These services encompassed both social activities, such as organizing sports events, and religious initiatives, such as marriage preparation courses or Bible study groups.

Taken together, these findings suggest that foreign priests effectively reinforce Catholic-aligned values among parishioners. However, the broader shortage of priests – making it impractical for each to reside in close proximity to their parishioners – limits the extent to which their greater motivation can be fully leveraged. Consequently, this constraint prevents the widespread mobilization of foreign priests' influence, making it unlikely that they can meaningfully reverse ongoing secularization processes.

7 Conclusion

This paper provides novel evidence of the importance of religious leaders in shaping religious and sociopolitical attitudes. To do so, I follow a twofold approach. First, I collect a unique dataset containing the universe of Catholic priest appointments taking place in rural Spain at any point in time between 2000 and 2019 and including detailed information on the priests' inherent traits, such as country of birth, order, age, tenure, and education. I further complement such data with a novel phone survey covering the priests' political opinions and working habits. Second, I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the assignment of foreign-born priests to Spanish parishes to provide a causal interpretation of how these religious leaders shape the native sociopolitical attitudes. I

[29] I validate this proxy using information on the exact home locations of priests, which is scattered across multiple diocesan yearbooks (i.e., 502 recorded priest home locations). The data indicate that 46% of all priests live in the most populated municipality they serve, while 10% live in a smaller parish under their jurisdiction. The remaining priests either reside in adjacent villages where they do not preach (20%) or in the capital, where they hold other diocesan positions (24%).

document that 13.3% of all the priests in the sample were not born in Spain, arriving primarily from Latin American countries and with a missionary vocation.

I find that foreign-born priests are influential traditional community builders. I show that upon arrival, foreign-born religious leaders influence their communities towards higher religious practice, measured by the number of Catholic weddings, births and divorcees. Similarly, foreign priests effectively bring their parishioners' political opinions closer to Catholic-aligned positions, both at the expense of left-leaning and radical right parties, and by mobilizing parishioners into the voting stations.

Further evidence shows that foreign-born religious leaders exert substantial influence in ethnically diverse municipalities, irrespective of the local immigrant composition, suggesting that a contact hypothesis story is not at play. The stronger influence observed among the native population highlights the capacity of foreign-born clergy to foster in-group cohesion among natives. In particular, foreign priests shape their parishioners' political views through the general provision of religious services, such as the celebration of masses, whereas shifts in social values requires from a more individualized approach. Accordingly, only foreign priests who reside within the community, where they presumably foster stronger social ties and provide additional social and religious services, are able to effectively promote traditional family values. Moreover, cultural and linguistic proximity to the local population does not explain the differential impact of foreign-born priests. These findings suggest that foreign religious leaders draw on unobserved attributes – such as greater motivation and religious devotion – combined with close pastoral relationships to guide parishioners toward values more closely aligned with Catholic doctrine.

This paper has important implications for policy-making as it highlights religious leaders' central role in shaping social values. I study this influence in a context where religious leaders have historically served as key pillars of the community, but where a pronounced secularization process has recently undermined their traditional social authority. Specifically, this study explores a relatively overlooked phenomenon – the "reversal of the mission" – showing that the arrival of foreign-born priests, driven by strong missionary commitment, has contributed to a reversal of secularizing trends. Our results highlight the important role of supply-side factors in explaining European secularization.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Descriptives - Priests' Country of Birth

Country of Origin	Share	N
Spanish	0.867	2243
Colombian	0.057	150
Other Latin American	0.024	64
Other nationalities	0.022	58
Mexican	0.016	43
Polish	0.011	29
Total	1	2587

Note: The table provides descriptive evidence of the nationality of those priests working in my sample of analysis. Own elaboration based on the information collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference.

Table 2: Summary Statistics (at baseline)

	Never Foreign-Led	Ever Foreign-Led	p-value
Population	762.422	641.897	0.042
Youth share	0.127	0.122	0.046
Retired share	0.325	0.334	0.041
Uneducated share	0.212	0.212	0.918
Technical education share	0.717	0.719	0.727
Singles share	0.378	0.365	0.000
Divorced share	0.004	0.004	0.123
Immigrants share	0.013	0.019	0.000
Labor participation (Male)	0.575	0.562	0.002
Labor participation (Female)	0.269	0.274	0.231
Unemployed share	0.106	0.100	0.059
Self-employed share	0.298	0.297	0.931
Temporal workers share	0.222	0.213	0.064
Farmers share	0.287	0.281	0.403
Share Right-wing	0.406	0.390	0.001
Grassroot Catholicism	0.074	0.058	0.119

Note: The table provides a comparison of the baseline characteristics between municipalities that had a foreign priest between 2000 and 2019 (ever foreign-led) and those that did not (never foreign-led). The information at the municipal level is extracted from the 2001 Census. The share of votes to right-leaning parties was calculated using all national and European elections held between 1975 and 2000. Grassroot Catholicism identifies whether there existed in 2001 any grassroot Catholic initiative in the municipality.

Table 3: Priests' Characteristics - Foreign vs. Local

		Foreign Priests		Local Priests		
	Baseline	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	p-value
Panel A: Full Sample Characteristics						
Foreign	0.134					
Religious Order	0.100	0.150	0.358	0.092	0.290	(0.004)
Spanish Educated	0.891	0.223	0.417	1.000	0.000	(0.000)
Observations	2587	346		2241		2587
Panel B: Individual Characteristics (from Annual Directories)						
Age (in years)	63.531	51.250	11.680	64.659	14.645	(0.000)
Tenure (in years)	36.431	20.647	11.757	37.884	15.887	(0.000)
Observations	808	68		740		808
Panel C: Individual Characteristics (from Survey)						
C.1) Missionary Status						
Missionary	0.292	0.667	0.480	0.248	0.433	(0.000)
Missionary (in years)	1.905	4.963	4.701	1.546	4.668	(0.001)
C.2) Political Ideology						
Social Conservative	6.056	6.467	1.854	6.006	1.794	(0.230)
Economic Liberal	5.593	4.720	3.127	5.701	2.306	(0.125)
Church is Right	0.665	0.520	0.510	0.683	0.467	(0.139)
Discuss Political Issues	2.210	2.074	1.072	2.226	0.916	(0.485)
Economic Situation	3.567	2.926	0.958	3.645	0.783	(0.001)
C.3) Working Habits						
Church Attendance (%)	23.706	21.462	21.967	23.975	19.212	(0.581)
Mass Hours (weekly)	9.769	9.704	5.485	9.777	5.167	(0.948)
Family Planning	0.537	0.500	0.508	0.542	0.499	(0.665)
Minorities Integration	0.337	0.375	0.492	0.332	0.472	(0.643)
Social Care	0.667	0.719	0.457	0.660	0.475	(0.499)
Village Participation	0.375	0.438	0.504	0.368	0.483	(0.462)
Num. Activities	2.868	3.074	1.466	2.843	1.815	(0.457)
Parish-Local Council Relation	2.400	2.259	1.347	2.417	1.186	(0.564)
Open Question (length)	133.809	136.519	114.324	133.491	109.194	(0.897)
Observations	257	27		230		257

Note: This table shows the distribution of priests' characteristics as follows: Baseline (Col. 1); Foreign priests (Col. 2-3); Local Priests (Col. 4-5). The p-value of the difference between Foreign and Local priests is reported in Column 6. Missionary is an indicator variable that identifies if a priest has ever worked/is working as missionary (See 6.2 and 7 in Section C). Missionary (in years) measures the cumulative time that an individual has ever worked as missionary. Social Conservative is a weighted sum of Questions 11-16 in Section C. Economic Liberal is a weighted sum of Questions 9 and 10, as exposed in Section C in the Appendix. Both Social Conservative and Economic Liberal have a distribution that go from 0 to 10. Church is Right is an indicator variable that identifies if a priest does not question the Pope's political views (See Questions 17 and 18). Discuss Political Issues corresponds to Question 23 in the survey and measures how much a priest talks with his parishioners about political issues. Economic Situation corresponds to Question 19 and measures how bad the priesthood sees the current economic situation. Church attendance measures the percentage of the priest's parishioners that attend frequently the Sunday mass (See Question 20). Mass Hours is a variable that measures the hours a priest employs directly officiating masses (See Question 21). Family Planning, Minorities Integration, Social Care, and Village Participation are indicator variables that identify if a given priest participates in any related activity (See Question 24). Num Activities is a discrete variable that identifies in how many activities a given priest participates (See Question 24). Parish-Local Council Relation is a discrete variable that identifies the level of disagreement between local council and parish (See Question 25). Open Question is a continuous variable that measures the length of Open Question 26. All other information is self-explanatory.

Table 4: Effect of a New Priest's Arrival vs. New Foreign Priest's Arrival

	(1) Cath. W.	(2) Civil W.	(3) Birth	(4) Divorcees	(5) Sh. Cons	(6) Sh. Left	(7) Sh. Rad Right	(8) Abstention
New Priest	-0.2836***	0.2320***	-0.0848	0.5816***	0.00200	-0.00300	-0.000900	-0.00160
	(0.0745)	(0.0331)	(0.1004)	(0.2011)	(0.0020)	(0.0020)	(0.0009)	(0.0015)
New Foreign Priest	0.2973***	-0.1747***	-0.0679	-0.2705***	0.00270	0.00170	-0.0054***	-0.0046*
	(0.0458)	(0.0226)	(0.1053)	(0.0675)	(0.0038)	(0.0035)	(0.0019)	(0.0027)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	78651	78651	78596	61746	46454	46454	46454	46454
Joint p-value	0.856	0.112	0.193	0.128	0.233	0.742	0.00240	0.0383
Mean Dep. Var.	1.587	1.286	6.506	3.366	0.538	0.408	0.0298	0.281

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a new foreign-born priest to a municipality affects a series of outcomes. Cath and Civil identifies the number of catholic and civil-only weddings, respectively. Birth measures the total number of births in a given municipality and year. Divorcees measures the stock of divorced individuals in a given municipality and year, using a 10% of the Spanish population. Cons, Left, and Rad. Right identify the voting share to Conservative, Left, and Radical Right parties, respectively. Abstention measure the abstention rate in a given municipality and election year. Joint p-value tests whether the sum of New Priest and New Foreign Priest is jointly equal to zero. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: Effect of Foreign Priest Presence on New Divorce Cases
Judicial Area Level

	(1) Divorce Cases	(2) Divorce Cases
Sh. Foreign Priests	-144.2273*	-166.4713***
	(73.0395)	(60.7250)
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Judicial Area FE	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	2342	2342
Dep. Var. Mean	141.9	141.9

Note: This table analyzes the effect of having a higher share of foreign-born priests on the opening of new divorce cases at the judicial area level. The data was scrapped from the Spanish Justice Ministry website. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the judicial area level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 1: Religiosity Evolution (2000-2019)



(a) By Religious Practice

(b) By Church Attendance

Note: The figure reports how self-reported religiosity has evolved over time. I use collapsed information at the yearly level from the monthly public opinion surveys conducted by the Spanish Center of Sociological Research (CIS). Subfigure 1a displays the overall evolution by religious practice, and Subfigure 1b shows the evolution by church attendance, for those individuals reporting following a denomination.

Figure 2: Ordainment Evolution (2001-2019)

Note: The figure displays the number of ordained priests per year in Spanish seminaries. Own elaboration based on the information collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference.

Figure 3: Distribution by Municipalities



Note: The figure displays the relationship of municipalities used in the analysis. The municipalities in dark green represent those in which at any point in time between 2000 and 2019, a foreign priest was present in the municipality. The municipalities in olive green represent all those other municipalities used in the analysis, which never had a foreign priest. Municipalities in light green represent those municipalities not used in the study, as they are composed by several population centers and/or parishes. Own elaboration based on the information collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference.

Figure 4: Outcome Evolution (2000-2019)



(a) Distribution by Wedding Type

(b) Distribution of Births



(c) Distribution of Divorcees



(d) Right vs. Left



(e) Conservative vs. Radical Right



(f) Abstention Rate

Note: The figure reports how a series of outcomes have evolved over time. Subfigure 4a shows the evolution of the relative share of Catholic, non-Catholic, and civil weddings. Subfigure 4b displays the average number of births per municipality in the sample of study, while Subfigure 4c displays the average number of divorcees. Subfigure 4d shows the evolution of the voting share of right and left-leaning parties, Subfigure 4e displays the evolution of the voting share of conservative and radical right parties, while Subfigure 4f displays the evolution of the abstention rate.

Figure 5: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Marriage by Ritual



(a) # Catholic Weddings



(b) # Civil-only Weddings



(c) # All Weddings



(d) # Weddings (Other Denominations)

Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects the probability of getting married, by wedding ritual. Subfigure 5a displays how it affects the total number of Catholic weddings performed, Subfigure 5b studies how it affects the total number of civil-only weddings, Subfigure 5c displays the impact on the overall total number of weddings carried out in a given municipality, and Subfigure 5d whether it affects the wedding probability in other non-catholic denominations. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A15 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 6: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Fertility



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of births in the municipality. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A15 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 7: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Divorcees



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of divorcees in the municipality. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A15 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 8: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Political Outcomes - Left vs. Right



(a) Left-wing parties (b) Right-wing parties

Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigures 8a shows how it affects the voting share of left-wing parties and Subfigure 8b displays how it affect the voting share of right-wing parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A16 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 9: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Political Outcomes
Conservative vs. Radical Right



(a) Conservative parties (b) Rad. Right parties

Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigures 9a displays how it affect the voting share of conservative parties and Subfigure 9b how it affects the voting share of radical right parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A16 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 10: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Voting Absenteeism



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality has an effect on its electoral participation. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A16 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 11: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Immigration



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates the change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, in green, and those with a below median number of foreign-born individuals, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A17 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 12: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Immigration
Latin American vs. Maghrebi



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates the change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, baseline, with an above median number of Latin American individuals, in green, and those with an above median number of Maghrebi individuals, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A18 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 13: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Conservatism



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with a historically conservative voting behavior (i.e., above median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999), in green, and those with a historically liberal voting behavior (i.e., below median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999), in blue. Municipalities are classified using data on all national and European elections that took place between 1975 and 1999, available at the Spanish Interior Ministry. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A19 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 14: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Unemployment



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median unemployment rate, in green, and those with a below median unemployment rate, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A20 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 15: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Study



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who studied in a Spanish seminary, in green, and those who did not, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A21 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 16: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Origin



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates foreign priests by those who were born in Latin America, in green, and those who were born anywhere else in the world, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A22 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 17: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Origin



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates foreign priests by those who were born in Latin America, in green, and those who were born anywhere else in the world, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A22 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 18: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Home Location



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who live and preach in a given municipality, in green, and those who only preach there, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A23 displays numerically this figure.

Appendix - For Online Publication

A Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Migration



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the arrival of new incoming population. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A24 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A2: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Foreign-born Priests Density



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those dioceses that belong to the ecclesiastical province of Zaragoza (characterized by the extensive use of foreign-born priests), in green, and those located elsewhere, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A25 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A3: Treatment Effects by Leaving a Diocese out at a Time



Notes: This figure replicates the main results derived from Equation 2, sequentially omitting one diocese at a time. The dioceses are ordered in ascending order based on the proportion of foreign-born priests within the studied dioceses. The represented dioceses include: 1) Osma-Soria, 2) Ávila, 3) Zamora, 4) Palencia, 5) Cuenca, 6) Salamanca, 7) Burgos, 8) Valladolid, 9) Valencia, 10) Ciudad Rodrigo, 11) Toledo, 12) Calahorra y la Calzada - Logroño, 13) Albacete, 14) Coria-Cáceres, 15) Sigüenza-Guadalajara, 16) Ciudad Real, 17) Jaca, 18) Plasencia, 19) Teruel y Albarracín, 20) Segovia, 21) Huesca, 22) Tarazona, 23) Barbastro-Monzón, and 24) Zaragoza. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure A4: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Social Spending



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality shapes preferences toward social projects. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A26 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A5: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Business-related Spending



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality shapes preferences toward business-related projects. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A26 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A6: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Unemployment Rates



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality leads to changes in unemployment rates. The unemployment rates are measured per capita instead of per working age population due to missing data. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A27 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A7: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Contracting Rates



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality promotes the creation of new labor contracts. The contracting rates are measured per capita instead of per working age population due to missing data. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A27 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A8: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Catholic Movements



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities who had registered as of the year 2000 at least a Catholic organization, in green, and those who did not have any organization registered, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from Directory of Religious Entities, provided by the Spanish Ministry of Justice. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A28 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A9: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Uneducatedness



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number in individuals with no formal education, in green, and those with a below median number in individuals with no formal education, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A29 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A10: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Demographic Structure



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of young individuals, in green, and those with a below median number of young individuals, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A30 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A11: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Foreign Religious Leader's Tenure



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests whose tenure is above the median, in green, and those whose tenure is below the median, in blue. Both senior and junior foreign priests are compared to the average Spanish priest. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A31 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A12: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Foreign Religious Leader's Age



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those foreign priests whose age is above the median, in green, and those whose age is below the median, in blue. Both young and old foreign priests are compared to the average Spanish priest. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A32 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A13: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Tenure



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests whose tenure is above the median, in green, and those whose tenure is below the median, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A33 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A14: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Age



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests whose age is above the median, in green, and those whose age is below the median, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A34 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A15: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Order



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who are part of a religious orders, in green, and those who are diocesan, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A35 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A16: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Ideology



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests holding more conservative views, in green, and those who do not, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A36 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A17: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Hierarchy-Leaning



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between religious leaders that do not challenge the pope's rulings, in green, and those that challenge them, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A37 displays numerically this figure.

Table A1: Distribution of Municipalities and Parishes per Diocese

	Municipalities			**Parishes**		
Diocese	Used	Not Used	Total	Used	Not Used	Total
Albacete	61	25	86	61	115	176
Ávila	216	4	220	216	15	231
Barbastro-Monzón	91	10	101	91	34	125
Burgos	328	40	368	328	359	687
Calahorra y La Calzada - Logroño	166	8	174	166	49	215
Ciudad Real	89	13	102	89	48	137
Ciudad Rodrigo	79	3	82	79	11	90
Coria-Cáceres	102	6	108	102	25	127
Cuenca	223	14	237	223	55	278
Huesca	61	11	72	61	45	106
Jaca	54	6	60	54	20	74
Osma-Soria	172	8	180	172	33	205
Palencia	177	13	190	177	53	230
Plasencia	132	10	142	132	32	164
Salamanca	243	13	256	243	53	296
Segovia	206	3	209	206	21	227
Sigüenza-Guadalajara	281	6	287	281	31	312
Tarazona	119	2	121	119	10	129
Teruel y Albarracín	191	3	194	191	14	205
Toledo	210	11	221	210	47	257
Valencia	274	52	326	274	326	600
Valladolid	204	17	221	204	92	296
Zamora	163	6	169	163	33	196
Zaragoza	178	2	180	178	71	249
Total	4020	286	4306	4020	1592	5612

Note: The table displays in Columns 1-3 those municipalities used and not used in the analysis. Column 4-6 display the equivalence in terms of parishes used and not used. I use in the analysis all those municipalities with a single population center and parish (Columns 1 and 4). I do not use those municipalities with multiple population centers or multiple parishes.

Table A2: Distribution of Priests by Country of Birth and Diocese

Diocese	Foreign Priests	Local Priests	Sh. Foreign	Total
Albacete	5	34	0.13	39
Ávila	2	74	0.03	76
Barbastro-Monzón	35	89	0.28	124
Burgos	6	177	0.03	183
Calahorra y La Calzada-Logroño	9	74	0.11	83
Ciudad Real	10	86	0.10	96
Ciudad Rodrigo	2	31	0.06	33
Coria-Cáceres	9	84	0.10	93
Cuenca	5	104	0.05	109
Huesca	12	40	0.23	52
Jaca	5	23	0.18	28
Osma-Soria	0	78	0	78
Palencia	1	92	0.01	93
Plasencia	34	71	0.32	105
Salamanca	3	73	0.04	76
Segovia	10	68	0.13	78
Sigüenza-Guadalajara	7	135	0.05	142
Tarazona	32	50	0.39	82
Teruel y Albarracín	32	65	0.33	97
Toledo	20	257	0.07	277
Valencia	16	264	0.06	280
Valladolid	4	109	0.04	113
Zamora	1	45	0.02	46
Zaragoza	86	118	0.42	204
Total	346	2241	0.13	2587

Note: The table displays in Column 1 the list of dioceses covered in the analysis. Column 2 displays the distribution of foreign-born priests per diocese. Column 3 shows the distribution of Spanish-born priest per diocese. Column 4 presents the share of priest in a given diocese that are foreign-born. Column 5 reports the total number of priests per diocese.

Table A3: Sample Comparison: Birth Data vs. No Birth Data

	Birth Data		No Birth Data		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	p-value
Foreign	0.084	0.278	0.156	0.363	(0.000)
Order Member	0.047	0.212	0.124	0.330	(0.000)
Spanish Educated	0.948	0.222	0.861	0.346	(0.000)
In Solidum	0.256	0.387	0.199	0.362	(0.000)
Observations	808		1779		2587

Note: This table compares how the sample of priest for which birth data was found (Col. 1 and 2) compares with those for which no birth data was found (Col.3 and 4). The p-value of the difference between both groups is presented in Column 5. Foreign is a dummy variable identifying if the priest was not born in Spain. Order Member is a variable identifying whether a priest is part of a religious order or not. Spanish Educated is a dummy variable identifying whether a given priest studied in a Spanish seminary. In Solidum identifies the share of positions held by a given priest that are shared with other priests (in solidum).

Table A4: Distribution of Priests by Country of Birth and Diocese - Survey Sample

Diocese	All Priests	Potential	Surveyed	Foreign	Local
Albacete	39	0	0	0	0
Ávila	76	47	10	0	10
Barbastro-Monzón	124	48	22	7	15
Burgos	183	38	5	0	5
Calahorra y La Calzada - Logroño	83	48	11	0	11
Ciudad Real	96	85	12	0	12
Ciudad Rodrigo	33	0	0	0	0
Coria-Cáceres	93	56	6	0	6
Cuenca	109	106	21	0	21
Huesca	52	28	11	2	9
Jaca	28	16	5	1	4
Osma-Soria	78	73	18	0	18
Palencia	93	0	0	0	0
Plasencia	105	48	3	0	3
Salamanca	76	57	18	0	18
Segovia	78	73	10	0	10
Sigüenza-Guadalajara	142	141	14	2	12
Tarazona	82	56	9	1	8
Teruel y Albarracín	97	41	14	4	10
Toledo	277	138	20	0	20
Valencia	280	0	0	0	0
Valladolid	113	51	14	0	14
Zamora	46	45	8	0	8
Zaragoza	204	93	26	10	16
Total	2587	1288	257	27	230

Note: The table displays in Column 1 the distribution of all priests per diocese. In Column 2, it shows the distribution of all priests per diocese for which the personal contact information was available. In Column 3, it shows the distribution per diocese of those priests that have been surveyed. In Column 4, it shows the distribution per diocese of foreign-born priests, and in Column 5, it shows the distribution of Spanish-born priests.

Table A5: Sample Comparison: Survey vs. No Survey

	Survey Data		**No Survey Data**		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	p-value
Foreign	0.105	0.307	0.137	0.344	(0.120)
Order Member	0.047	0.211	0.106	0.308	(0.000)
Spanish Educated	0.949	0.220	0.884	0.320	(0.000)
In Solidum	0.305	0.402	0.207	0.366	(0.000)
Observations	257		2330		2587
Age	58.545	13.988	65.864	14.746	(0.000)
Tenure	31.358	15.269	38.802	16.232	(0.000)
Observations	257		550		807

Note: This table compares how the sample of priest for which survey data was collected (Col. 1 and 2) compares with those for which no survey data was collected (Col.3 and 4). The p-value of the difference between both groups is presented in Column 5. Foreign is a dummy variable identifying if the priest was not born in Spain. Order Member is a variable identifying whether a priest is part of a religious order or not. Spanish Educated is a dummy variable identifying whether a given priest studied in a Spanish seminary. In Solidum identifies the share of positions held by a given priest that are shared with other priests (in solidum). All other variables are self-explanatory.

Table A6: Left-Right Political Spectrum

Panel A: Left-wing Parties

AR, CEUS, CHA, EQUO, En Marea, ERC, ERPV, EUPV-EV, FRONT, IU, Los Verdes, Mas Pais, Més Compromís, PCPE, Podemos, PH, POSI, Primavera Europea, PR+, PSOE, PUM+J, Recortes Cero

Panel B: Right-wing Parties

ADÑ, AES, AN, AUN, CDES, Cs, CVA, DN, España 2000, FA, FE, FEdelasJONS, FN, La Falange, MAS, MSR, PADE, PDN, PAR, PFyV, PLD, PP, PPSO, PRGU, UDCA, VOX

Note: The initials for the left-wing parties relate to the following parties. AR: Acción Republicana; CEUS: Coalición por una Europa Solidaria; CHA: Chunta Aragonesista; ERC: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; ERPV: Esquerra Republicana del País Valencià; EUPV-EV: Esquerra Unida del País Valencià; FRONT: Front per País Valencià; IU: Izquierda Unida¡; PCPE: Partido Comunida del Pueblo Español; PH: Partido Humanista; POSI: Partido Obrero Socialista Internacionalista; PR+: Partido Riojano; PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español; PUM+J: Por Un Mundo Más Justo. The initials for the right-wing parties relate to the following parties. ADÑ: ADÑ Identidad Española; AES: Alternativa Española; AN: Alianza Nacional; AUN: Alianza por la Unidad Nacional; CDES: Centro Democrático Español; Cs: Ciudadanos; CVA: Coalición Valenciana; DN: Democracia Nacional; FA: Falange Auténtica; FE: Frente Español; FEdelasJONS: Falange Española de las JONS; FN: Fuerza Nueva; MAS: Movimiento Social Aragonés; MSR: Moviment Social Republicà; PADE: Partido Demócrata Español; PDN: Partido Demócrata Nacional de España; PFyV: Familia y Vida; PLD: Partido Liberal de Derechas; PP: Partido Popular; PPSO: Plataforma del Pueblo Soriano; PRGU: Partido Regionalista de Guadalajara; UDCA: Unidad Castellana

Table A7: Conservative - Radical Right Political Spectrum

Panel A: Conservative Parties

CDES, Cs, PADE, PAR, PDN, PFyV, PLD, PP, PPSO, PRGU, UDCA

Panel B: Radical Right Parties

ADÑ, AES, AN, AUN, CVA, DN, España 2000, FA, FE, FEdelasJONS, FN, La Falange, MAS, MSR, VOX

Note: The initials for the conservative parties relate to the following parties. CDES: Centro Democrático Español; Cs: Ciudadanos; PADE: Partido Demócrata Español; PDN: Partido Demócrata Nacional de España; PFyV: Familia y Vida; PLD: Partido Liberal de Derechas; PP: Partido Popular; PPSO: Plataforma del Pueblo Soriano; PRGU: Partido Regionalista de Guadalajara; UDCA: Unidad Castellana. The initials for the far-right parties refer to the following parties. ADÑ: ADÑ Identidad Española; AES: Alternativa Española; AN: Alianza Nacional; AUN: Alianza por la Unidad Nacional; CVA: Coalición Valenciana; DN: Democracia Nacional; FA: Falange Auténtica; FE: Frente Español; FEdelasJONS: Falange Española de las JONS; FN: Fuerza Nueva; MAS: Movimiento Social Aragonés; MSR: Moviment Social Republicà

Table A8: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Marriage, Fertility and Divorcees
Fictitious shock

	(1) Cath. W.	(2) Civil W.	(3) Total W.	(4) Other W.	(5) Births	(6) Divorcees
Pre-treatment						
Years from treatment: -5	-0.3355**	0.104	-0.238	-0.00630	0.7099***	0.514
	(0.1614)	(0.0817)	(0.1574)	(0.0040)	(0.2851)	(0.3253)
Years from treatment: -4	-0.139	0.0197	-0.114	0.00440	0.3722*	0.372
	(0.1350)	(0.0705)	(0.1385)	(0.0060)	(0.1921)	(0.2509)
Years from treatment: -3	-0.2520**	-0.0215	-0.2750**	-0.00140	0.3312*	0.227
	(0.1220)	(0.0713)	(0.1222)	(0.0029)	(0.1894)	(0.2043)
Years from treatment: -2	-0.0962	-0.0615	-0.154	0.00380	0.2917*	0.102
	(0.1008)	(0.0718)	(0.1259)	(0.0052)	(0.1636)	(0.1349)
Post-treatment						
Years from treatment: 0	-0.0241	-0.0835	-0.111	-0.00350	0.229	-0.00490
	(0.1046)	(0.0753)	(0.1254)	(0.0046)	(0.1774)	(0.1541)
Years from treatment: 1	0.0496	-0.115	-0.0667	-0.000900	0.121	-0.226
	(0.1152)	(0.0710)	(0.1277)	(0.0046)	(0.2366)	(0.2190)
Years from treatment: 2	0.0957	0.0507	0.146	-0.000100	-0.00540	-0.4862*
	(0.1334)	(0.1014)	(0.1744)	(0.0066)	(0.2022)	(0.2820)
Years from treatment: 3	0.0929	-0.0436	0.0465	-0.00270	-0.234	-0.6158*
	(0.1476)	(0.1160)	(0.1849)	(0.0059)	(0.2093)	(0.3546)
Years from treatment: 4	0.173	-0.0604	0.113	0.000200	-0.256	-0.700
	(0.1424)	(0.0957)	(0.1509)	(0.0085)	(0.2356)	(0.4677)
Years from treatment: 5	0.148	-0.0307	0.116	-0.00120	-0.4850*	-1.0355*
	(0.1773)	(0.1235)	(0.1728)	(0.0059)	(0.2552)	(0.5640)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.173	0.506	0.239	0.331	0.111	0.625
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.0612	0.857	0.0737	0.964	0.00710	0.137
Mean Dep. Var.	1.426	0.867	2.299	0.00570	4.917	1.960
Observations	6145	6145	6145	6145	6122	4785

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its religious behaviors. Column 1 uses as outcome the number of Catholic weddings carried out in a given municipality. Column 2 looks at the number of Civil-only weddings. Column 3 looks at the number of weddings following a non-Catholic denomination. Column 4 explores the total number of weddings performed. Column 5 focuses on the total number of birth in a given municipality. Column 5 looks on the total number of divorcees. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A9: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Political Outcomes
Fictitious shock

	(1) Right	(2) Left	(3) Conservative	(4) Rad. Right	(5) Abstention
Pre-treatment					
Elections from treatment: -5	0.00770	-0.00620	0.00820	-0.000300	-0.00440
	(0.0081)	(0.0077)	(0.0080)	(0.0013)	(0.0066)
Elections from treatment: -4	0.00130	0.00330	0.00220	-0.000700	-0.00380
	(0.0088)	(0.0082)	(0.0088)	(0.0014)	(0.0062)
Elections from treatment: -3	0.00850	-0.00490	0.00820	-0.000100	-0.000700
	(0.0060)	(0.0052)	(0.0059)	(0.0013)	(0.0048)
Elections from treatment: -2	0.00430	0.000700	0.00490	-0.000100	-0.00630
	(0.0051)	(0.0044)	(0.0051)	(0.0014)	(0.0052)
Post-treatment					
Elections from treatment: 0	0.00200	0.00120	0.00440	0.000100	-0.00190
	(0.0052)	(0.0044)	(0.0049)	(0.0014)	(0.0054)
Elections from treatment: 1	0.00430	-0.00140	0.00730	-0.000500	0.00260
	(0.0059)	(0.0060)	(0.0057)	(0.0015)	(0.0052)
Elections from treatment: 2	0.00740	-0.00350	0.00680	-0.000500	0.00550
	(0.0077)	(0.0074)	(0.0077)	(0.0015)	(0.0068)
Elections from treatment: 3	0.00880	-0.00380	0.00820	-0.00120	-0.00200
	(0.0098)	(0.0098)	(0.0100)	(0.0018)	(0.0076)
Elections from treatment: 4	0.0140	-0.00990	0.00770	-0.00240	-0.0103
	(0.0115)	(0.0141)	(0.0133)	(0.0018)	(0.0113)
Elections from treatment: 5	0.0137	-0.0131	0.0126	-0.00170	-0.00680
	(0.0115)	(0.0149)	(0.0120)	(0.0016)	(0.0092)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.581	0.555	0.603	0.900	0.719
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.317	0.721	0.275	0.815	0.372
Mean Dep. Var.	0.536	0.441	0.533	0.00340	0.304
Observations	4218	4221	4215	4213	4213

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Column 1 uses as outcome the share of votes to left-leaning parties and Column 2 the share of votes to right-leaning parties. Column 3 looks at the share of votes to conservative parties, and Column 4 focuses on the share of votes to radical right parties. Column 5 reports the abstention rates. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A10: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Religious Attitudes using Different Spatial Clusterings

	(1) Cath. W. Baseline	(2) Cath. W. 30km	(3) Cath. W. 50km	(4) Civil W. Baseline	(5) Civil W. 30km	(6) Civil W. 50km	(7) Fertility Baseline	(8) Fertility 30km	(9) Fertility 50km	(10) Divorcees Baseline	(11) Divorcees 30km	(12) Divorcees 50km
Pre-treatment												
Years from treatment: -5	-0.0634	-0.0634	-0.0634	-0.0278	-0.0278	-0.0278	-0.000200	-0.000200	-0.000200	-0.0399	-0.0399	-0.0399
	(0.0754)	(0.0741)	(0.0785)	(0.0650)	(0.0617)	(0.0623)	(0.1977)	(0.1887)	(0.1853)	(0.1573)	(0.1687)	(0.1765)
Years from treatment: -4	0.0162	0.0162	0.0162	0.0115	0.0115	0.0115	-0.181	-0.181	-0.181	0.0333	0.0333	0.0333
	(0.0631)	(0.0658)	(0.0666)	(0.0641)	(0.0573)	(0.0592)	(0.1491)	(0.1435)	(0.1427)	(0.1155)	(0.1281)	(0.1279)
Years from treatment: -3	0.0114	0.0114	0.0114	-0.00240	-0.00240	-0.00240	-0.0698	-0.0698	-0.0698	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283
	(0.0476)	(0.0643)	(0.0666)	(0.0549)	(0.0555)	(0.0575)	(0.1394)	(0.1450)	(0.1574)	(0.1040)	(0.1186)	(0.1266)
Years from treatment: -2	0.0406	0.0406	0.0406	-0.00860	-0.00860	-0.00860	0.153	0.153	0.153	-0.00440	-0.00440	-0.00440
	(0.0555)	(0.0577)	(0.0590)	(0.0610)	(0.0571)	(0.0564)	(0.1376)	(0.1403)	(0.1473)	(0.0737)	(0.1037)	(0.0970)
Post-treatment												
Years from treatment: 0	0.0412	0.0412	0.0412	-0.00680	-0.00680	-0.00680	0.0860	0.0860	0.0860	0.108	0.108	0.108
	(0.0494)	(0.0586)	(0.0621)	(0.0593)	(0.0571)	(0.0555)	(0.1500)	(0.1572)	(0.1412)	(0.0869)	(0.1040)	(0.1068)
Years from treatment: 1	0.1076*	0.1076*	0.108	-0.0548	-0.0548	-0.0548	0.3294***	0.3294**	0.3294**	-0.0507	-0.0507	-0.0507
	(0.0560)	(0.0653)	(0.0692)	(0.0579)	(0.0597)	(0.0582)	(0.1401)	(0.1488)	(0.1516)	(0.1019)	(0.1225)	(0.1164)
Years from treatment: 2	0.1833***	0.1833***	0.1833***	-0.1084**	-0.1084**	-0.1084**	0.4819***	0.4819***	0.4819***	-0.2496**	-0.2496*	-0.2496*
	(0.0553)	(0.0637)	(0.0659)	(0.0485)	(0.0546)	(0.0540)	(0.1395)	(0.1456)	(0.1553)	(0.1164)	(0.1326)	(0.1368)
Years from treatment: 3	0.2025***	0.2025***	0.2025***	-0.0425	-0.0425	-0.0425	0.3513***	0.3513***	0.3513***	-0.2632**	-0.2632**	-0.2632**
	(0.0597)	(0.0645)	(0.0670)	(0.0617)	(0.0568)	(0.0538)	(0.1468)	(0.1467)	(0.1491)	(0.1340)	(0.1324)	(0.1247)
Years from treatment: 4	0.2452***	0.2452***	0.2452***	-0.1049*	-0.1049*	-0.1049*	0.6568***	0.6568***	0.6568***	-0.3352***	-0.3352**	-0.3352**
	(0.0892)	(0.0851)	(0.0896)	(0.0581)	(0.0615)	(0.0610)	(0.1727)	(0.1712)	(0.1679)	(0.1430)	(0.1516)	(0.1493)
Years from treatment: 5	0.3555***	0.3555***	0.3555***	-0.1700***	-0.1700***	-0.1700***	0.6553***	0.6553***	0.6553***	-0.3219*	-0.322	-0.322
	(0.1111)	(0.1031)	(0.1111)	(0.0694)	(0.0649)	(0.0641)	(0.1981)	(0.1862)	(0.1950)	(0.1929)	(0.2000)	(0.1996)
Mean Dep. Var.	1.612	1.612	1.612	1.328	1.328	1.328	6.640	6.640	6.640	3.453	3.453	3.453
Observations	71079	71079	71079	71079	71079	71079	71039	71039	71039	57473	57473	57473

Note: This table examines the impact of the arrival of a foreign priest on a municipality's religious behavior, employing different levels of clustering: municipality (baseline), 30km spatial correlation, and 50km spatial correlation. Columns 1-3 present results for the number of Catholic weddings, Columns 4-6 focus on the number of civil-only weddings performed, and Columns 7-9 reports effects on fertility. Lastly, Columns 10-12 looks divorce. For further details on the data, refer to Section 3. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, as well as at the 30km and 50km spatial correlation levels, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A11: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Political Attitudes using Different Spatial Clusterings

	(1) Sh. Cons Baseline	(2) Sh. Cons 30km	(3) Sh. Cons 50km	(4) Sh. Left Baseline	(5) Sh. Left 30km	(6) Sh. Left 50km	(7) Sh. Rad Right Baseline	(8) Sh. Rad Right 30km	(9) Sh. Rad Right 50km	(10) Abstention Baseline	(11) Abstention 30km	(12) Abstention 50km
Pre-treatment												
Years from treatment: -5	0.00270	0.00270	0.00270	-0.00650	-0.00650	-0.00650	0.0017***	0.00170	0.00170	-0.00440	-0.00440	-0.00440
	(0.0044)	(0.0059)	(0.0065)	(0.0041)	(0.0057)	(0.0062)	(0.0006)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0035)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)
Years from treatment: -4	0.00140	0.00140	0.00140	-0.0060*	-0.00600	-0.00600	0.0018***	0.00180	0.00180	-0.0077**	-0.0077*	-0.0077*
	(0.0038)	(0.0055)	(0.0057)	(0.0034)	(0.0044)	(0.0049)	(0.0006)	(0.0012)	(0.0011)	(0.0035)	(0.0040)	(0.0044)
Years from treatment: -3	-0.00120	-0.00120	-0.00120	-0.00190	-0.00190	-0.00190	0.0020**	0.00200	0.00200	-0.00340	-0.00340	-0.00340
	(0.0035)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)	(0.0031)	(0.0043)	(0.0048)	(0.001)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0029)	(0.0035)	(0.0040)
Years from treatment: -2	0.00350	0.00350	0.00350	-0.00330	-0.00330	-0.00330	0.0011**	0.00110	0.00110	-0.0060**	-0.0060*	-0.00600
	(0.0029)	(0.0040)	(0.0043)	(0.0026)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)	(0.0005)	(0.0011)	(0.001)	(0.0031)	(0.0035)	(0.0040)
Post-treatment												
Years from treatment: 0	0.0060*	0.00600	0.00600	-0.00330	-0.00330	-0.00330	-0.0024*	-0.0024*	-0.0024*	-0.0071***	-0.0071**	-0.0071*
	(0.0034)	(0.0044)	(0.0046)	(0.0029)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0013)	(0.003)	(0.0035)	(0.0037)
Years from treatment: 1	0.0070**	0.00700	0.00700	-0.0059*	-0.00590	-0.00590	-0.000900	-0.000900	-0.000900	-0.0068***	-0.0068*	-0.00680
	(0.0034)	(0.0043)	(0.0044)	(0.0033)	(0.0040)	(0.0044)	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0013)	(0.0029)	(0.0038)	(0.0043)
Years from treatment: 2	0.0125***	0.0125***	0.0125***	-0.0108***	-0.0108***	-0.0108**	-0.0057***	-0.0057***	-0.0057***	-0.0133***	-0.0133***	-0.0133***
	(0.0038)	(0.0051)	(0.0052)	(0.0031)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)	(0.0020)	(0.0020)	(0.0018)	(0.0033)	(0.0035)	(0.0038)
Years from treatment: 3	0.0159***	0.0159***	0.0159***	-0.0140***	-0.0140***	-0.0140***	-0.0059***	-0.0059***	-0.0059***	-0.0194***	-0.0194***	-0.0194***
	(0.0040)	(0.0052)	(0.0057)	(0.0038)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)	(0.0018)	(0.0020)	(0.0022)	(0.0035)	(0.0041)	(0.0046)
Years from treatment: 4	0.0199***	0.0199***	0.0199***	-0.0209***	-0.0209***	-0.0209***	-0.0092***	-0.0092***	-0.0092***	-0.0209***	-0.0209***	-0.0209***
	(0.0041)	(0.0051)	(0.0055)	(0.0043)	(0.0055)	(0.0055)	(0.0024)	(0.0027)	(0.0027)	(0.0037)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)
Years from treatment: 5	0.0153***	0.0153**	0.0153**	-0.0274***	-0.0274***	-0.0274***	-0.0085***	-0.0085**	-0.0085**	-0.0273***	-0.0273***	-0.0273***
	(0.0049)	(0.0066)	(0.0074)	(0.0051)	(0.0093)	(0.0107)	(0.0034)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0049)	(0.0055)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.0294	0.0294	0.0294	0.282	0.282	0.282
Observations	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568

Note: This table examines the impact of the arrival of a foreign priest on a municipality's political behavior, employing different levels of clustering: municipality (baseline), 30km spatial correlation, and 50km spatial correlation. Columns 1-3 present results for the share of votes received by conservative parties, Columns 4-6 focus on the share of votes for left-leaning parties, and Columns 7-9 analyze the share of votes for radical right parties. Lastly, Columns 10-12 report abstention rates. For further details on the data, refer to Section 3. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, as well as at the 30km and 50km spatial correlation levels, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A12: Covariate Test - Number of Priest Appointments

	(1) Population	(2) Youth	(3) Uneducated	(4) Tech. Studies	(5) Divorced	(6) Immigration	(7) Male Part.
Num. Priest Changes	-60.3056	-0.0015	0.0013	-0.0018	-0.0000	0.0003	-0.0023
	(50.0455)	(0.0014)	(0.0019)	(0.0016)	(0.0001)	(0.0007)	(0.0028)
Observations	4014	4014	4014	4014	4014	4014	4014
Mean Dep. Var.	739.9	0.126	0.212	0.717	0.00368	0.0146	0.572

	(8) Female Part.	(9) Unemployment	(10) Temporal Work	(11) Farmers	(12) Right-wing	(13) Grassroot Cath.	(14) Franco Honors
Num. Priest Changes	-0.0001	0.0017	-0.0007	0.0023	0.0004	-0.0032	0.0123
	(0.0025)	(0.0012)	(0.0015)	(0.0039)	(0.0014)	(0.0060)	(0.0620)
Observations	4014	4014	4014	4014	4012	4020	4014
Mean Dep. Var.	0.270	0.105	0.221	0.286	0.403	0.0716	1.561

Note: The table tests whether the total number of priests appointments in the sample of study predicts baseline municipality characteristics. See Section D for further details on the construction of the dependent variables. All regressions include diocese fixed effects. Standard error are clustered at the diocesan level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A13: Effect of Foreign Priests Presence on Donations - Diocesan Level

	(1) Church	(2) Church	(3) Church	(4) Any	(5) Any	(6) Any
Sh. Foreign Priests	214.45	399.21***	605.46**	-3,447.3440	-2,952.01	-3,943.81**
	(171.99)	(148.61)	(289.67)	(2,121.41)	(2,463.66)	(1,849.09)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Diocese FE	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Bishop FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	376	376	376
Dep. Var. Mean	245.3	245.3	245.3	3646	3646	3646

Note: This table analyzes the effect of having a higher share of foreign-born priests on donations at the diocesan level, specifically donations to the church and overall charitable contributions. Columns 1-3 examine the impact on church donations, with a particular focus on contributions made during the Pontifical Mission Societies (TPMS) day, also known as Missio. The data for these columns were obtained from the internal records of the Spanish Episcopal Conference. Columns 4-6 assess the effect of a higher share of foreign-born priests on total charitable donations, using information derived from Spanish Income Tax declarations, which include a randomly selected 10% sample of the Spanish population. The variable Any Donation is measured in thousands. Robust standard errors are used. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A14: Effect of Replacing a Foreign Priest by a Spanish Priest

	(1) Cath.	(2) Civil	(3) Birth	(4) Divorcees	(5) Cons.	(6) Left	(7) Rad. Right	(8) Abstention
Spanish Priest	-0.173**	0.297***	-0.094	0.518	-0.002	0.006	-0.0025	0.0108***
	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.203)	(0.316)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Observations	5173	5173	5173	5106	4333	4333	4333	4333
Mean Dep. Var.	0.723	1.120	4.707	2.923	0.481	0.435	0.0530	0.289

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a Spanish priest to a municipality, previously led by a foreign-born priest, changes a series of municipality characteristics. Column 1 uses as outcome the number of Catholic weddings carried out in a given municipality. Column 2 looks at the number of Civil-only weddings. Column 3 focuses on the total number of birth in a given municipality. Column 4 looks on the total number of divorcees. Column 5 looks at the share of votes to conservative parties, Column 6 uses as outcome the share of votes to left-leaning parties, while Column 7 focuses on the share of votes to radical right parties. Finally, Column 8 reports the abstention rates. See Section 3 for further details. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A15: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Marriage, Fertility and Divorcees

	(1) Cath. W.	(2) Civil W.	(3) Total W.	(4) Other W.	(5) Births	(6) Divorcees
Pre-treatment						
Years from treatment: -5	-0.0634	-0.0278	-0.0935	-0.00240	-0.0002	-0.0399
	(0.0754)	(0.0650)	(0.0925)	(0.0057)	(0.1977)	(0.1573)
Years from treatment: -4	0.0162	0.0115	0.0230	-0.00480	-0.181	0.0333
	(0.0631)	(0.0641)	(0.0891)	(0.0054)	(0.1491)	(0.1155)
Years from treatment: -3	0.0114	-0.00240	0.00770	-0.00110	-0.0698	0.0283
	(0.0476)	(0.0549)	(0.0766)	(0.0043)	(0.1394)	(0.1040)
Years from treatment: -2	0.0406	-0.00860	0.0284	-0.00370	0.153	-0.00440
	(0.0555)	(0.0610)	(0.0821)	(0.0041)	(0.1376)	(0.0737)
Post-treatment						
Years from treatment: 0	0.0412	-0.00680	0.0361	0.00160	0.0860	0.108
	(0.0494)	(0.0593)	(0.0864)	(0.0040)	(0.1500)	(0.0869)
Years from treatment: 1	0.1076*	-0.0548	0.0513	-0.00140	0.3294***	-0.0507
	(0.0560)	(0.0579)	(0.0837)	(0.0040)	(0.1401)	(0.1019)
Years from treatment: 2	0.1833***	-0.1084**	0.0723	-0.00240	0.4819***	-0.2496**
	(0.0553)	(0.0485)	(0.0715)	(0.0038)	(0.1395)	(0.1164)
Years from treatment: 3	0.2025***	-0.0425	0.1577**	-0.00220	0.3513***	-0.2632**
	(0.0597)	(0.0617)	(0.0797)	(0.0038)	(0.1468)	(0.1340)
Years from treatment: 4	0.2452***	-0.1049*	0.142	0.00200	0.6568***	-0.3352***
	(0.0892)	(0.0581)	(0.0997)	(0.0046)	(0.1727)	(0.1430)
Years from treatment: 5	0.3555***	-0.1700***	0.182	-0.00380	0.6553***	-0.3219*
	(0.1111)	(0.0694)	(0.1274)	(0.0034)	(0.1981)	(0.1929)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.458	0.985	0.487	0.806	0.106	0.957
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.980	0.882	0.899	0.485	0.853	0.961
Mean Dep. Var.	1.612	1.328	2.946	0.0066	6.640	3.453
Observations	71079	71079	71079	71079	71039	57473

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its religious behaviors. Column 1 uses as outcome the number of Catholic weddings carried out in a given municipality. Column 2 looks at the number of Civil-only weddings. Column 3 looks at the number of weddings following a non-Catholic denomination. Column 4 explores the total number of weddings performed. Column 5 focuses on the total number of birth in a given municipality. Column 6 looks on the total number of divorcees. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A16: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Political Outcomes

	(1) Right	(2) Left	(3) Conservative	(4) Rad. Right	(5) Abstention
Pre-treatment					
Elections from treatment: -5	0.00460	-0.00650	0.00270	0.0017***	-0.00440
	(0.0044)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)	(0.0006)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -4	0.00310	-0.0060*	0.00140	0.0018***	-0.0077**
	(0.0038)	(0.0034)	(0.0038)	(0.0006)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -3	0.000700	-0.00190	-0.00120	0.0020**	-0.00340
	(0.0035)	(0.0031)	(0.0035)	(0.001)	(0.0029)
Elections from treatment: -2	0.00460	-0.00330	0.00350	0.0011**	-0.0060**
	(0.0029)	(0.0026)	(0.0029)	(0.0005)	(0.0031)
Post-treatment					
Elections from treatment: 0	0.00350	-0.00330	0.0060*	-0.0024*	-0.0071***
	(0.0033)	(0.0029)	(0.0034)	(0.0014)	(0.003)
Elections from treatment: 1	0.0060*	-0.0059*	0.0070**	-0.000900	-0.0068***
	(0.0031)	(0.0033)	(0.0034)	(0.0013)	(0.0029)
Elections from treatment: 2	0.0068*	-0.0108***	0.0125***	-0.0057***	-0.0133***
	(0.0035)	(0.0031)	(0.0038)	(0.0020)	(0.0033)
Elections from treatment: 3	0.0099***	-0.0140***	0.0159***	-0.0059***	-0.0194***
	(0.0038)	(0.0038)	(0.0040)	(0.0018)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: 4	0.0108***	-0.0209***	0.0199***	-0.0092***	-0.0209***
	(0.0044)	(0.0043)	(0.0041)	(0.0024)	(0.0037)
Elections from treatment: 5	0.00680	-0.0274***	0.0153***	-0.0085***	-0.0273***
	(0.0049)	(0.0051)	(0.0049)	(0.0034)	(0.0040)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.441	0.355	0.465	0.033	0.251
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.272	0.112	0.588	0.002	0.037
Mean Dep. Var.	0.569	0.407	0.539	0.0294	0.282
Observations	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Column 1 uses as outcome the share of votes to left-leaning parties and Column 2 the share of votes to right-leaning parties. Column 3 looks at the share of votes to conservative parties, and Column 4 focuses on the share of votes to radical right parties. Column 5 reports the abstention rates. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A17: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Immigration

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) High	(3) Low	(4) Baseline	(5) High	(6) Low
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.1115***	0.0152*	0.3619***	0.7792***	0.0255*
	(0.0217)	(0.0377)	(0.0092)	(0.1133)	(0.2630)	(0.0154)
Observations	74503	37290	37213	74503	37290	37213
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.0533**	-0.0205*	-0.1717***	-0.3228**	-0.0204*
	(0.0157)	(0.0261)	(0.0125)	(0.0702)	(0.1581)	(0.0124)
Observations	74503	37290	37213	74503	37290	37213
Births	0.0348***	0.0566***	0.00380	0.6613***	1.4436***	0.0174
	(0.0104)	(0.0179)	(0.0068)	(0.1999)	(0.4580)	(0.0313)
Observations	74503	37290	37213	74503	37290	37213
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0847***	0.0242	-0.3264*	-1.1998***	0.125
	(0.0179)	(0.0297)	(0.0179)	(0.1957)	(0.4217)	(0.0930)
Observations	58138	29095	29043	58138	29095	29043
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.1064***	0.0952**	0.0157***	0.0148***	0.0157***
	(0.0252)	(0.0313)	(0.0414)	(0.0040)	(0.0044)	(0.0068)
Observations	44764	22400	22364	44764	22400	22364
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.0785***	-0.1083***	-0.0138***	-0.0100***	-0.0171***
	(0.0263)	(0.0313)	(0.0450)	(0.0038)	(0.0040)	(0.0071)
Observations	44764	22400	22364	44764	22400	22364
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.0953***	-0.0952**	-0.0059***	-0.0059***	-0.0057**
	(0.0296)	(0.0368)	(0.0482)	(0.0018)	(0.0023)	(0.0029)
Observations	44764	22400	22364	44764	22400	22364
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1564***	-0.1791***	-0.0193***	-0.0179***	-0.0205***
	(0.0311)	(0.0379)	(0.0513)	(0.0035)	(0.0044)	(0.0059)
Observations	44764	22400	22364	44764	22400	22364

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, and those with a below median number of foreign-born individuals. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A18: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Immigration
Latin American vs. Maghrebi

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Latam	(3) Maghrebi	(4) Baseline	(5) Latam	(6) Maghrebi
Cath. Weddings	0.1115***	0.1536***	0.1039*	0.7792***	1.2137***	0.9674*
	(0.0377)	(0.0524)	(0.0621)	(0.2630)	(0.4144)	(0.5781)
Observations	37290	28379	17514	37290	28379	17514
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0533**	-0.0922***	-0.1463***	-0.3228**	-0.6277***	-1.1829***
	(0.0261)	(0.0346)	(0.0526)	(0.1581)	(0.2361)	(0.4257)
Observations	37290	28379	17514	37290	28379	17514
Births	0.0566***	0.0733***	0.0679*	1.4436***	2.0871***	2.2815*
	(0.0179)	(0.0250)	(0.0390)	(0.4580)	(0.7124)	(1.3135)
Observations	37290	28379	17514	37290	28379	17514
Divorcees	-0.0847***	-0.0962***	-0.1149*	-1.1998***	-1.5836***	-2.3055*
	(0.0297)	(0.0414)	(0.0672)	(0.4217)	(0.6819)	(1.3489)
Observations	29095	22420	13869	29095	22420	13869
Sh. Cons.	0.1064***	0.1440***	0.1067***	0.0148***	0.0183***	0.0130***
	(0.0313)	(0.0342)	(0.0450)	(0.0044)	(0.0044)	(0.0055)
Observations	22400	17166	10660	22400	17166	10660
Sh. Left	-0.0785***	-0.1068***	-0.1119***	-0.0100***	-0.0124***	-0.0124***
	(0.0313)	(0.0342)	(0.0472)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0052)
Observations	22400	17166	10660	22400	17166	10660
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0953***	-0.1316***	-0.0829*	-0.0059***	-0.0081***	-0.0052*
	(0.0368)	(0.0392)	(0.0441)	(0.0023)	(0.0024)	(0.0027)
Observations	22400	17166	10660	22400	17166	10660
Abstention Rate	-0.1564***	-0.1169***	-0.1413***	-0.0179***	-0.0136***	-0.0168***
	(0.0379)	(0.0401)	(0.0535)	(0.0044)	(0.0046)	(0.0063)
Observations	22400	17166	10660	22400	17166	10660

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, baseline, with an above median number of Latin American individuals (Latam), and those with an above median number of Maghrebi individuals (Maghrebi). Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A19: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Conservatism

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Conservative	(3) Liberal	(4) Baseline	(5) Conservative	(6) Liberal
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.0179*	0.1335***	0.3619***	0.0452*	0.9056***
	(0.0217)	(0.0098)	(0.0384)	(0.1133)	(0.0247)	(0.2606)
Observations	74503	37285	37136	74503	37285	37136
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.00490	-0.0816***	-0.1717***	-0.0114	-0.4715***
	(0.0157)	(0.0142)	(0.0259)	(0.0702)	(0.0326)	(0.1492)
Observations	74503	37285	37136	74503	37285	37136
Births	0.0348***	0.0203***	0.0562***	0.6613***	0.1888***	1.3811***
	(0.0104)	(0.0066)	(0.0183)	(0.1999)	(0.0617)	(0.4481)
Observations	74503	37285	37136	74503	37285	37136
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0253*	-0.0612**	-0.3264*	-0.1327*	-0.8718**
	(0.0179)	(0.0138)	(0.0296)	(0.1957)	(0.0727)	(0.4225)
Observations	58138	29003	29059	58138	29003	29059
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.0390	0.1386***	0.0157***	0.00570	0.0164***
	(0.0252)	(0.0447)	(0.0276)	(0.0040)	(0.0065)	(0.0033)
Observations	44764	22352	22355	44764	22352	22355
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.0172	-0.1467***	-0.0138***	-0.00220	-0.0163***
	(0.0263)	(0.0439)	(0.0313)	(0.0038)	(0.0057)	(0.0035)
Observations	44764	22352	22355	44764	22352	22355
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.1667***	-0.00570	-0.0059***	-0.0109***	-0.000300
	(0.0296)	(0.0467)	(0.0377)	(0.0018)	(0.0031)	(0.0020)
Observations	44764	22352	22355	44764	22352	22355
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1184**	-0.2097***	-0.0193***	-0.0135**	-0.0241***
	(0.0311)	(0.0533)	(0.0364)	(0.0035)	(0.0060)	(0.0041)
Observations	44764	22352	22355	44764	22352	22355

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with a historically conservative voting behavior (i.e., above median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999), and those with a historically liberal voting behavior (i.e., below median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999). Municipalities are classified using data on all national and European elections that took place between 1975 and 1999, available at the Spanish Interior Ministry. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A20: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Unemployment

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) High	(3) Low	(4) Baseline	(5) High	(6) Low
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.1111***	0.0370*	0.3619***	0.6226***	0.1776*
	(0.0217)	(0.0399)	(0.0208)	(0.1133)	(0.2243)	(0.0996)
Observations	74503	37202	37301	74503	37202	37301
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.0469*	-0.0295	-0.1717***	-0.2358*	-0.112
	(0.0157)	(0.0261)	(0.0192)	(0.0702)	(0.1310)	(0.0728)
Observations	74503	37202	37301	74503	37202	37301
Births	0.0348***	0.0627***	0.0136	0.6613***	1.2941***	0.234
	(0.0104)	(0.0153)	(0.0142)	(0.1999)	(0.3167)	(0.2462)
Observations	74503	37202	37301	74503	37202	37301
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0307	-0.0197	-0.3264*	-0.410	-0.150
	(0.0179)	(0.0337)	(0.0215)	(0.1957)	(0.4499)	(0.1624)
Observations	58138	29073	29065	58138	29073	29065
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.1196***	0.0854***	0.0157***	0.0179***	0.0137***
	(0.0252)	(0.0340)	(0.0364)	(0.0040)	(0.0051)	(0.0059)
Observations	44764	22340	22424	44764	22340	22424
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.0838***	-0.1031***	-0.0138***	-0.0119***	-0.0154***
	(0.0263)	(0.0359)	(0.0375)	(0.0038)	(0.0051)	(0.0055)
Observations	44764	22340	22424	44764	22340	22424
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.1076***	-0.0863**	-0.0059***	-0.0065***	-0.0054**
	(0.0296)	(0.0423)	(0.0416)	(0.0018)	(0.0026)	(0.0026)
Observations	44764	22340	22424	44764	22340	22424
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.125***	-0.2027***	-0.0193***	-0.0143***	-0.0230***
	(0.0311)	(0.0419)	(0.0449)	(0.0035)	(0.0048)	(0.0051)
Observations	44764	22340	22424	44764	22340	22424

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between municipalities with an above median unemployment rate, and those with a below median unemployment rate. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A21: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Study

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Spanish E.	(3) No Spanish E.	(4) Baseline	(5) Spanish E.	(6) No Spanish E.
Cath. Weddings	0.0769***	0.0744**	0.0710***	0.4018***	0.4061**	0.3856***
	(0.0227)	(0.0364)	(0.0197)	(0.1185)	(0.1994)	(0.1071)
Observations	74503	63838	64971	74503	63838	64971
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0406***	-0.0115	-0.0476***	-0.1808***	-0.0540	-0.2199***
	(0.0164)	(0.0241)	(0.0164)	(0.0731)	(0.1123)	(0.0762)
Observations	74503	63838	64971	74503	63838	64971
Births	0.0430***	0.0419***	0.0419***	0.8158***	0.8361***	0.8253***
	(0.0109)	(0.0176)	(0.0116)	(0.2091)	(0.3517)	(0.2308)
Observations	74503	63838	64971	74503	63838	64971
Divorcees	-0.0255	-0.0443*	-0.0201	-0.278	-0.4756*	-0.213
	(0.0186)	(0.0239)	(0.0201)	(0.2026)	(0.2565)	(0.2132)
Observations	58138	49345	50506	58138	49345	50506
Sh. Cons.	0.1244***	0.1057***	0.1289***	0.0195***	0.0164***	0.0200***
	(0.0263)	(0.0348)	(0.0285)	(0.0041)	(0.0054)	(0.0044)
Observations	44764	37946	38704	44764	37946	38704
Sh. Left	-0.1111***	-0.1000***	-0.1317***	-0.0164***	-0.0146***	-0.0192***
	(0.0274)	(0.0362)	(0.0296)	(0.0040)	(0.0052)	(0.0043)
Observations	44764	37946	38704	44764	37946	38704
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1160***	-0.1431***	-0.1023***	-0.0071***	-0.0088***	-0.0063***
	(0.0307)	(0.0463)	(0.0305)	(0.0019)	(0.0029)	(0.0019)
Observations	44764	37946	38704	44764	37946	38704
Abstention Rate	-0.1424***	-0.1724***	-0.1292***	-0.0164***	-0.0197***	-0.0148***
	(0.0324)	(0.0439)	(0.0344)	(0.0037)	(0.0051)	(0.0040)
Observations	44764	37946	38704	44764	37946	38704

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who studies in a Spanish seminary, and those who did not. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A22: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Origin

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Latam	(3) Non Latam	(4) Baseline	(5) Latam	(6) Non Latam
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.0529***	0.0762***	0.3619***	0.2773***	0.4018***
	(0.0217)	(0.0206)	(0.0307)	(0.1133)	(0.1080)	(0.1622)
Observations	74503	73601	72367	74503	73601	72367
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.0283	-0.0408**	-0.1717***	-0.127	-0.1824**
	(0.0157)	(0.0176)	(0.0200)	(0.0702)	(0.0790)	(0.0898)
Observations	74503	73601	72367	74503	73601	72367
Births	0.0348***	0.0329***	0.0335**	0.6613***	0.6270***	0.6413**
	(0.0104)	(0.0116)	(0.0154)	(0.1999)	(0.2239)	(0.2960)
Observations	74503	73601	72367	74503	73601	72367
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0174	-0.0529***	-0.3264*	-0.191	-0.5778***
	(0.0179)	(0.0215)	(0.0200)	(0.1957)	(0.2354)	(0.2194)
Observations	58138	57192	56046	58138	57192	56046
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.0852***	0.1186***	0.0157***	0.0132***	0.0185***
	(0.0252)	(0.0285)	(0.0317)	(0.0040)	(0.0044)	(0.0049)
Observations	44764	43928	43024	44764	43928	43024
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.0881***	-0.1272***	-0.0138***	-0.0130***	-0.0186***
	(0.0263)	(0.0302)	(0.0328)	(0.0038)	(0.0044)	(0.0048)
Observations	44764	43928	43024	44764	43928	43024
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.0948***	-0.1005***	-0.0059***	-0.0057***	-0.0060***
	(0.0296)	(0.0342)	(0.0361)	(0.0018)	(0.0020)	(0.0022)
Observations	44764	43928	43024	44764	43928	43024
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1367***	-0.2246***	-0.0193***	-0.0156***	-0.0258***
	(0.0311)	(0.0348)	(0.0397)	(0.0035)	(0.0040)	(0.0046)
Observations	44764	43928	43024	44764	43928	43024

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates foreign priests by those who were born in Latin America, and those were born anywhere else in the world. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A23: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Home Location

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Neighbor + Preaching	(3) Preaching	(4) Baseline	(5) Neighbor + Preaching	(6) Preaching
Cath. Weddings	0.0627***	0.1521***	0.00890	0.3021***	1.0582***	0.0127
	(0.0249)	(0.0644)	(0.0086)	(0.1200)	(0.4485)	(0.0122)
Observations	40511	17029	23482	40511	17029	23482
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0342**	-0.0785**	0.000300	-0.1759**	-0.5649**	0.000600
	(0.0170)	(0.0392)	(0.0116)	(0.0877)	(0.2833)	(0.0273)
Observations	40511	17029	23482	40511	17029	23482
Births	0.0408***	0.0993***	0.0138***	0.8404***	2.8915***	0.0966***
	(0.0115)	(0.0285)	(0.0052)	(0.2371)	(0.8317)	(0.0372)
Observations	40511	17029	23482	40511	17029	23482
Divorcees	-0.0255	-0.0834*	0.0127	-0.308	-1.4000*	0.0746
	(0.0196)	(0.0443)	(0.0126)	(0.2365)	(0.7440)	(0.0741)
Observations	36862	15357	21505	36862	15357	21505
Sh. Cons.	0.0983***	0.1181***	0.0930***	0.0156***	0.0161***	0.0161***
	(0.0270)	(0.0303)	(0.0397)	(0.0043)	(0.0041)	(0.0068)
Observations	25601	10533	15068	25601	10533	15068
Sh. Left	-0.1133***	-0.0904***	-0.1371***	-0.0168***	-0.0110***	-0.0223***
	(0.0285)	(0.0320)	(0.0425)	(0.0043)	(0.0038)	(0.0068)
Observations	25601	10533	15068	25601	10533	15068
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1240***	-0.1674***	-0.1071**	-0.0086***	-0.0113***	-0.0074**
	(0.0342)	(0.0469)	(0.0496)	(0.0024)	(0.0031)	(0.0035)
Observations	25601	10533	15068	25601	10533	15068
Abstention Rate	-0.1967***	-0.1603***	-0.2205***	-0.0228***	-0.0188***	-0.0251***
	(0.0342)	(0.0427)	(0.0505)	(0.0040)	(0.0049)	(0.0057)
Observations	25601	10533	15068	25601	10533	15068

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests by who reside in the focal municipality, and those who do not. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A24: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Migration

	(1) All Inflow Migrants
Pre-treatment	
Years from treatment: -5	-1.484 (2.0204)
Years from treatment: -4	-1.887 (1.5808)
Years from treatment: -3	-0.369 (1.7251)
Years from treatment: -2	-1.6996** (0.7968)
Post-treatment	
Years from treatment: 0	0.779 (0.6802)
Years from treatment: 1	1.192 (1.1347)
Years from treatment: 2	-2.283 (1.9808)
Years from treatment: 3	1.573 (1.3387)
Years from treatment: 4	1.500 (1.4128)
Years from treatment: 5	2.567 (1.6565)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.071
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.306
Mean Dep. Var.	44.03
Observations	63379

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the arrival of new settlers. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A25: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Foreign-born Priests Density

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) High Density	(3) Low Density	(4) Baseline	(5) High Density	(6) Low Density
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.0263	0.1130***	0.3619***	0.133	0.5925***
	(0.0217)	(0.0282)	(0.0381)	(0.1133)	(0.1424)	(0.2000)
Observations	74503	10633	63870	74503	10633	63870
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.0395	-0.0340	-0.1717***	-0.165	-0.153
	(0.0157)	(0.0242)	(0.0231)	(0.0702)	(0.1017)	(0.1041)
Observations	74503	10633	63870	74503	10633	63870
Births	0.0348***	0.0307*	0.0436***	0.6613***	0.6079*	0.8231***
	(0.0104)	(0.0186)	(0.0147)	(0.1999)	(0.3675)	(0.2770)
Observations	74503	10633	63870	74503	10633	63870
Divorcees	-0.0299*	0.0154	-0.0293	-0.3264*	0.138	-0.327
	(0.0179)	(0.0241)	(0.0255)	(0.1957)	(0.2153)	(0.2863)
Observations	58138	8229	49909	58138	8229	49909
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.0346	0.0129	0.0157***	0.00520	0.00200
	(0.0252)	(0.0384)	(0.0368)	(0.0040)	(0.0059)	(0.0057)
Observations	44764	6831	37933	44764	6831	37933
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	0.0401	-0.0672*	-0.0138***	0.00590	-0.0098*
	(0.0263)	(0.0388)	(0.0397)	(0.0038)	(0.0057)	(0.0057)
Observations	44764	6831	37933	44764	6831	37933
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.1446***	-0.0604	-0.0059***	-0.0087***	-0.00370
	(0.0296)	(0.0491)	(0.0401)	(0.0018)	(0.003)	(0.0024)
Observations	44764	6831	37933	44764	6831	37933
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.0707	-0.1494***	-0.0193***	-0.00820	-0.0170***
	(0.0311)	(0.0445)	(0.0460)	(0.0035)	(0.0052)	(0.0052)
Observations	44764	6831	37933	44764	6831	37933

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those dioceses that belong to the ecclesiastical province of Zaragoza (characterized by a high density of extensive use of foreign-born priests), so-called High Density, and those located elsewhere, so-called Low Density. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A26: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Local Budget Allocations

	(1) Social Budget	(2) Business Budget
Pre-treatment		
Years from treatment: -5	-3196	-30157*
	(18294)	(16074)
Years from treatment: -4	514	-16071
	(14468)	(13598)
Years from treatment: -3	4457	-6842
	(11652)	(10292)
Years from treatment: -2	-11825	1219
	(10337)	(10076)
Post-treatment		
Years from treatment: 0	-8493	9768
	(8200)	(9768)
Years from treatment: 1	-17187**	6368
	(8698)	(9327)
Years from treatment: 2	-2814	-4500
	(16284)	(14005)
Years from treatment: 3	-8491	-16704
	(14039)	(18020)
Years from treatment: 4	-9802	-10149
	(13303)	(18867)
Years from treatment: 5	-11834	-9387
	(14544)	(20229)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.554	0.403
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.823	0.209
Mean Dep. Var.	248924	90831
Observations	43008	43008

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects how local budget is spent, differentiating between social (Column 1) and business-related item (Column 2). Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A27: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Local Economic Conditions

	(1) Unemployment	(2) Contracts
Pre-treatment		
Years from treatment: -5	0.0007	0.0017
	(0.001)	(0.0011)
Years from treatment: -4	0.0013	-0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.0011)
Years from treatment: -3	0.0014*	0.0011
	(0.0008)	(0.0014)
Years from treatment: -2	-0.0004	-0.0006
	(0.0007)	(0.0011)
Post-treatment		
Years from treatment: 0	0.0003	-0.0005
	(0.0007)	(0.0012)
Years from treatment: 1	-0.0007	0.0017
	(0.0009)	(0.0015)
Years from treatment: 2	-0.0005	0.0012
	(0.001)	(0.0017)
Years from treatment: 3	-0.003***	0.0014
	(0.0011)	(0.0019)
Years from treatment: 4	-0.0013	0.0004
	(0.0012)	(0.0016)
Years from treatment: 5	-0.0012	-0.0006
	(0.0013)	(0.0017)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.0778	0.1780
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.285	0.589
Mean Dep. Var.	0.0507	0.0155
Observations	54876	54876

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influence local economic outcomes. Column 1 looks at the unemployment per capita and Column 2 displays the effect on the number of contracts per capita. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A28: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Catholic Movements

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Present	(3) Not Present	(4) Baseline	(5) Present	(6) Not Present
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	-0.163	0.0652***	0.3619***	-2.094	0.2296***
	(0.0217)	(0.2587)	(0.0175)	(0.1133)	(3.3269)	(0.0615)
Observations	74503	5429	69074	74503	5429	69074
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.179	-0.0232*	-0.1717***	-1.902	-0.0751*
	(0.0157)	(0.1733)	(0.0133)	(0.0702)	(1.8372)	(0.0432)
Observations	74503	5429	69074	74503	5429	69074
Births	0.0348***	0.1764*	0.0237***	0.6613***	7.9801*	0.3048***
	(0.0104)	(0.0949)	(0.0098)	(0.1999)	(4.2983)	(0.1277)
Observations	74503	5429	69074	74503	5429	69074
Divorcees	-0.0299*	0.294	-0.0335***	-0.3264*	7.535	-0.2675***
	(0.0179)	(0.2630)	(0.0133)	(0.1957)	(6.7385)	(0.1066)
Observations	58138	4301	53837	58138	4301	53837
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.0784	0.1033***	0.0157***	0.00930	0.0164***
	(0.0252)	(0.1283)	(0.0256)	(0.0040)	(0.0153)	(0.0041)
Observations	44764	3253	41511	44764	3253	41511
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.138	-0.0936***	-0.0138***	-0.0146	-0.0140***
	(0.0263)	(0.1070)	(0.0272)	(0.0038)	(0.0114)	(0.0041)
Observations	44764	3253	41511	44764	3253	41511
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.0215	-0.0995***	-0.0059***	-0.00130	-0.0060***
	(0.0296)	(0.0707)	(0.0309)	(0.0018)	(0.0043)	(0.0019)
Observations	44764	3253	41511	44764	3253	41511
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1571**	-0.1693***	-0.0193***	-0.0187**	-0.0193***
	(0.0311)	(0.0754)	(0.0326)	(0.0035)	(0.0089)	(0.0037)
Observations	44764	3253	41511	44764	3253	41511

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities who had registered as of the year 2000 at least a Catholic organization, so-called Present, and those who did not have any organization registered (Not Present). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A29: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Uneducatedness

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) High	(3) Low	(4) Baseline	(5) High	(6) Low
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.0447***	0.0956***	0.3619***	0.2232***	0.5188***
	(0.0217)	(0.0178)	(0.0357)	(0.1133)	(0.0892)	(0.1944)
Observations	74503	37273	37230	74503	37273	37230
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.0458**	-0.0308	-0.1717***	-0.1594**	-0.162
	(0.0157)	(0.0220)	(0.0225)	(0.0702)	(0.0768)	(0.1177)
Observations	74503	37273	37230	74503	37273	37230
Births	0.0348***	0.0227**	0.0496***	0.6613***	0.3950**	1.0125***
	(0.0104)	(0.0111)	(0.0176)	(0.1999)	(0.1957)	(0.3621)
Observations	74503	37273	37230	74503	37273	37230
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0274	-0.0348	-0.3264*	-0.245	-0.435
	(0.0179)	(0.0238)	(0.0230)	(0.1957)	(0.2127)	(0.2888)
Observations	58138	29088	29050	58138	29088	29050
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.1186***	0.0838***	0.0157***	0.0185***	0.0131***
	(0.0252)	(0.0364)	(0.0355)	(0.0040)	(0.0057)	(0.0055)
Observations	44764	22394	22370	44764	22394	22370
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.1463***	-0.0423	-0.0138***	-0.0216***	-0.00600
	(0.0263)	(0.0373)	(0.0370)	(0.0038)	(0.0055)	(0.0054)
Observations	44764	22394	22370	44764	22394	22370
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.0331	-0.1612***	-0.0059***	-0.00200	-0.0096***
	(0.0296)	(0.0449)	(0.0366)	(0.0018)	(0.0029)	(0.0022)
Observations	44764	22394	22370	44764	22394	22370
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1934***	-0.1421***	-0.0193***	-0.0220***	-0.0163***
	(0.0311)	(0.0454)	(0.0417)	(0.0035)	(0.0052)	(0.0048)
Observations	44764	22394	22370	44764	22394	22370

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between municipalities with an above median number of individuals with no formal education, and those with a below median number of individuals with no formal education. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A30: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Demographic Structure

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Many Youth	(3) Few Youth	(4) Baseline	(5) Many Youth	(6) Few Youth
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.1377***	0.000200	0.3619***	0.9710***	0.000100
	(0.0217)	(0.0425)	(0.0048)	(0.1133)	(0.3007)	(0.0024)
Observations	74503	37275	37228	74503	37275	37228
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.0819***	0.00160	-0.1717***	-0.4959***	0.000900
	(0.0157)	(0.0297)	(0.0088)	(0.0702)	(0.1805)	(0.0049)
Observations	74503	37275	37228	74503	37275	37228
Births	0.0348***	0.0553***	0.0074*	0.6613***	1.4048***	0.0118*
	(0.0104)	(0.0206)	(0.0044)	(0.1999)	(0.5225)	(0.0070)
Observations	74503	37275	37228	74503	37275	37228
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0728**	0.0107	-0.3264*	-1.0700**	0.0258
	(0.0179)	(0.0346)	(0.0081)	(0.1957)	(0.5087)	(0.0196)
Observations	58138	29110	29028	58138	29110	29028
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.1020***	0.0938***	0.0157***	0.0137***	0.0155***
	(0.0252)	(0.0318)	(0.0392)	(0.0040)	(0.0043)	(0.0065)
Observations	44764	22406	22358	44764	22406	22358
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.0778***	-0.1044***	-0.0138***	-0.0098***	-0.0164***
	(0.0263)	(0.0331)	(0.0408)	(0.0038)	(0.0041)	(0.0063)
Observations	44764	22406	22358	44764	22406	22358
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.1032***	-0.0894*	-0.0059***	-0.0063***	-0.0055*
	(0.0296)	(0.0351)	(0.0480)	(0.0018)	(0.0022)	(0.003)
Observations	44764	22406	22358	44764	22406	22358
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1782***	-0.1547***	-0.0193***	-0.0208***	-0.0174***
	(0.0311)	(0.0350)	(0.0511)	(0.0035)	(0.0041)	(0.0057)
Observations	44764	22406	22358	44764	22406	22358

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between municipalities with an above median youth share, and those with a below median youth share. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A31: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Foreign Religious Leader's Tenure

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Senior	(3) Junior	(4) Baseline	(5) Senior	(6) Junior
Cath. Weddings	-0.0234	-0.0161	-0.00920	-0.0737	-0.0384	-0.0342
	(0.0265)	(0.0320)	(0.0291)	(0.0833)	(0.0768)	(0.1081)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0491	0.0850*	0.0137	0.167	0.2596*	0.0505
	(0.0377)	(0.0516)	(0.0412)	(0.1277)	(0.1574)	(0.1524)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Births	0.0182	0.0348	-0.00600	0.261	0.425	-0.0973
	(0.0307)	(0.0439)	(0.0252)	(0.4415)	(0.5360)	(0.4095)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Divorcees	0.0339	0.0322	0.0335	0.343	0.275	0.384
	(0.0399)	(0.0436)	(0.0478)	(0.4041)	(0.3716)	(0.5498)
Observations	17270	8617	8653	17270	8617	8653
Sh. Cons.	0.0697	0.0339	0.1203***	0.0115	0.00570	0.0192**
	(0.0450)	(0.0549)	(0.0516)	(0.0074)	(0.0092)	(0.0082)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Sh. Left	-0.0275	-0.00290	-0.0738	-0.00410	-0.000500	-0.0111
	(0.0441)	(0.0491)	(0.0571)	(0.0068)	(0.0077)	(0.0086)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Sh. Rad Right	-0.2143***	-0.1614***	-0.1826*	-0.0154***	-0.0119***	-0.0129*
	(0.0640)	(0.0675)	(0.0948)	(0.0046)	(0.0049)	(0.0066)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Abstention Rate	-0.1660***	-0.1899***	-0.1103*	-0.0194***	-0.0219***	-0.0131*
	(0.0582)	(0.0692)	(0.0641)	(0.0068)	(0.0080)	(0.0076)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those foreign priests who have a tenure above the median tenure (Senior), and those who have a tenure below the median (Junior), and compare them to the average Spanish priest. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A32: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Foreign Religious Leader's Age

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Old	(3) Young	(4) Baseline	(5) Old	(6) Young
Cath. Weddings	-0.0241	0.00930	-0.0337	-0.0754	0.0298	-0.104
	(0.0265)	(0.0329)	(0.0284)	(0.0832)	(0.1048)	(0.0874)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0496	0.0659	0.0357	0.168	0.240	0.112
	(0.0377)	(0.0518)	(0.0421)	(0.1275)	(0.1888)	(0.1316)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Births	0.0178	0.0401	-0.00660	0.257	0.623	-0.0886
	(0.0307)	(0.0465)	(0.0244)	(0.4411)	(0.7210)	(0.3237)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Divorcees	0.0342	0.00730	0.0570	0.347	0.0820	0.505
	(0.0399)	(0.0450)	(0.0454)	(0.4036)	(0.5069)	(0.4020)
Observations	17298	8516	8782	17298	8516	8782
Sh. Cons.	0.0714	0.0648	0.0800	0.0116	0.0104	0.0132
	(0.0450)	(0.0562)	(0.0516)	(0.0074)	(0.0089)	(0.0086)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Sh. Left	-0.0296	-0.0118	-0.0540	-0.00440	-0.00180	-0.00830
	(0.0441)	(0.0535)	(0.0515)	(0.0068)	(0.0081)	(0.0080)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Sh. Rad Right	-0.2144***	-0.1665***	-0.1691*	-0.0154***	-0.0115***	-0.0126*
	(0.0640)	(0.0667)	(0.0895)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0066)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Abstention Rate	-0.1682***	-0.1093*	-0.1897***	-0.0197***	-0.0129	-0.0219***
	(0.0582)	(0.0666)	(0.0671)	(0.0068)	(0.0078)	(0.0077)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those foreign priests who are above the median age (Old), and those that are below the median age (Young), and compare them to the average Spanish priest. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A33: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Tenure

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Senior	(3) Junior	(4) Baseline	(5) Senior	(6) Junior
Cath. Weddings	-0.0234	-0.0241	-0.0303	-0.0737	-0.0577	-0.113
	(0.0265)	(0.0727)	(0.0272)	(0.0833)	(0.1744)	(0.1008)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0491	0.118	0.0482	0.167	0.360	0.178
	(0.0377)	(0.1403)	(0.0447)	(0.1277)	(0.4282)	(0.1650)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Births	0.0182	0.268	-0.0285	0.261	3.265	-0.464
	(0.0307)	(0.1993)	(0.0220)	(0.4415)	(2.4323)	(0.3580)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Divorcees	0.0339	-0.146	0.1046*	0.343	-1.243	1.2015*
	(0.0399)	(0.0908)	(0.0588)	(0.4041)	(0.7730)	(0.6758)
Observations	17270	8617	8653	17270	8617	8653
Sh. Cons.	0.0697	0.107	0.1159*	0.0115	0.0178	0.0185*
	(0.0450)	(0.0803)	(0.0608)	(0.0074)	(0.0133)	(0.0097)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Sh. Left	-0.0275	-0.0687	-0.0781	-0.00410	-0.0107	-0.0118
	(0.0441)	(0.0777)	(0.0636)	(0.0068)	(0.0120)	(0.0096)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Sh. Rad Right	-0.2143***	-0.2689**	-0.1764*	-0.0154***	-0.0197**	-0.0124*
	(0.0640)	(0.1220)	(0.0947)	(0.0046)	(0.0089)	(0.0066)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Abstention Rate	-0.1660***	-0.149	-0.1792***	-0.0194***	-0.0172	-0.0211***
	(0.0582)	(0.1180)	(0.0755)	(0.0068)	(0.0136)	(0.0088)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who have a tenure above the median tenure (Senior), and those who have a tenure below the median (Junior). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A34: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Age

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Old	(3) Young	(4) Baseline	(5) Old	(6) Young
Cath. Weddings	-0.0241	-0.0125	-0.0130	-0.0754	-0.0399	-0.0399
	(0.0265)	(0.0645)	(0.0295)	(0.0832)	(0.2055)	(0.0908)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0496	0.104	0.0135	0.168	0.378	0.0421
	(0.0377)	(0.0904)	(0.0454)	(0.1275)	(0.3285)	(0.1424)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Births	0.0178	0.165	-0.0265	0.257	2.555	-0.351
	(0.0307)	(0.1150)	(0.0240)	(0.4411)	(1.7811)	(0.3161)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Divorcees	0.0342	-0.0970	0.0665	0.347	-1.090	0.589
	(0.0399)	(0.0688)	(0.0601)	(0.4036)	(0.7742)	(0.5317)
Observations	17298	8516	8782	17298	8516	8782
Sh. Cons.	0.0714	0.0872	0.1234*	0.0116	0.0140	0.0205*
	(0.0450)	(0.0883)	(0.0728)	(0.0074)	(0.0142)	(0.0120)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Sh. Left	-0.0296	-0.0318	-0.1513***	-0.00440	-0.00480	-0.0233***
	(0.0441)	(0.0807)	(0.0625)	(0.0068)	(0.0122)	(0.0097)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Sh. Rad Right	-0.2144***	-0.178	-0.156	-0.0154***	-0.0124	-0.0115
	(0.0640)	(0.1237)	(0.0966)	(0.0046)	(0.0086)	(0.0071)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Abstention Rate	-0.1682***	-0.00660	-0.1861**	-0.0197***	-0.000800	-0.0215**
	(0.0582)	(0.1055)	(0.0908)	(0.0068)	(0.0125)	(0.0104)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who are above the median age (Old), and those that are below the median age (Young). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A35: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Order

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Religious Order	(3) Diocesan	(4) Baseline	(5) Religious Order	(6) Diocesan
Cath. Weddings	0.0627***	0.4675***	0.0329	0.3021***	2.2204***	0.159
	(0.0249)	(0.1576)	(0.0212)	(0.1200)	(0.7481)	(0.1027)
Observations	40511	2776	37735	40511	2776	37735
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0342**	-0.1763***	-0.0212	-0.1759**	-0.6812***	-0.112
	(0.0170)	(0.0559)	(0.0186)	(0.0877)	(0.2159)	(0.0974)
Observations	40511	2776	37735	40511	2776	37735
Births	0.0408***	0.1172***	0.0361***	0.8404***	2.0713***	0.7481***
	(0.0115)	(0.0467)	(0.0120)	(0.2371)	(0.8245)	(0.2511)
Observations	40511	2776	37735	40511	2776	37735
Divorcees	-0.0255	0.00740	-0.0282	-0.308	0.0601	-0.346
	(0.0196)	(0.0680)	(0.0217)	(0.2365)	(0.5534)	(0.2666)
Observations	36862	2487	34375	36862	2487	34375
Sh. Cons.	0.0983***	-0.196	0.1164***	0.0156***	-0.0324	0.0185***
	(0.0270)	(0.1209)	(0.0282)	(0.0043)	(0.0200)	(0.0044)
Observations	25602	1798	23804	25602	1798	23804
Sh. Left	-0.1133***	0.0788	-0.1120***	-0.0168***	0.0124	-0.0166***
	(0.0285)	(0.1402)	(0.0292)	(0.0043)	(0.0220)	(0.0043)
Observations	25602	1798	23804	25602	1798	23804
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1240***	0.0489	-0.1588***	-0.0086***	0.00330	-0.0109***
	(0.0342)	(0.1330)	(0.0357)	(0.0024)	(0.0091)	(0.0024)
Observations	25602	1798	23804	25602	1798	23804
Abstention Rate	-0.1967***	-0.4427***	-0.1911***	-0.0228***	-0.0505***	-0.0221***
	(0.0342)	(0.1492)	(0.0355)	(0.0040)	(0.0171)	(0.0041)
Observations	25602	1798	23804	25602	1798	23804

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who are part of a religious orders, and those who are diocesan. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A36: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Ideology

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Conservative	(3) Progressive	(4) Baseline	(5) Conservative	(6) Progressive
Cath. Weddings	-0.184	-0.1869*	-0.101	-0.642	-0.6833*	-0.339
	(0.1322)	(0.1049)	(0.0767)	(0.4609)	(0.3837)	(0.2578)
Observations	6556	2717	3839	6556	2717	3839
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0480	-0.00200	0.0930	0.176	-0.00820	0.311
	(0.0577)	(0.0824)	(0.1098)	(0.2114)	(0.3352)	(0.3666)
Observations	6556	2717	3839	6556	2717	3839
Births	-0.0724	-0.1737***	0.0103	-1.173	-2.9230***	0.162
	(0.0483)	(0.0449)	(0.0522)	(0.7818)	(0.7551)	(0.8226)
Observations	6556	2717	3839	6556	2717	3839
Divorcees	0.2951*	0.2222***	0.0351	2.9784*	2.7093***	0.288
	(0.1561)	(0.0931)	(0.0630)	(1.5753)	(1.1360)	(0.5181)
Observations	5955	2509	3446	5955	2509	3446
Sh. Cons.	0.2551***	0.422	0.2407*	0.0421***	0.0703	0.0395*
	(0.0824)	(0.2669)	(0.1351)	(0.0136)	(0.0445)	(0.0221)
Observations	4289	1800	2489	4289	1800	2489
Sh. Left	-0.1814*	-0.4909***	-0.196	-0.0282*	-0.0772***	-0.0302
	(0.1054)	(0.1008)	(0.1585)	(0.0164)	(0.0157)	(0.0243)
Observations	4289	1800	2489	4289	1800	2489
Sh. Rad Right	-0.3885***	-0.324	-0.4101*	-0.0297***	-0.0251	-0.0311*
	(0.1235)	(0.2736)	(0.2176)	(0.0094)	(0.0211)	(0.0165)
Observations	4289	1800	2489	4289	1800	2489
Abstention Rate	-0.136	-0.4194***	-0.158	-0.0159	-0.0478***	-0.0186
	(0.0958)	(0.1344)	(0.1569)	(0.0111)	(0.0153)	(0.0185)
Observations	4289	1800	2489	4289	1800	2489

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between religious leaders with Conservative political views, and those with more progressive political views. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A37: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Hierarchy-Leanings

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Hierarchical	(3) Not Hierarchical	(4) Baseline	(5) Hierarchical	(6) Not Hierarchical
Cath. Weddings	-0.0637	0.0183	0.5279***	-0.224	0.0786	0.8133***
	(0.0634)	(0.0654)	(0.1277)	(0.2224)	(0.2815)	(0.1967)
Observations	5955	3618	1959	5955	3618	1959
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0183	-0.0394	0.0129	0.0689	-0.178	0.0276
	(0.0575)	(0.0808)	(0.1005)	(0.2169)	(0.3650)	(0.2155)
Observations	5955	3618	1959	5955	3618	1959
Births	-0.0592	-0.127	0.2973***	-0.970	-2.479	2.9186***
	(0.0502)	(0.0922)	(0.0586)	(0.8241)	(1.7961)	(0.5756)
Observations	5955	3618	1959	5955	3618	1959
Divorcees	0.141	0.0957	-0.0802	1.464	1.181	-0.516
	(0.1064)	(0.1625)	(0.0750)	(1.1055)	(2.0079)	(0.4833)
Observations	5399	3252	1795	5399	3252	1795
Sh. Cons.	0.2495***	0.4684***	-0.0421	0.0410***	0.0750***	-0.00710
	(0.0835)	(0.1671)	(0.2475)	(0.0137)	(0.0267)	(0.0419)
Observations	3889	2329	1319	3889	2329	1319
Sh. Left	-0.142	-0.4537***	-0.0434	-0.0219	-0.0684***	-0.00680
	(0.1014)	(0.1774)	(0.1784)	(0.0156)	(0.0267)	(0.0284)
Observations	3889	2329	1319	3889	2329	1319
Sh. Rad Right	-0.4600***	-0.6963***	0.217	-0.0348***	-0.0537***	0.0164
	(0.1128)	(0.2264)	(0.1903)	(0.0085)	(0.0175)	(0.0143)
Observations	3889	2329	1319	3889	2329	1319
Abstention Rate	-0.1818*	-0.225	-0.134	-0.0210*	-0.0261	-0.0155
	(0.1001)	(0.1877)	(0.2066)	(0.0115)	(0.0218)	(0.0240)
Observations	3889	2329	1319	3889	2329	1319

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between religious leaders that do not challenge the pope's decisions (i.e., Hierarchical), and those with their own opinion (i.e., Not Hierarchical). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

B Alternative Difference-in-Difference Estimators

In this section, I look at the influence that foreign religious leaders have on their communities, using alternative estimation methods. For each main outcome, I provide the results obtained using the approaches proposed by De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2020); Sun and Abraham (2021); Gardner (2021); Cengiz et al. (2019), together with the canonical two-way fixed effect model. All figures report the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B1: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Catholic Weddings - Alt. Estimators



Figure B2: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Civil-only Weddings Alt. Estimators



Figure B3: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Total Weddings
Alt. Estimators



Figure B4: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Other Weddings
Alt. Estimators



Figure B5: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Fertility - Alt. Estimators



Figure B6: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Divorcees - Alt. Estimators



Figure B7: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Left-wing Votes - Alt. Estimators



Figure B8: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Right-wing Votes Alt. Estimators



Figure B9: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Conservative Votes - Alt. Estimators



Figure B10: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Radical Right Votes - Alt. Estimators



Figure B11: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Voting Abstention - Alt. Estimators



C Priests' Survey - List of Questions

In this section, I outline the questions used in the survey administered to those priests for which I could access their contact details. For each question, I detail the statement, together with the options provided to the interviewee. The same questions were used in both phone and email surveys. The questions were asked in Spanish (available upon request), and followed the ordering shown below:

1) In which diocese are you currently living?

2) How old are you?

3) When were you ordained priest?

4) In which seminary did you study to become a priest?

5) Are you a diocesan priest or are you a member of a religious order?

- Diocesan priest
- Member of a religious order (Please specify)

6) In which country were you born?

6.1) (If not born in Spain) How long have you been living in Spain?

6.2) (If not born in Spain) Which one was your main motivation for coming to Spain?

- Work as missionary
- Study
- Express petition by a Spanish bishop
- Other (Please specify)

7) Have you ever worked as priest abroad? (Please specify each project and country).

7.1) (If you worked abroad) How long have you worked as a priest abroad?

8) How do you identify yourself?

- White
- Mestizo

- Indigenous
- Black
- Other (Please specify)

Mark from 0 to 10, how much do you agree with the following statements (0=Nothing, 10=Completely):

9) Nationalizing strategic industries is necessary to protect citizenry

10) Those who become rich, do so always by exploiting the work of the many

11) In Spain, there exist real equality between man and woman

12) We need to look at what unites us instead of dwelling on the past

13) Immigrants receive more social protection than nationals

14) Minorities should adapt their customs and traditions to the Spanish ones

15) The new lifestyles are contributing to today's social rupture

16) Spain would have far less problems if more emphasis would be set in traditional families

For the next two questions, choose one of the following three options:

17) In your opinion, how are Pope Francisco's views on moral issues?

- Conservative
- About right
- Liberal

18) In your opinion, how were Pope Benedict XVI's views on moral issues?

- Conservative
- About right
- Liberal

19) According to your own experience, how would you describe today's Spanish economic situation?

- Very good
- Good
- Regular
- Bad
- Very bad

20) Which percentage of your parishioners attends frequently the Sunday sermon?

21) How many hours per week do you spend officiating masses?

22) How many hours per week do you spend in direct contact with your parishioners (but not in masses)?

23) How frequently do you discuss current sociopolitical events with your parishioners?

- Always
- Often
- Occasionally
- Seldom
- Never

24) In which other projects/activities, not directly linked to your priestly work, do you participate in?

- Helping with the integration of foreign families
- Helping in the local Caritas/Food Bank
- Participating in sport-related activities
- Preparing new events, such as talks
- Nothing (Only for the interviewer)
- Other (Please specify)

25) How frequently do you collaborate with the local administration in the promotion of religious activities? (e.g., the mass, catechism, religious pilgrimages, etc.)

- Always

- Often
- Occasionally
- Seldom
- Never

26) Have you found any new challenge at your parishes? Which ones? (Open question).

D Propensity Score Matching

In this section, I use a matching-on-observables approach, in the tradition of Heckman et al. (1997), to account for the fact that treated and control municipalities may be structurally different at baseline. Using this method, I implicitly assume that unobservable characteristics are time-invariant, being eliminated with the introduction of municipality fixed effects.

I use a propensity score matching algorithm (PSM) with two neighbors and no replacement on a list of municipality characteristics available at the 2001 Spanish Census. The variables used to matched those municipalities that ever had a foreign priest with their corresponding controls are: population, share of young people, share of retirees, share of people with no formal diploma, share of people with technical education, share of singles, share of divorcees, share of immigrants, unemployment rate, self-employment rate, share of temporal workers, share of farmers, and male and female labor force participation. Table D1 shows the covariate means in control and treatment groups after matching, as well as the p-value of the mean difference between treatment and control groups. For reference, Table 2 shows the mean comparison when no propensity score matching is used.

Table D1: Summary Statistics (at baseline) - Matched sample

	Never Foreign-Led	Ever Foreign-Led	p-value
Population	720.267	640.358	0.221
Youth share	0.124	0.122	0.367
Uneducated share	0.208	0.213	0.552
Technical education share	0.725	0.719	0.487
Divorced share	0.004	0.004	0.196
Immigrants share	0.015	0.018	0.043
Labor participation (Male)	0.566	0.561	0.390
Labor participation (Female)	0.275	0.274	0.869
Unemployed share	0.103	0.100	0.458
Temporal workers share	0.216	0.214	0.717
Farmers share	0.283	0.282	0.873
Share Right-wing parties	0.391	0.390	0.919
Grass-root Catholicism	0.055	0.057	0.854
% Francoist Streets	1.254	1.304	0.802

Note: The table provides a comparison of the baseline characteristics between municipalities that had a foreign priest between 2000 and 2019 (ever foreign-led) and those that did not (never foreign-led). The control group is composed by matched municipalities. I use a propensity score matching, with 2 neighbours, no replacement and a caliper of 0.1. The information at the municipal level is extracted from the 2001 Census. The share of votes to right-leaning parties was calculated using all national and European elections held between 1975 and 2000. Grassroot Catholicism identifies whether there existed in 2001 any grassroot Catholic initiative in the municipality. The percentage of Francoist streets is calculated using the 2001 Spanish Street Map Census.

Figure D1: Kernel Densities - Common Support



Using the previously explained matching method, Figure D2 reproduces the main findings from Figure 5, Figure D3 those from Figure 6, Figure D5 those from Figure 8, and Figure D6 those from Figure 9. I find no significant difference between using only matched municipalities when compared to using the full sample.

Figure D2: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on religious outcomes
Matched sample



(a) # Catholic weddings



(b) # Civil-only weddings



(c) # Weddings



(d) # Weddings (Other Denominations)

Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects the probability of getting married, by wedding ritual. Subfigure D2a displays how it affects Catholic weddings, subfigure D2b shows how it affects civil-only weddings, subfigure D2c whether it affects the total number of weddings carried out, and subfigure D2d whether it affects the wedding probability in other denominations. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D3: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on fertility - Matched sample



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of births in the municipality. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D4: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on divorcees - Matched sample



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of divorcees in the municipality. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D5: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on political outcomes
Left vs. Right - Matched sample



(a) Left-wing parties (b) Right-wing parties

Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigure D5a displays how it affect the voting share of right-wing parties and subfigure D5b how it affects the voting share of left-wing parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D6: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on political outcomes
Conservative vs. Rad. Right - Matched sample



(a) Conservative parties (b) Rad. Right parties

Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigure D6a displays how it affect the voting share of conservative parties and subfigure D6b how it affects the voting share of radical right parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D7: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on voting absenteeism - Matched sample



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality has an effect on its electoral participation. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.