Reverse Revolving Doors: The Influence of Interest Groups on Legislative Voting[*]

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Abstract

This paper investigates how legislators with a background in an interest group (i.e., reverse revolvers) influence other legislators' voting behavior. To answer this question, we collect novel data containing the universe of votes cast at the European Parliament between 2004 and 2019 and characterize legislators by their former working experience. Using the alphabetic allocation of seats, we find that seating beside reverse revolvers when the motion is relevant to their former interest groups increases co-voting by 2.4%, attendance by 1.3%, and decreases abstention by 14.8%. We find no influence on non-relevant ballots. We show that reverse revolvers exert the greatest influence during key votes, such as budget-related motions, and on pivotal colleagues, such as motion-drafting legislators, while reverse revolvers' expertise is not decisive in persuading their colleagues. Our results show that revolving doors influence the political process when working in reverse.

Keywords: Voting behavior, Interest groups, Social interaction, Revolving doors, European Parliament, Decision-making

JEL Classification: D72, D73, F53, N44, P16

1 Introduction

Modern democracies have long strived to regulate the activities of interest groups. These efforts have been broadened in recent years due to interest groups' growing intensity and public notoriety. As of 2018, more than 12.000 organizations were openly interested in influencing European policy-making, spending €2.38 billion on lobbying-related activities (EU Transparency Register, 2018).[1] Lobbying directed at European institutions has mainly focused on influencing legislative powers. In particular, 89% of the Members of the European Parliament (hereafter, MEPs) report receiving voting instructions from interest groups. Similarly, legislators receive at least 21 weekly meeting requests from interest groups, with 59% of them admitting attending at least one of those meetings (Hix et al., 2016).

Interest groups are also known for using a subtler practice to promote their agenda that is often overlooked by regulators: the *reverse revolving doors*. This practice refers to the flow of individuals from interest groups into active politics (hereafter, reverse revolvers). According to Hix et al. (2016), 22% of surveyed MEPs admitted having been encouraged by an interest group representative to stand in European elections. Understanding whether reverse revolvers in public institutions affect decision-making is paramount for the fulfilment of their mission and their healthy development. However, little is known in that respect.

In this paper, we investigate whether the voting behavior of members of the European Parliament is influenced by their close contact with reverse revolvers. We first identify interest groups in the legislators' résumés and document that 28% of all elected EU legislators between 2004 and 2019 had worked for an interest group before taking office. These engagements range from short work spells for regional NGOs to high-level consulting jobs in lobbying firms. We then link this information with individual-level votes cast during the studied period to test whether, compared to similar legislators, reverse revolvers are more influential on their colleagues' voting decisions in motions related to their former employers.

We encounter three main challenges to causally estimate this influence. The first challenge involves obtaining a relevant metric of connection between legislators exogenous to the characteristics predicting their voting behavior. To address this, we follow Harmon, Fisman and Kamenica (2019) and rely on the seating adjacency of legislators in the European Parliament, in which non-leader members of the main political groups sit alphabetically. This measure is chosen for two reasons: First, legislators who sit next to each other during plenary sessions are more likely to interact and influence each other's views (Masket, 2008;

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[1]The European Union lobbying industry is the second largest in the world, only after the US. According to OpenSecrets.org, in 2018, the US federal lobbying sector accounted for 11.600 organizations spending $3.42 billion.

Saia, 2018; Harmon, Fisman and Kamenica, 2019; Lowe and Jo, 2021). Second, the connections created by the alphabetic seating rule are as good as random after conditioning on specific observable characteristics. This context allows us to causally measure the additional influence exerted by reverse revolvers on their colleagues' voting behavior beyond the average seating adjacency effects.

A second obstacle that might hinder our causal estimation is the joint selection into lobbying and politics. For instance, if more charismatic individuals are inclined towards both career paths, it becomes difficult to isolate the influence of charisma from having interest group working experience. To tackle that concern, we leverage the variation in the subject of each voted motion, identifying those relevant for each interest group. Our research hypothesis is that reverse revolvers will significantly influence the voting behavior of their seating neighbors when voting on motions relevant to their former employers.

The third challenge concerns the interpretation of the results. The influence of reverse revolvers could theoretically arise from two main sources. Firstly, reverse revolvers may hold strong policy preferences aligned with those of their former employers, leading them to advocate for the same interests. Alternatively, reverse revolvers might have higher expertise on relevant subjects, enabling them to influence less experienced colleagues, independently of their interest group's agenda. To address this issue, we identify the policy subjects in which each MEP had expertise before taking office as detailed in their résumés. We validate this measure by showing how it strongly correlates with their voting behavior on their subject of expertise and the parliamentary roles they are assigned to. We also estimate a higher probability of co-voting when sitting next to a legislator with expertise on the subject. By introducing our measure of expertise as a control in our analysis, we are confident of obtaining a measure of peer influence from reverse revolvers that is not confounded by different levels of subject expertise.

We construct a novel dataset that significantly contributes to understanding the voting patterns and legislators' work history. First, we collect all electronic ballots cast at the European Parliament between June 2004 and May 2019, categorizing each motion with the subjects they addressed. Second, we use the legislators' résumés to describe their work experience and education, classifying each working spell by job domains, skill level, and related policy subjects. We then identify MEPs who worked for an interest group before taking office by searching for registered interest groups in their résumés. Third, we matched each identified interest group to the predefined motion subjects voted on in Parliament, determining which votes were relevant for each reverse revolver. Finally, we integrate all the previous data with the precise seating arrangement of every legislator in every plenary session, allowing us to study how seating proximity to a reverse revolver influences voting behavior on motions relevant to their former employers.

We find that legislators seated next to reverse revolvers are 2.4% more likely to coincide

in their ballots on motions related to the interest group's economic activity, compared to those seated adjacent to the average legislator. The magnitude of the effect corresponds to 21% of the influence exerted by those legislators in charge of drafting the motions being voted – also known as *rapporteur* – and 43% of the magnitude of seating next to colleagues from the same national party. Conversely, we find no statistically significant effect of sitting next to a former interest group employee when the vote is unrelated to the interest group's economic activity. Furthermore, our findings indicate that the peer effects in legislative voting detected in previous studies, such as in Harmon, Fisman and Kamenica (2019), are in part driven by legislators with prior work experience in interest groups. These results underscore the crucial role of reverse revolvers in explaining peer effects in legislative voting, particularly on motions relevant to their former employers.

We shed light on the channels through which legislators' voting behavior is influenced by reverse revolvers. First, we show that the influence exerted by reverse revolvers on their peers is twice as large when voting on relevant motions involving significant public expenditure decisions. Second, we find that reverse revolvers mobilize their peers towards active voting positions, resulting in a 14.8% lower abstention rate and a 1.3% higher attendance. However, this influence appears to decline over time, as legislators slowly learn from their peers' preferences and adjust their behavior to avoid consistently co-voting with them.

We show that the reverse revolving door is particularly valuable for interest groups with limited lobbying resources, especially those operating at the national level. This suggests that reverse revolving and traditional lobbying strategies function more as substitutes than complements, offering less well-resourced interest groups a cost-effective means of policy influence. Moreover, the influence exerted by reverse revolvers is not uniformly distributed: they have a greater impact on female legislators and on those tasked with drafting legislative texts. These findings point to a strategic use of the reverse revolving door to target central actors in the legislative process, amplifying its effectiveness even under resource constraints.

To better understand this influence, we propose two alternative mechanisms. The first is partisan informational signaling, wherein reverse revolvers primarily shape their peers' votes by providing partisan rather than substantive expert cues. In line with this interpretation, we show that while subject-matter expertise leads to strong co-voting behavior, only those reverse revolvers lacking specialized knowledge are effective at advancing their former interest groups' agendas. In contrast, expert reverse revolvers do not exert additional effort to sway their colleagues. These findings suggest that, within the context of the European Parliament, reverse revolvers primarily influence their peers by providing partisan information rather than expert-level insights.

The second mechanism explores the legislators' strategic incentives related to career advancement considerations. Legislators may strategically align their voting behavior with reverse revolvers after recognizing that these members often secure influential parliamen-

tary roles, doing so in expectation of some potential professional benefits. We provide empirical evidence that supports this view: legislators seated adjacent to reverse revolvers are more likely to obtain influential in-parliament positions tied to their neighbors' policy interests. However, the absence of explicit vote trading suggests that this strategic alignment is mainly driven by informal cooperation and reputational considerations rather than through explicit vote trading arrangements.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study showing the influence reverse revolving doors have on the legislative process. Our contribution is twofold. First, we build a unique dataset containing the universe of electronic ballots cast in the European Parliament between 2004 and 2019 and complement it with detailed information on the legislators' backgrounds and subject expertise. Second, through detailed text analysis techniques, we document that 28% of all elected legislators had worked for an interest group before taking office and identify those votes relevant to their former employers' agenda. Our analysis shows that reverse revolvers influence their colleagues when voting on motions relevant to their former employer. These findings have important implications for policy-making as they shed light on a relatively overlooked feature of modern democracies: the presence of former interest group employees in democratically elected institutions. Our results support the hypothesis that revolving doors affect the political process, even when working in reverse.

This paper relates to three different strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the literature on lobbying in politics, which harks back to Logan and Fellow (1929). Some recent studies have provided compelling evidence in favor of the argument that lobbyists' main asset is their connection with policymakers: (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen, 2012; Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi, 2014; Bertrand et al., 2020; d'Este, Draca and Fons-Rosen, 2020). While most of the literature focuses on how interest groups benefit from their political connections (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014; DellaVigna et al., 2016; Bombardini and Trebbi, 2020), our paper is the first one to causally study how interest groups can influence the legislative process by focusing on a commonly overlooked practice: the placement of industry insiders in democratically elected institutions.[2]

Second, this paper contributes to the literature on legislators' voting behavior determinants, which goes back to Rice (1927) and Routt (1938). However, existing evidence on how legislators affect each other's voting behavior is still limited. Recent research has focused on understanding the role of legislators' social ties (Cohen and Malloy, 2014; Battaglini, Sciabolazza and Patacchini, 2023a), in-parliament proximity (Masket, 2008; Saia, 2018;

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[2]Further reviews on the lobbying literature can be found in de Figueiredo and Richter (2014), DellaVigna et al. (2016) and Bombardini and Trebbi (2020).

Harmon, Fisman and Kamenica, 2019; Lowe and Jo, 2021) on their co-voting behavior, and the role played by having experts in the legislator's network (Coppock, 2014; Zelizer, 2019; Fong, 2020). We build on and contribute to this literature by showing that those legislators who used to work for an interest group influence their seating peers' voting behavior, particularly in motions relevant to their former employer. Additionally, we provide evidence that peer effects driven by in-parliament proximity are most significant when legislators are seated next to reverse revolvers, while not otherwise.

Thirdly, we contribute to the literature on political selection (Besley, 2005; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008). This literature has expanded in addressing the question of how legislators' careers, before entering parliament, influence different outcomes such as the working committee to which they are assigned (Adler and Lapinski, 1997; McElroy, 2006; Yordanova, 2009; Martin and Mickler, 2019), their leadership roles (Daniel and Thierse, 2018), and voting behavior (Van Geffen, 2016; Francis and Bramlett, 2017). Our study expands on this literature by highlighting the significant role that legislators' expertise and prior exposure to interest groups play in shaping their parliamentary roles and the influence they exert on their colleagues.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the institutional setting. Section 3 presents our data. Section 4 exposes the empirical strategy followed. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 explores the mechanisms at play. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2 Institutional Setting and Conceptual Framework

2.1 Legislative Voting in the European Parliament

The European Parliament is the lower legislative branch of the European Union. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are chosen through elections held in each EU member state. Once elected, they join cross-national European Political Groups (EPGs) based on their national party's ideology. EPGs comprise legislators from different nationalities with close political affiliations. These groups perform actions similar to conventional political parties in national parliaments. Before every vote, each group discusses its position internally; however, crucially for our analysis, every MEP has the right to choose which ballot to cast in every single vote.

The European Parliament meets once or twice a month, during the so-called plenary sessions, in one of its two venues, Brussels and Strasbourg. These plenary sessions represent the final step of the legislative process, in which legislation is debated and voted on. MEPs cast their ballot in three ways: by show of hands, secret ballot, or electronic vote. In our analysis, we focus on electronic votes as they are the default practice at the Euro-

pean Parliament (i.e., 40% of all votes) and are the only voting method identifying each legislator's ballot. To cast a vote, legislators must first obtain recognition in the system by inserting their unique ID card into their voting device and subsequently pressing the button with their preferred choice. Casting a ballot for a colleague is strictly forbidden and penalized by the Parliament's norms.

2.2 Alphabetical Seating in the Chamber

The rules of the Conference of Presidents regulate the seating arrangement in the European Parliament's chambers. MEPs belonging to the different European political groups are clustered in the chamber, and groups are allocated from left to right according to their political orientation. Figure 1 shows the seat distribution, highlighting the block seating allocation by the European political groups. Within these groups, leaders sit in the front rows while the remaining seats are generally allocated alphabetically by surname. The five largest groups, S&D, Verts/ALE, ALDE, PPE, and ECR, adhere to this seating rule. In total, 55.7% of all MEPs sat alphabetically during our study period, amounting to 1,703 legislators. The compliance rate with the alphabetic seating rule might vary across groups and time.[3] The explanation for non-perfect adherence to the seating rule within the "alphabetical groups" is that the rule allows members to occupy another seat for "technical or organizational proposes".

Figure 2 illustrates the predictive power of the alphabetical rank on the seating rank. It plots the within-EPG alphabetic rank and the within-EPG seating order for two groups, one that adheres to the seating rule (Panel A) and one that does not (Panel B). In addition, individuals with prior working experience in interest groups are identified. The sample used in our analysis is determined by the change in the seating pattern depicted in Panel A. The dots on the left-hand side of Panel A represent those MEPs in the front rows of their group who do not adhere to the alphabetic seating rule. We identify those as EPG leaders. The dots on the right-hand side represent those MEPs that do sit alphabetically within the seats designated for their EPG, the non-leader MEPs. Lastly, Panel B contains MEPs belonging to an EPG that does not adhere to the alphabetic seating rule. Our analysis is restricted to non-leader MEPs belonging to alphabetically seating EPGs. Moreover, the distribution of legislators with prior experience in an interest group is not spatially nor alphabetically clustered.

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[3]The compliance rate is the correlation between the within-EPG alphabetical and seating rank. The average correlation across all voting dates is 0.92 in our sample of non-leaders from alphabetically organized EPGs.

3 Data

3.1 Plenary Sessions

We collect the complete record of electronic votes at the European Parliament between June 2004 and May 2019, corresponding to the 6th, 7th, and 8th legislative terms from each plenary session summary report. This dataset contains all electronically cast ballots for each MEP and information on the motions' characteristics, such as the subjects covered and the committees involved. We restrict our analysis to those motions with an assigned rapporteur. Table A1 in the Appendix displays how motions with and without rapporteur compare, showing the relative importance of the former ones. Similarly, Table A2 shows the characteristics of our sample of interest, non-leaders in alphabetically seated groups, their group leaders, and other legislators in non-alphabetically seated groups. We combine this voting information with the MEP's corresponding plenary seating arrangement, published before each plenary session on the European Parliament's website.[4]

3.2 MEPs' Background

We obtain the legislators' biographical information of all those who took office at any point in time during our studied period from two different sources publicly provided by the European Parliament, namely the MEPs' profiles and their résumés. From the first, we collect the legislators' characteristics, such as age, sex, nationality, national party, and their roles in Parliament (e.g., working committees, EPG positions, and procedure rapporteurships). Second, we compile the biographical records of all the MEPs using their submitted résumés to the European Parliament upon the start of their mandates.[5] Using the information in these résumés, we classify legislators based on their educational and professional backgrounds.

We identify those MEPs who studied at a "Top 500" university, measured using the 2003 Academic Ranking of World Universities, as a proxy of education excellence as in Fisman et al. (2015). We further characterize MEPs using their professional experience. We use two main measures to classify our legislators: their labor profile, and skill level. The first measure is obtained by classifying the legislators' working spells with the same three categories used by the European Parliament to classify each spell: political, professional, and academic. We assign each parliamentarian to a category by selecting the category with the most common type of work spell after weighing them linearly by the duration of each spell. We use a supervised Random Forest algorithm to fill working spells

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[4]In the rare event that no seating plan was available for a particular plenary session, we take the preceding seating plan corresponding to the same venue as reference.

[5]Despite being voluntary, 81% of the MEPs submit their résumé. We hand-collected the biographical information of the remaining ones. The information in the résumés, initially collected by the European Parliament, was retrieved from the watchdog *Parltrack*.

that the European Parliament did not classify under one of these three categories.[6] The second measure relates to the legislator's skill level. We use a keyword-matching algorithm designed to identify those spells that reflect high levels of responsibility, including roles such as CEO, secretary general, and director. Based on this information, we define each parliamentarian as having or not having managerial skills, following the same methodology used to define their labor profile.

3.3 Interest Groups

The fundamental source of information on interest groups is provided by the EU Transparency Register. This is a voluntary register listing the organizations interested in influencing the EU decision-making process. Despite being voluntary, both the European Parliament and the European Commission require individuals to be listed in the register to access its facilities and to participate in the diverse range of activities promoted by these two institutions, i.e., public consultations, expert groups, and to contact high-level decision-makers.[7]

As of 2018, the register encompasses around 12.000 entities, with a total lobbying budget of €2.38 billion and almost 30.000 employees. We assemble a dataset including all the 17.000 entities registered on the European Transparency Registry at any point in time between 2016 and 2019, including information on each organization's lobbying budget, policy interests, and sectors of activity. We use this dataset to extract the list of all organizations that have expressed interest in EU policy-making and match them with the employers' names found in the MEPs' résumés. We employ a keyword-matching algorithm using a wide variety of patterns, such as stemmed words, the interest groups' websites, and different versions and translations of their registered names. The overall matching rate is 85%, computed using a hand-coded sample. We find that 28% of the MEPs in our sample worked for an interest group at some point before taking office, ranging from short spells on regional NGOs to high-level consulting jobs in lobbying firms.

Lastly, and crucial for our analysis, we are interested in identifying those relevant motions for the economic activity of the interest groups identified in our sample. To do so, we linked the 48-policy subject categories the European Parliament assigns to each motion to each interest group. The result of the hand-coded linkage between policy subjects and interest groups is the indicator variable *Relevant*, which allows us to distinguish which votes are relevant to each interest group. To construct this variable, we use information scattered over different sources, such as the revealed issues of interest reported in the EU Transparency Register, the topics covered during the meetings with high-level officials

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[6]We use as training dataset the résumés submitted during the 8th and 9th term, as the European Parliament classified them under these three categories. The algorithm has a 5% error rate.

[7]For further information, please refer to the Annual Report on the operations of the Transparency Register (2019) and Rule 11 in the Rules of Procedures of the European Parliament.

from the European Commission, and their activity description from their website, among others.[8]

Table 1 provides the summary statistics on the differences between those legislators who worked for an interest group before entering the European Parliament and those who did not. For instance, reverse revolvers are, on average, older, more experienced, and have a professional (and not political) profile compared to other non-revolving legislators. Similarly, Table 2 provides evidence on the distribution of interest groups' characteristics. For instance, the average interest group with reverse revolvers in Parliament is European, nationally based, non-business-oriented, and has a limited lobbying scope, both in terms of accreditations to access the European Parliament and the total lobbying budget.

3.4 MEPs' Expertise

We identify the policy subjects in which each legislator gained expertise before entering parliament. This measure of expertise is crucial for our analysis, as it mitigates potential confounding effects coming through a legislator's greater knowledge of the subjects being voted on.

To identify each legislator's areas of expertise, we use their complete employment histories that were submitted to the parliament at the beginning of their mandates. We apply a keyword-matching algorithm and map each résumé entry to one of the 48 policy subjects defined by the European Parliament. This algorithm incorporates a wide variety of patterns, leveraging detailed information on each subject's subcategories, as well as specific job positions associated with them. On average, legislators are knowledgeable on three distinct subjects and have a 10% probability of having expertise in the motions voted on at the European Parliament. No particular subject could be matched with the information provided in the résumé of 15% of the MEPs, leaving them without any expertise.[9]

We validate our measure of legislators' expertise by analysing how these are associated with their voting behavior and parliamentary roles. We selected parliamentary outcomes that in principle ought to correlate with having expertise on a specific subject. Namely, we estimate the association between having expertise in the subject being voted with attending the vote, casting a yes or no ballot, voting with their rapporteur or shadow rapporteur as a proxy for the partyline, representing either of these two roles and sitting in the drafting committee of the voted motion. To benchmark the size of the association we also control for having professional experience in an interest group and whether the subject of the vote is considered of relevance to their former employer.

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[8]Table A3 provides the distribution, in shares and counts, of the interest groups' subjects of relevance overall the voted subjects.

[9]Table A4 provides further evidence on the distribution, in shares and counts, of the legislators' expertise over all parliament subjects.

Table 3 provides the results of estimating linear probability models controlling for name and MEP characteristics as well as group times term, session since the term started, procedure type, and vote subject fixed effects. Having expertise on the subject of the vote marginally increases the probability of attending the vote and casting a yes or no ballot, but not for voting with the partyline. The coefficients are of a similar size to those for having experience in an interest group and voting on a vote considered to be relevant for the interest group. Similarly, MEPs with expertise on the voted subject are more likely to be the rapporteur, shadow rapporteur or have a seat in the drafting committee of the voted motion. These last set of coefficients are large when compared to the mean of the dependent variable and once more of similar size when benchmarked against having an interest group background on a relevant subject.

This analysis allows us to conclude that our measure of legislators' expertise captures relevant information about their professional background that is key in explaining their voting behavior and their parliamentary roles. Therefore, by controlling for this measure of expertise in our main analysis we are significantly reducing the possibility of confounding our main effect of the influence of a reveres revolver.

4   Empirical Strategy

We are first interested in examining the extent to which MEPs' voting behavior is influenced by being placed adjacent to a colleague with working experience in an interest group using the following model:

$$Agree_{iv} = \alpha + \beta_1 Peers\ IG_{iv} + \eta_{iv} \qquad (1)$$

where $Agree_{iv}$ is a variable capturing the fraction of legislators sitting to the left and right of the focal legislator i casting the same ballot in vote v. $Peers\ IG_{iv}$ is the fraction of adjacent legislators to the focal legislator i during vote v who used to work for an interest group before joining parliament. We focus on the agreement rate between legislators, as opposed to measures of policy support, since reverse revolvers could be both influencing in favor and against particular motions relevant to their former employers.

To interpret β_1 as the causal effect of sitting beside a colleague with an interest group background, we need legislators not to be able to choose where to sit; otherwise, some of their unobserved characteristics might correlate both with their voting behavior and their previous professional experience, biasing our estimation of β_1. We address this concern

by restricting our attention to those members who sit in alphabetical order.[10] Despite the high compliance rate with the alphabetic seating rule, as shown in Section 2, we estimate both the intention-to-treat (ITT) and the average treatment effect of the compliers (LATE) instrumenting the group of individuals that sit adjacently to the focal MEP using the individuals whose surname is adjacent in the group's alphabetic rank. Hence, *Name Peers IG*$_{iv}$ is the fraction of legislators who previously worked at an interest group whose surnames are adjacent to the focal MEP i in her EPG's alphabetic list in vote v.

A concern when using surname contiguity as an instrument for seat adjacency is that the former might be confounding other unobserved heterogeneous characteristics that cause legislators to vote similarly, such as having similar backgrounds. Using a dyadic approach, Harmon, Fisman and Kamenica (2019) assesses this concern by showing that, after conditioning for party affiliation and surname similarity controls, surname adjacency between two MEPs does not predict their shared characteristics, such as shared nationality, similar education, freshman status, or gender. Following their results, we control for surname similarity by using the fraction of adjacent legislators sharing the same surname as the focal MEP and the absolute alphabetic rank across EPGs and terms. These two controls help us mitigate unobservable characteristics shared by the focal and peer legislators.

In addition to the name similarity controls, we further include a comprehensive set of controls to capture any other type of characteristic of the focal legislator and her group of peers that might affect their voting agreement, together with fixed effects by EPG-Term, plenary sessions since the term started, procedure type and vote subject. Section B in the Appendix includes the list of all the controls introduced in our specifications, and their descriptive statistics are reported in Table B1. Particularly relevant among all these controls is our measure of expertise, which allows us to account for the role of subject expertise in the influence exerted by reverse revolvers.

Next, we analyze whether the effect captured by β_1 depends on whether the subject of the voted motion is related to the adjacent legislators' former interest groups. To that end, we introduce a new variable that identifies whether any of the subjects of the voted proposal are related to the interest group in which the adjacent colleagues used to work, *Relevant*. Importantly, we code this variable only for the interest groups identified in our sample. Thus, this variable only takes value 1 if the motion voted on is relevant for the economic activity of any of the adjacent reverse revolvers; it takes value 0 when no adjacent legislator has experience in an interest group or when the voting subject is unrelated to their interest group's sector of activity. Thus, we estimate the following fully saturated

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[10]Note that the alphabetic seating of MEPs ensures that, in expectation, each pair of non-revolver MEPs have the same agreement rate in the groups in which the third member is a reverse revolver with the groups in which she is not. Therefore, our coefficient of interest only identifies the difference in the agreement rate due to having a reverse revolver in the group.

model:

$$Agree_{iv} = \alpha + \gamma_1 Peers\ IG_{iv} + \gamma_2 Peers\ IG_{iv} \times Relevant_{iv} + \epsilon_{iv} \qquad (2)$$

as in Equation 1, we instrument Equation 2 using *Name Peers IG$_{iv}$* and *Name Peers IG$_{iv}$ × Relevant*, in a twin first stage regression setting. We cluster all standard errors at the legislator level.

5 Results

5.1 Main Results

We present our first set of results in Table 4. Columns 1 to 5 display the ITT estimates from Equation 1, using *Name Peers IG* and progressively including different fixed effects, individual and peer controls. Our first coefficient of interest, present in Column 1, is estimated using a specification that does not include any fixed effect or control variables. It displays a statistically significant increase of 3.5 percentage points in the probability of MEPs casting the same ballot as their adjacent alphabetic peers when they all have professional experience in an interest group.

By including EPG-by-Term, plenary session fixed effects and name similarity controls, we account for the estimated effect coming from a specific EPG at a given legislative term, from some temporal trend, or name similarity conditions. The effect on the agreement probability is still statistically significant while attenuated to an increase of 2.07 percentage points. In Column 3, we further control by the procedure type and the vote subject and estimate a similar effect of 2.05 percentage points. In Column 4, we introduce focal legislators' characteristics, reducing the average probability of casting the same ballot to 1.27 percentage points. Introducing peer-related controls in Column 5 produces a considerable drop in the probability of co-voting to 0.58 percentage points, and the coefficient becomes statistically insignificant.

Column 6 introduces our main regressor of interest, *Name Peers IG × Relevant*. It captures the additional effect of voting on a motion deemed relevant to the former employer of alphabetically adjacent MEPs. It can be interpreted as the additional effect of being adjacent in the alphabetic list to a legislator who used to work for an interest group when the subject of the motion is related to that group's economic activity. When the subject is not relevant to the peers' former employers, the agreement rate is smaller and not precisely estimated. However, when the voting subject is relevant to the peers' former interest group, the probability of vote coincidence increases by 0.83 percentage points.

The estimated effect of surname adjacency to legislators with interest group background when the vote is relevant to their interest groups represents an increase in the probability of

casting the same ballot of 1.8 percent on the mean agreement rate of 70%. The magnitude of this effect is 16% and 44% of the influence of being name adjacent to the motion's rapporteur and shadow rapporteur, respectively. Similarly, the estimated effect explains 33% of the variation in co-voting with a name colleague from the same national party.[11] Given that the primary task of a (shadow) rapporteur is to convince other legislators to vote like them on the motion they represent, we argue that former interest group members have a sizable influence on their adjacent colleagues.[12]

Finally, Column 7 estimates the LATE using both regressors of interest.[13] Compared to Column 6, both *Peers IG* and *Peers IG × Relevant* are similar in magnitude to their surname counterparts due to the strong first stages. We find an increase in the average probability of casting the same ballot as the adjacent MEPs when voting on subjects deemed of relevance to their interest groups by 1.7 percentage points, or 2.4%, compared to those legislators with no adjacent former interest group member. This effect corresponds to 20% or 56% of the influence exerted by an adjacent rapporteur or shadow rapporteurs, respectively. Similarly, it explains 42% of the variation in co-voting behavior with a seating colleague from the same national party.[14]

It is worth noticing that seating adjacency increases, on average, the probability of vote coincidence among legislators, as shown in Harmon, Fisman and Kamenica (2019). We replicate their main analysis to understand how much of the seating adjacency effect is driven by the legislators' previous professional experience in an interest group. Table 5 uses a dyadic approach to replicate their results in columns 1 and 4, and expand them with our measure of interest group exposure in columns 2, 3, and 5. We find a similar effect of seat adjacency on the probability of disagreeing of -0.73 percentage points in the preferred specification in column 4, with our estimate being larger than theirs by 0.13 percentage points.

Columns 3 and 5 of Table 5 respectively interact name and seat adjacency with the legislators' experience in an interest group. The proximity effect on the probability of disagreeing is reduced when neither legislator holds experience in an interest group, while

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[11]Table C1 displays Table 4 together with the coefficients for both focal and peer rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs, and for whether both focal and peer MEPs are from the same national party.

[12]While we document that reverse revolvers exert influence in votes relevant to their former interest groups, a key limitation is that we cannot assess whether this influence aligns with the groups' policy preferences. Doing so would require a subjective mapping of each motion's content to the unobserved positions of the respective interest groups.

[13]Table C2 in the Appendix reports the first stage results corresponding to Column 7.

[14]We show in Table C3 that the introduction of legislator-fixed effects delivers quantitatively comparable results to our benchmark case. We show in Table C4 how reverse revolvers do affect not only their closest peers but also those at higher distances, with a decaying influence as distance increases. In the same line, Table C5 shows that using row-aggregated information produces consistent results with our main specification. In Table A5, we provide evidence that our benchmark results are not sensitive to different clustering choices, and in Table C6, that they are comparable when assigning each interest group with up to 3 relevant subjects. Finally, Table C7 shows that influence is absent in cross-party neighbors.

it reaches -0.58 and -.85, respectively, when at least one of the members has it. Therefore, using the same dyadic data structure as in Harmon, Fisman and Kamenica (2019), we obtain very similar estimates for the influence of reverse revolvers on their seating peers.

In sum, these results evidence that seating adjacency has a higher influence on vote coincidence when seating next to a reverse revolver, while it is substantially reduced when seating next to legislators with no former interest group exposure. In what follows, we shed light on the channels through which reverse revolvers persuade their colleagues to vote like them, analyzing whether they are better at mobilizing their colleagues and whether their effect varies depending on vote, MEPs, and IG's characteristics.

5.2 Voting Mobilization, High-stakes and Persistence

5.2.1 Voting Mobilization

We start by exploring how legislators influence their peers by examining voting mobilization. Specifically, we investigate whether reverse revolvers are more effective at mobilizing their peers to participate in roll-call votes.

To address this question, we first estimate Equation (2), using as the dependent variable a binary indicator taking value one if legislator i casts an abstention ballot in vote v and zero if the legislator votes either in favor or against the motion. The results, reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, indicate that physical proximity to a reverse revolver has no significant effect on abstention rates in votes unrelated to the economic interests of the reverse revolver's former employer. In contrast, when the motion is relevant to the interest group, seating next to a reverse revolver leads to a significant reduction in abstention. In our preferred specification, legislators seated adjacent to a reverse revolver are, on average, 0.3 percentage points – or 14.8% – less likely to abstain from voting when the motion is relevant for their interest group.

In the same direction, we could expect reverse revolvers to mobilize their network to participate in the voting process to increase the support for a specific motion. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 6 present the estimates in which the dependent variable is an indicator taking value one if the focal legislator i was absent during vote v, and 0 otherwise. The results show that sitting next to reverse revolvers decreases the focal legislator's probability of not attending the vote by 1.11 percentage points. Given that MEPs in our sample are absent from 13% of votes on average, this estimate corresponds an 8.8% reduction in the mean absenteeism or, equivalently, a 1.3% increase in attendance.

Taken together, these results suggest that reverse revolvers actively mobilize their legislative peers by decreasing both abstention and absenteeism, thereby encouraging more engaged and consistent participation in parliamentary voting, particularly on issues aligned with their former employers' interests.

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5.2.2 High-stakes Votes

We next examine whether the influence exerted by reverse revolvers intensifies under high-stakes voting conditions. To do so, we rely on two dimensions of vote salience: the intrinsic importance of the motion and the degree of contestation in the vote outcome.

First, to proxy for the intrinsic importance of a motion, we leverage whether the vote pertains to the European Union's annual budget. Budget-related motions provide a credible measure of high-stakes decision-making, as they determine the allocation of the Union's financial resources. In our sample, 16% of ballots concern budgetary issues.. These votes are characterized by lower abstention rates (i.e., 12% compared to 13.3% for non-budget votes) and stronger party cohesion (i.e., 80% versus 77.7%, respectively).[15]

Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 present the corresponding results, interacting by whether the motion is budget-related. The results show that legislators are more strongly influenced by proximate peers with prior ties to interest groups when the motion is both relevant to their employers' interests and pertains to the budget. For instance, having all seating neighbors with an interest group background when the subject is relevant for any of their prior employers increases the probability of casting the same ballot by 1.6 percentage points in non-budgetary motions and by 6.2 percentage points on budget motions, with both estimated effects statistically significant at the 10% level. Relative to the average probability of peer agreement, this translates into a 2.3% increase for non-budget votes and a 6.4% increase for budget-related votes. Furthermore, we reject the null hypothesis that these two coefficients are equal, highlighting the importance of budget votes for reserve revolvers.

Second, to assess the ex-post importance of individual votes, we examine motions passed by narrow margins—interpreted as instances of high legislator pivotality. In our sample, 2%, 9.5%, and 18% of motions were approved with margins of victory below 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Figure 3 shows that the influence of reverse revolvers declines as contestation increases. While it is plausible that interest groups concentrate lobbying resources on closely contested motions, legislators may simultaneously face stronger disciplinary pressures from their political parties, raising the cost of deviating from the party line. Consequently, the effectiveness of the reverse revolving door may be reduced in these settings. Our results are consistent with this interpretation: reverse revolvers appear less focused on swaying pivotal votes and more oriented towards building broad consensus, favoring motions that result in supermajorities.

In sum, these results suggest that reverse revolvers are more influential in budget-related votes, but their impact diminishes in closely contested motions, where party discipline pre-

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[15]It is worth noting that that budget votes typically reflect the thematic content of the motion rather than constituting a standalone category. Similarly, reverse revolvers are not exclusively interested in budget votes per se, but rather in policy areas aligned with their former employers, as detailed in Table A3.

vails and consensus-building takes precedence over strategic persuasion.

5.2.3 Connection Persistence

An important aspect of peer influence is exposure duration, that is, how the time legislators spend seated next to one another may shape voting behavior. On the one hand, prolonged proximity could facilitate the exchange of ideas and the negotiation process, thus potentially increasing the agreement rate between members. In our context, longer exposure may help reverse revolvers to steadily persuade adjacent colleagues into aligning with their positions. On the other hand, extended interactions may lead to the opposite result: as legislators become more familiar with their neighbors' policy preferences, they may deliberately distance themselves, leading to reduced co-voting over time. If this latter mechanism dominates, the influence of reverse revolvers would be expected to attenuate as their peers learn more about each other's inclinations.

To assess the persistence of reverse revolvers' influence over time, we estimate Equation 2, interacting the treatment variable with the cumulative time each legislator has spent seated next to their peers during the legislative term. As shown in Table 7, consistent with our baseline results, reverse revolvers exert differential influence on their peers on those motions relevant to their former employing interest group. However, that influence diminishes progressively with increased exposure. The estimates suggest that peer influence fully dissipates after approximately 67 voting sessions—equivalent to 3.6 years in parliament.

This result is consistent with a learning mechanism whereby legislators gradually acquire more information about the policy preferences of their peers, thereby limiting the scope of influence that reverse revolvers can exert over the long term. Importantly, all regressions include time fixed effects to account for potential confounding due to general legislative learning or temporal dynamics in voting behavior.[16]

5.3 MEPs' and IGs' Characteristics

5.3.1 MEPs' Characteristics

To investigate how individual-level characteristics mediate the influence of reverse revolvers, we examine the following personal attributes: gender, parliamentary tenure, involvement in the drafting process of the motion, prior managerial status, and membership in an interest group.

Figure 4 shows interaction effects based on the attributes of focal legislators. First, we find that reverse revolvers exert significantly more influence on peers who hold positions in

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[16]Table A6 presents a fully interacted specification using the number of joint voting days (rather than sessions) as the time variable, yielding quantitatively similar results.

committees responsible for drafting the motion under consideration. This influence is the most pronounced among all personal characteristics, corresponding to an increase in the co-voting probability by 6.7 percentage points, or a 9.5% increase in the average co-voting probability. Second, we find that gender plays a central role in explaining how reverse revolvers influence their peers. Specifically, reverse revolvers have a significantly positive influence on their female peers, while they exert no influence on their male colleagues.

Figure 5 extends the analysis to the personal characteristics of adjacent legislators. The results show that female reverse revolvers are particularly effective at influencing their peers when the motion is relevant to their former employers. This finding aligns with prior research suggesting that female legislators tend to exert greater effort and engage more actively in legislative processes than their male colleagues (Wängnerud, 2009; Volden, Wiseman and Wittmer, 2013). No significant differences are found across other personal attributes, such as parliamentary tenure, managerial background, or interest group affiliation, for either focal or adjacent legislators.

In sum, these results shows that the influence of reverse revolvers is most pronounced when targeted at female legislators and colleagues involved in the drafting of the motion, while attributes such as tenure, managerial experience, and interest group affiliation appear to have limited explanatory power.

5.3.2 Interest Groups' Characteristics

Finally, we explore the importance of interest groups' characteristics in mediating their reverse revolvers' influence. In particular, we focus on five dimensions: the nature of the interest group's business activity, the extent of regulatory exposure, lobbying capacity, geographic location, and the managerial status of the legislator within the organization.

First, we look at whether the influence that former interest group members exert on their peers depends on the interest groups' business type. To that end, we define an interest group as private good if its legal status is business-related (e.g., companies and corporations which are not state-owned) and public good if its legal status is non-business-related, such as NGOs, trade unions, and the like. Figure 6 reports the results of our preferred specification, showing that the business nature of the interest groups represented in our sample does not explain the observed influence.

Second, we next examine whether an interest group's regulatory exposure, proxied by its involvement in highly regulated sectors such as agriculture, environment, ICT, banking, and energy, conditions the influence of its former employees. While reverse revolvers from regulated sectors might have higher incentives to influence others, their activities, as in the case of highly contested votes, are also subject to higher scrutiny from their parties and the chamber, making it more costly to convince other party peers. Consistent with this last point, Figure 6 shows that only reverse revolvers linked to less regulated interest

groups exert greater influence in votes relevant to their prior employers

Third, we consider the geographic location of the interest group's headquarters. One might think that those interest groups located in Brussels, given their physical proximity to EU institutions, would be more actively engaged in legislative lobbying, potentially leveraging reverse revolving as part of a broader influence strategy. Conversely, such groups may already possess sufficient direct access to policymakers and thus rely less on informal channels such as former employees. In contrast, interest groups located in their respective member states might not have an extensive network, may lack immediate access to EU institutions and thus use reverse revolving more strategically to influence policy outcomes. Our results, shown in Figure 6, supports the later hypothesis, suggesting that reverse revolvers linked to nationally-based interest groups exhibit greater influence on peers during relevant votes.

Fourth, we examine whether interest groups' lobbying capacity, proxied by their annual lobbying expenditures, conditions the effectiveness of reverse revolvers. We classify interest groups as resource-constrained if their lobbying budgets fall below the sample median of €1 million per year. On the one hand, interest groups with large lobbying budgets could have potentially sufficient power to mobilize their networks towards their desired outcomes, utilizing more direct forms of lobbying, not having to resort to their former employees. On the other hand, constrained interest groups may view reverse revolving as a cost-effective strategy to gain insider access. Our empirical evidence supports this later hypothesis. Figure 6 shows reverse revolvers from lower-budget interest groups exert more influence on their peers, suggesting that the revolving door is particularly valuable to financially constrained organizations.

Finally, we investigate whether the relative position held in the interest group matters in explaining their ability to influence voting behavior. Using information from the legislators' résumés, we distinguish between legislators who held managerial roles and those who did not. The results, reported in Figure 6, reveal no significant differences in peer influence between these two groups.[17]

Overall, these results shed light on which interest groups are crucial in understanding the effective influence of reverse revolvers. We find that reverse revolvers are particularly influential when linked to nationally-based and resource-constrained interest groups. By contrast, other factors, such as the position held by the reverse revolver or the business activity of the interest group, appear to have no impact on their level of influence.

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[17]Table C8 shows that the influence reverse revolvers have on their peers does not depend on the time that has passed since the termination of their employment contract. Similarly, Table C9 evidences that reverse revolvers' influence does not systematically depend on their interest group's tenure.

6 Mechanisms

In this section, we investigate two mechanisms that may explain the peer influence of reverse revolvers: (i) their role as subject-matter experts and (ii) their capacity to facilitate logrolling, such as vote trading or political career support.

6.1 The Role of Expertise

We begin by examining the role of subject-specific expertise in shaping the influence exerted by reverse revolvers on legislative voting behavior. A plausible mechanism underlying our baseline results is that reverse revolvers may derive their influence from their superior expertise on the topics under consideration, thereby positioning them as informational leaders within the legislative process. It is a well-known phenomenon that legislators often rely on informational cues from colleagues who are perceived as more knowledgeable, particularly when confronted with decisions on complex or unfamiliar topics (Coppock, 2014; Zelizer, 2019; Fong, 2020).

To empirically test this hypothesis, we condition our main analysis on whether both the focal legislator and their adjacent peers acquired subject-specific expertise before entering the European Parliament. By incorporating a comprehensive set of expertise controls, we can identify and compare shifts in voting alignment among groups of MEPs with similar expertise profiles. For this hypothesis to hold, reverse revolvers with higher expertise in the voted subject should exhibit a disproportionately stronger influence on the voting behavior of their peers relative to those with lower levels of expertise. Additionally, we examine whether the degree of subject-specific expertise among adjacent peers moderates the extent of influence, thereby testing for heterogeneity in peer effects linked to informational asymmetries within the legislative network.

Consistent with prior literature on informational cue-taking, our results suggest that expertise indeed facilitates voting alignment. Legislators are more likely to vote in line with their peers when those peers are recognized as knowledgeable in the voted subject. Column 1 in Table 8 presents the OLS estimates from estimating Equation 1 using *Name Peers Expertise* as our variable of interest. The results indicate that name adjacency to an expert increases the co-voting probability by 0.6 percentage points, which corresponds to a 0.9% increase relative to the average co-voting probability. This finding provides empirical validation of our expertise measure and supports the notion that expert legislators serve as informational references for their colleagues.

We then extend the analysis by incorporating our variable of expertise alongside indicators of connectedness to interest groups. As a first step, we replicate our baseline results in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8, not accounting for individual-level expertise. Next, in Columns 4 and 5, we estimate a fully interacted specification of Equation 2, introducing

interactions between peer expertise and interest group exposure. The findings show that the observed peer influence is driven by reverse revolvers who lack subject-matter expertise in the area under consideration. In particular, these inexpert reverse revolvers achieve a 2.4% increase in the probability of peer co-voting on issues relevant to their former employer's interests. By contrast, expert reverse revolvers do not significantly influence their colleagues' voting behavior.

These results reveal three key insights. First, expertise independently enhances a legislator's capacity to influence their peers, consistent with the cue-taking literature. Second, only reverse revolvers who lack subject-specific expertise appear to be effective at influencing their peers in those topics relevant to their interest group's agenda. Third, knowledgeable reverse revolvers do not exert additional effort influencing their peers' voting behavior. Together, these findings suggest that, within the institutional context of the European Parliament, reverse revolvers influence their colleagues not by providing independent expert-level insights but rather by disseminating partisan or interest-aligned information. Consequently, the hypothesis that reverse revolvers exert influence through informational superiority does not find empirical support in our analysis.

6.2 Career Incentives and Vote Trading

A plausible complementary mechanism at work could be that reverse revolvers possess greater persuasive capacity to influence their peers toward engaging in logrolling practices, such as vote trading or career advancement. This influence is likely to increase the probability of co-voting behavior, particularly in cases where the legislative outcome is perceived as salient to the interests of their affiliated group. This hypothesis aligns with the broader literature emphasizing the role of interpersonal legislative networks (Cohen and Malloy, 2014), career incentives (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008), and informal exchange arrangements (Battaglini, Sciabolazza and Patacchini, 2023b) in shaping parliamentary voting behavior.

To investigate legislators' co-voting incentives, we begin by examining whether co-voting with reverse revolvers is associated with subsequent promotions to influential in-parliament positions. As shown in Table 3, reverse revolvers are often rewarded by their parliamentary groups with leadership positions on motions relevant to their former interest groups.[18] In this context, legislators may have incentives to strategically co-vote with reverse revolvers, anticipating that such alignment could be reciprocated through future rewards once these individuals attain positions of influence.

Table 9 presents empirical evidence testing this hypothesis. The results suggest that greater exposure to reverse revolvers—measured by the share of voting days in which a

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[18]We remain agnostic—and it lies beyond the scope of this paper—whether the internal promotions observed among reverse revolvers are driven by alignment with the party line, by observed/unobserved individual characteristics, or by other latent factors that may lead European Party Groups to reward them, particularly in votes highly salient to their former interest group affiliations.

legislator is seated adjacent to at least one reverse revolver—is positively associated with the likelihood of being appointed as rapporteur. This association is particularly pronounced for rapporteurships and committee roles related to motions that are salient to the interest group background of the neighboring reverse revolver. Taken together, the findings provide suggestive evidence that legislators who are frequently close to reverse revolvers may face career incentives to maintain cooperative relationships with them, potentially securing influential positions on matters relevant to their neighbors' former interest groups.

We then examine the potential presence of vote trading among legislators. The analysis is restricted to reverse revolvers for whom we have a detailed mapping of motions relevant to their former organizations, allowing us to identify cases of asymmetrically aligned voting incentives. We test whether these legislators engage in reciprocal voting behavior with other reverse revolvers, particularly when a motion is salient to one legislator's affiliated interest group but not to the other's. Under the vote logrolling hypothesis, such asymmetries should give rise to systematic co-voting between reverse revolvers when motions are relevant to either party. Table 10 in the Appendix reports the results, revealing no significant evidence of systematic vote trading among former interest group members within the European Parliament.

Overall, these findings indicate that legislators seated more frequently next to reverse revolvers are more likely to obtain rapporteurships and committee roles, particularly on issues relevant to their neighbors' former interest groups, suggesting the existence of career incentives for strategic co-voting. However, the absence of systematic vote trading among reverse revolvers suggests that these incentives likely stem from informal reputational considerations rather than explicit vote trading arrangements.

7   Conclusion

This paper provides novel evidence of interest groups' influence on the legislative process through reverse revolving doors. To do so, we follow a twofold approach. First, we collect a unique dataset containing the universe of electronic votes that took place at the European Parliament between 2004 and 2019 and complement it with detailed information on the legislators' characteristics. In particular, we use the legislators' résumés to pinpoint those with prior experience in an interest group and identify the motions in which their former employers are more interested. We document that 28% of the legislators had work experience on interest groups before entering European politics. Second, we exploit the alphabetic seating rule followed at the European Parliament to construct an exogenous measure of network formation. This setting allows us to estimate the causal effect of sitting next to a former interest group member when voting on motions crucial to their former employer's business activity.

We show that reverse revolvers influence their adjacent colleagues when voting on a motion relevant to their former employer, implying a 2.4% increase in the co-voting probability. Meanwhile, no influence is exerted in non-relevant motions. When voting on relevant motions containing important public expenditure decisions, these results are twice as large. We further show that reverse revolvers influence their seating peers by decreasing their abstention ballots by 14.8% and increasing their voting attendance by 1.3%. However, legislators eventually learn from their peers' inclinations and avoid co-voting with their adjacent reverse revolvers.

We further evidence that the influence of reverse revolvers on their colleagues is driven by those individuals with limited expertise on the issues at hand, suggesting that they offer more partisan information than expert-level insights. Additional evidence shows that reverse revolvers exert a disproportionate influence on legislators responsible for drafting the motions being voted on, central in the European decision-making process. Moreover, the reverse revolving doors are predominantly used by nationally-based and budget-constraint interest groups, suggesting that this more subtle lobbying strategy enables less well-resourced groups to influence European legislators effectively. Finally, we find suggestive evidence in favor of the existence of career incentives for strategic co-voting.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study providing evidence of the influence of reverse revolving doors on the legislative process. These findings have important implications for policy-making as they shed light on a relatively overlooked lobbying practice used by interest groups, consisting of having insiders sitting in democratically elected institutions. Our results support the hypothesis that revolving doors affect the political process even when working in reverse.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: MEPs' Characteristics - Reverse Revolvers vs. Other Legislators

	Reverse Revolvers		Other legislators		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	p-value
Panel A: Legislators' characteristics					
Women	0.37	0.48	0.35	0.48	(0.45)
Age	54.07	10.63	52.72	10.60	(0.02)
Top ranked education	0.44	0.50	0.26	0.44	(0.00)
Panel B: Roles in Parliament					
First-term elected	0.57	0.50	0.59	0.49	(0.58)
Tenure at the EP	3.14	4.96	3.08	4.94	(0.83)
Absence	0.13	0.11	0.14	0.13	(0.02)
Rapporteur	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(0.30)
Shadow rapporteur	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	(0.00)
Committee membership	4.91	1.22	4.82	1.22	(0.19)
Panel C: Legislators' prior experience					
Work spells	15.24	12.44	10.62	8.20	(0.00)
Work experience (years)	26.85	10.66	23.46	10.85	(0.00)
Managerial profile	0.28	0.45	0.26	0.44	(0.60)
Political profile	0.61	0.49	0.73	0.44	(0.00)
Professional profile	0.34	0.47	0.23	0.42	(0.00)
Academic profile	0.05	0.21	0.04	0.19	(0.50)
Total	473		1230		1703

Notes: This table shows the distribution of legislators' characteristics as follows: Baseline (Col. 1); Reverse revolvers (Col. 2-3); Other legislators (Col. 4-5). The p-value of the difference between reverse revolvers and any other legislator is reported in Column 6.

Table 2: Interest Groups' Characteristics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Panel A: Business Type					
NGOs	0.23	0.42	0	1	513
Academic institutions	0.19	0.39	0	1	513
Companies & Groups	0.18	0.39	0	1	513
Trade Unions	0.10	0.30	0	1	513
Other institutions	0.09	0.29	0	1	513
Trade and Business associations	0.06	0.24	0	1	513
Think Tanks	0.06	0.23	0	1	513
Transnational associations	0.04	0.19	0	1	513
Consultancies	0.03	0.17	0	1	513
Regional structures	0.03	0.17	0	1	513
Panel B: Headquarter's Location					
Belgium	0.23	0.42	0	1	513
Germany	0.12	0.32	0	1	513
United Kingdom	0.11	0.32	0	1	513
Italy	0.07	0.26	0	1	513
France	0.07	0.25	0	1	513
Poland	0.04	0.21	0	1	513
Finland	0.04	0.20	0	1	513
Netherlands	0.04	0.20	0	1	513
Spain	0.04	0.20	0	1	513
Denmark	0.03	0.17	0	1	513
Rest of Europe	0.15	0.36	0	1	513
Rest of the World	0.05	0.22	0	1	513
Panel C: Other Characteristics					
Num. Employees	14.81	209.82	0	4750	513
Num. EP Accreditations	1.78	3.86	0	53	513
Lobbying Budget	512,445	1,131,297	0	10,000,000	513

Notes: The table displays the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values for a set of interest group's characteristics. The interest groups correspond to those identified in the résumés of non-leader MEPs affiliated with an alphabetic seating group.

Table 3: Association of expertise and interest group background with voting and parliamentary roles

	(1) Present	(2) Yes/No	(3) Partyline	(4) Rapporteur	(5) Shadow	(6) Committee
Expertise	0.0026***	0.0027***	0.0012*	0.0017***	0.0028***	0.0048***
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Reverse Revolver	-0.0048***	-0.0042***	-0.0060***	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0003***
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Reverse Revolver x Relevant	0.0062***	0.0057***	0.0124***	0.0016***	0.0067***	0.0076***
	(0.0010)	(0.0011)	(0.0015)	(0.0002)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	4,674,682	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Joint p-value	0.162	0.166	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Mean Dep. Var.	0.869	0.849	0.781	0.001	0.004	0.006

Notes: This table presents the results of regressing prior expertise and interest group exposure in a given subject on a series of voting and parliamentary outcomes. *Present* is a dummy variable that identifies if whether a legislator was in parliament during a voting session. *Yes/No* is a dummy variable that identifies whether a legislator had a clear voting stance, namely voting yay or nay. *Partyline* is a dummy variable that identifies whether the legislator voted the same as its EPG, measured by the vote of the corresponding rapporteur. *Rapporteur* and *Shadow* are dummy variables that identify whether the legislator is a rapporteur or shadow rapporteur in the voted motion, respectively. *Committee* is a dummy variable that identifies whether the legislator is part of the committee drafting the voted motion. Joint p-value tests the joint significance of being reverse revolvers and when the topic is relevant for any of her interest groups. A comprehensive set of controls of the focal and peer legislators is used. See Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Robust standard errors are included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4: REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS CONNECTION AND VOTE COINCIDENCE

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree	(5) OLS Agree	(6) OLS Agree	(7) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0350*** (0.0076)	0.0206*** (0.0067)	0.0205*** (0.0067)	0.0127** (0.0053)	0.0058 (0.0049)	0.0050 (0.0049)	
Name Peers (IG x Relevant)						0.0083** (0.0039)	
Peers IG							0.0068 (0.0066)
Peers (IG x Relevant)							0.0104** (0.0049)
EPG × Term FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value						0.023	0.026
F-stat 1							1043
F-stat 2							1288

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2). We denote as joint p-value the test on the the joint significance of being adjacent to reverse revolvers when the topic is relevant for any of their interest groups (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls of the focal and peer legislators is used. See Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: Peer effects of name and seating adjacency on voting disagreement - Dyadic approach

	(1) Disagree	(2) Disagree	(3) Disagree	(4) Disagree	(5) Disagree
Name adjacent	-0.0113*** (0.0020)	-0.0044*** (0.0014)	-0.0032* (0.0017)		
Name adjacent * IG			-0.0026** (0.0012)		
Seat neighbors				-0.0073*** (0.0024)	-0.0050* (0.0026)
Seat neighbors * IG					-0.0035** (0.0017)
EPG × Term FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline dyadic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name similarity controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name rank gap controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
IG-specific dyadic controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	109,990,078	109,990,078	109,990,078	109,990,078	109,990,078
Disagree mean	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.086
Joint p-value			0.0065		0.0080
F-stat 1				120.2	113.2
F-stat 2					26.14

Notes: This table shows the results of replicating the main estimation in Harmon, Fisman and Kamenica (2019) using their dyadic approach, and expanding it with our measure of Interest Group adherence. Observations in the reported regressions are motions-by-MEP-pairs in the main analysis sample of non-leader MEPs from alphabetical parties between October 2006 and October 2010. The outcome variable, *Disagree*, is an indicator variable denoting whether the MEP pair cast different votes on the proposal. *Name adjacent* is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within their seating section. *Seat neighbors* is an indicator for whether the MEP pair are seated adjacently. "Baseline dyadic controls" are indicators for whether the dyadic MEPs have the same educational attainment, freshman status, country of origin, gender, sector of activity (before entering parliament), and committee in parliament, as well as variables measuring difference between MEPs in age, working tenure, and tenure at the EP. "Name similarity controls" are comprised of an indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a flexible set of indicators to capture the distance between the MEPs' last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names in our data, additionally they include cubic polynomials in Bigram-Jaccard and Levensthein name similarity as well as an indicator variable for whether the names sound alike under the SoundEx algorithm. "Name rank gap controls" are indicators for every 10-seat bin in the "overall name rank gap" variable. "IG-specific dyadic controls" are indicator variables identifying if in a given pair of MEPs there is a former interest group member, a rapporteur, and a shadow rapporteur. Estimates in Columns (1)-(3) were obtained via OLS. Estimates in Columns (4) and (5) were obtained by 2SLS, using the indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within their seating section to instrument for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently, and interacted by whether any of the dyadic members was a former interest group member. Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, clustered at the level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary term. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Voting Mobilization and High Stakes Votes

	(1) OLS Abstain	(2) OLS Abstain	(3) 2SLS Absent	(4) OLS Absent	(5) OLS Agree	(6) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	-0.0008		-0.0083*		0.0048	
	(0.0014)		(0.0046)		(0.0049)	
Name Peers (IG x Relevant)	-0.0018**		-0.0003		0.0077*	
	(0.0009)		(0.0038)		(0.0040)	
Name Peers (IG * Budget)					0.0027	
					(0.0057)	
Name Peers (IG * Budget * Relevant)					0.0208**	
					(0.0101)	
Peers IG		-0.0011		-0.0112*		0.0066
		(0.0019)		(0.0062)		(0.0066)
Peers (IG x Relevant)		-0.0023**		-0.0003		0.0096*
		(0.0011)		(0.0048)		(0.0050)
Peers (IG * Budget)						0.0031
						(0.0068)
Peers (IG * Budget * Relevant)						0.0248**
						(0.0120)
EPG × Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,880,578	5,880,578	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean of Dependent Var.	0.0229	0.0229	0.131	0.131	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value	0.089	0.096	0.143	0.137	0.001	0.001
Non-budget: p-value					0.070	0.070
Budget vs. Non-budget: p-value					0.0319	0.0311
F-stat 1			1008		1043	518
F-stat 2			1219		1288	

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2) using as the dependent variable whether the legislator cast an abstention ballot (Columns 1-3) or was absent during the vote (Columns 4-6). We denote as joint p-value the test on the joint significance of being adjacent to reverse revolvers when the topic is relevant for any of their interest groups. A comprehensive set of controls of the focal and peer legislators is used. See Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the legislator level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table 7: AVERAGE EFFECT OF REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS CONNECTIONS ON VOTE COINCIDENCE PERSISTENCE BY PLENARY SESSIONS

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0050	0.0034	0.0025	
	(0.0049)	(0.0068)	(0.0068)	
Name Peers (IG x Relevant)	0.0083**	0.0083**	0.0174***	
	(0.0039)	(0.0039)	(0.0064)	
Sessions name adjacent	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	
Name Peers IG x Sessions name adjacent		0.0001	0.0001	
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	
Name Peers (IG x Relevant) x Sessions name adjacent			-0.0003	
			(0.0002)	
Peers IG				0.0036
				(0.0094)
Peers (IG x Relevant)				0.0239***
				(0.0089)
Sessions seat adjacent				-0.0001
				(0.0002)
Peers IG x Sessions seat adjacent				0.0002
				(0.0004)
Peers (IG * Relevant) * Sessions seat adjacent				-0.0006*
				(0.0004)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value		0.129	0.0306	0.0311
F-stat (KP)				188

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2) adding as regressors the number of previous plenary sessions in which each legislator has been assigned to sit adjacent to the same two other legislators, as well as the interactions with *Peers IG* and *Peers IG * Relevant*, and their correspondent instruments. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of all the variables displayed in the table (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix B for further information on the controls included. The reported F Statistics has been calculated following Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 8: AVERAGE EFFECT OF REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS AND EXPERT CONNECTIONS ON VOTE COINCIDENCE

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree	(5) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG		0.0071 (0.0049)	0.0063 (0.0050)	0.0072 (0.0052)	
Name Peers (IG x Relevant)			0.0080** (0.0039)	0.0102** (0.0040)	
Name Peers Expertise	0.0063** (0.0032)			0.0080* (0.0044)	
Name Peers (IG x Expertise)				-0.0082 (0.0092)	
Name Peers (IG x Expertise x Relevant)				-0.0347 (0.0316)	
Peers IG					0.0096 (0.0068)
Peers (IG x Relevant)					0.0131** (0.0057)
Peers Expertise					0.0096* (0.0053)
Peers (IG x Expertise)					-0.0095 (0.0115)
Peers (IG x Expertise x Relevant)					-0.0448 (0.0411)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value[a]			0.0143	0.537	0.546
Joint p-value[b]				0.008	0.009
Joint p-value[c]				0.248	0.254
F-stat (KP)					42

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2) adding as regressors whether adjacent legislators have expertise on the motion voted on, as well as the interactions with $NamePeers\ IG$ and $NamePeers\ IG * Relevant$, and $Peers\ IG$ and $Peers\ IG * Relevant$, respectively. We denote as joint p-value[a] as the joint significance test of all the variables displayed in each column, [b] on the adjacency to a reverse revolver in a vote for a relevant topic when the endogenous variables are not interacted with our trait of interest (peer expertise), and (c) the difference between (a) and (b). See Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 9: CAREER PROMOTIONS IN PARLIAMENT

	(1) Num. Positions	(2) Party Leader	(3) Committee Leader	(4) Committee Leader (Peer Relevant)	(5) Num. Rapports	(6) Num. Rapports (Peer Relevant)
Share Peers IG	0.0820	-0.0095	-0.0048	0.1016***	0.3202*	1.5272***
	(0.0849)	(0.0124)	(0.0270)	(0.0126)	(0.1939)	(0.2649)
Observations	1,702	1,702	1,702	1,702	1,702	1,702
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dep. var. mean	3.589	0.117	0.380	0.0616	1.725	0.899

Notes: This table reports the results from regressions of the share of voting motions in which a focal legislator was seated adjacent to reverse revolvers during a given parliamentary term on a set of key in-parliament positions. The specification includes legislator-term level controls for both the focal legislator and their peers, consistent with the baseline model, as well as their initial positions in parliament. Robust standard errors are included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 10: LOGROLLING WITH ADJACENT IG MEMBERS

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0073	
	(0.0090)	
Name Peers (IG x Relevant)	0.0043	
	(0.0069)	
Name Peers IG x Focal Relevant	0.0091	
	(0.0174)	
Name Peers (IG x Relevant) x Focal Relevant	-0.0277	
	(0.0232)	
Focal IG x Relevant	0.0075	0.0071
	(0.0071)	(0.0078)
Peers IG		0.0101
		(0.0122)
Peers (IG x Relevant)		0.0058
		(0.0091)
Peers IG x Focal Relevant		0.0119
		(0.0217)
Peers (IG x Relevant) x Focal Relevant		-0.0356
		(0.0295)
EPG × Term FEs	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,890,829	1,890,829
Mean Agree	0.718	0.718
Joint p-value	0.267	0.981
F-stat (KP)		88

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2) interacting *Peers IG* and *Peers IG x Relevant* and their correspondent instruments by an indicator variable identifying if the motion voted upon is relevant for the interest group of the focal legislator. The sample used is only composed by focal legislators with IG past experience. We denote as joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the displayed variables. A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis, see Appendix B for further information on the controls included. The reported F Statistics has been calculated following Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 1: Strasbourg Seating Plan during the Plenary Session Held on February 4th, 2013

Figure 2: Seating and Alphabetical Rank

(a) Alphabetically Seating Group

(b) Non-alphabetically Seating Group

Notes: This figure shows the correlation between within-EPG alphabetic rank and within-EPG seating rank. Subfigure 2a displays the correlation for the ECR group, which adheres to the alphabetic seating rule. Subfigure 2b looks at the GUE/NGL group, which does not adhere to the alphabetic seating rule. The data plotted corresponds to the plenary seating held on February 5, 2013.

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Figure 3: REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS AND VOTE COINCIDENCE BY MARGINS OF VICTORY

Notes: This figure shows the results of estimating Equation (2) interacted with each one of the following margins of victory, 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. The results shown correspond to the effect of seating adjacently to a legislator who previously worked for an interest group, when the subject of the motion is not relevant for its former employer, *Non-Relevant motion*, and when it is, *Relevant motion*. A comprehensive set of controls of the focal and peer legislators is used, see Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at the legislator level. Dashed horizontal lines represent the 95% confidence level. *p*-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. Table C10 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 4: REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS AND VOTE COINCIDENCE BY PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Notes: This figure shows the results of estimating Equation (2), interacted with the legislators' personal characteristics. The results shown correspond to the effect of seating adjacently to a legislator who previously worked for an interest group, when the subject of the motion is not relevant for its former employer, *Non-Relevant motion*, and when it is, *Relevant motion*. A comprehensive set of controls for the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix B for further information on the included controls. Standard errors are clustered at the legislator level. Confidence intervals represent the 95% confidence level. *p*-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. Table C11 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 5: REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS AND VOTE COINCIDENCE BY PEERS' PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Notes: This figure shows the results of estimating Equation (2), interacted with the adjacent legislators' personal characteristics. The results shown correspond to the effect of seating adjacently to a legislator who previously worked for an interest group, when the subject of the motion is not relevant for its former employer, *Non-Relevant motion*, and when it is, *Relevant motion*. A comprehensive set of controls for the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix B for further information on the included controls. Standard errors are clustered at the legislator level. Confidence intervals represent the 95% confidence level. *p*-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. Table C12 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 6: REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS AND VOTE COINCIDENCE
BY PEER INTEREST GROUPS' CHARACTERISTICS

Notes: This figure shows the results of estimating Equation (2) interacted with the peers Interest Group's characteristics. The results shown correspond to the effect of seating adjacently to a legislator who previously worked for an interest group, when the topic is not relevant for its former employer, *Non-Relevant motion*, and when the topic is relevant for its former employer, *Relevant motion*. A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at the legislator level. Confidence intervals represent the 95% confidence level. *p*-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. Table C13 displays numerically this figure.

Appendix

A   Supplementary Materials

Table A1: Summary of Samples by Rapporteur Presence

	With Rapporteur	Without Rapporteur
Panel A: Voting distribution		
Electronic ballots	13,365,545	4,067,500
In favour	51.78	42.52
Abstained	3.49	3.84
Against	31.37	34.62
Absence	13.36	19.03
Panel B: Vote characteristics		
Position on voting order	40.10	35.52
Budget of the Union	13.12	0.09
Legislative & Non-legislative	38.32	2.13
Resolutions and initiatives	48.56	97.78

Notes: This table presents the counts and shares by whether a vote had a rapporteur assigned to or not. It displays the absolute frequency of electronic ballots cast with and without rapporteur during the terms 6, 7 and 8. The distributions by vote outcome and by vote characteristics are expressed in percentages. The three type of procedure categories shown in Panel B are based on the procedure description present at the European Parliament website.

Table A2: European Parliament Sample Comparison

	Non-leaders alphabetic EPGs		Leaders alphabetic EPGs		No alphabetic EPGs	
	Votes cast	MEPs	Votes cast	MEPs	Votes cast	MEPs
Panel A: Legislators' characteristics						
Women	0.37	0.36	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.28
Age	53.42	53.23	56.34	55.59	53.15	53.62
Top ranked education	0.30	0.31	0.39	0.37	0.30	0.28
Panel B: Roles in Parliament						
First-term elected	0.58	0.58	0.26	0.34	0.66	0.67
Tenure at the EP	3.22	3.10	6.06	5.41	2.21	2.19
Absence	0.13	–	0.12	–	0.15	–
Rapporteur	0.001	–	0.002	–	0.001	–
Shadow rapporteur	0.004	–	0.003	–	0.01	–
Committee membership	4.96	–	5.37	–	4.66	–
Panel C: Legislators' prior experience						
Work spells	12.19	11.90	14.32	13.34	7.93	8.04
Work experience (years)	24.68	24.40	26.69	26.29	22.69	22.85
Managerial profile	0.27	0.27	0.30	0.28	0.23	0.23
Political	0.69	0.70	0.79	0.78	0.57	0.57
Professional	0.27	0.26	0.18	0.18	0.36	0.37
University	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.06
Panel D: Legislators' prior interest group experience						
Worked in interest group	0.28	0.28	0.31	0.31	0.21	0.19
Work experience in interest group (years)	9.40	9.06	9.19	8.87	9.15	8.90
Relevant subject	0.05	–	0.06	–	0.05	–
Total	6,769,158	1,703	3,056,927	828	2,388,204	526

Notes: This table presents the counts and shares in three different subsamples representing all the members of the European Parliament. Every member is coded as part of one of these samples or blocks. Columns 1, 3, and 5 represent shares computed using all the votes cast, while Columns 2, 4, and 6, show those same shares computed using individual legislators. The sample selection criterion used to construct each of these three blocks is the same applied to obtain the sample used in the baseline analysis: we use only votes with an assigned rapporteur and containing at least one subject. In Columns 1 and 2, we look at non-leader legislators in an alphabetic seating group. In Columns 3 and 4, we look at those legislators who are leaders in an alphabetic seating group. Finally, in Columns 5 and 6, we look at all other legislators who are affiliated to non-alphabetic seating groups . Moreover, for all three categories, we use only members who sit beside at least one other legislator belonging to the same category.

Table A3: Vote and Interest Groups Share by Procedure Subject

Vote Subjects	Share votes	Share IGs	Num. MEPs	Extra subjects
Budget of the Union	16.52	0	0	2.07
Environmental policy	12.08	3.82	15	2.56
Social policy, social charter and protocol	10.24	4.71	17	2.03
Employment policy, action to combat unemployment	8.81	10.29	35	2.37
Agricultural policy and economies	8.58	3.53	12	2.36
Industrial policy	7.75	3.24	11	2.77
Institutions of the Union	6.80	0.59	3	2
Consumers' protection in general	6.76	1.76	7	2.67
Common commercial policy in general	6.73	0.88	4	2.43
Transport policy in general	6.22	3.820	14	2.36
Common foreign and security policy	5.30	3.82	16	1.89
Energy policy	5.22	3.24	11	2.64
Police, judicial and customs cooperation in general	4.87	0.29	1	2.25
Relations with third countries	4.81	0	0	2.12
Research and technological development and space	4.12	5.59	20	2.39
Enterprise policy, inter-company cooperation	3.70	3.53	14	2.47
Fisheries policy	3.67	0.59	2	2.20
Public health	3.60	4.71	19	2.43
Free movement and integration of third-country nationals	3.50	1.47	5	1.82
Regional policy	3.35	8.53	30	2.31
Economic union	3.19	0	0	2.13
Free movement of capital	3.08	8.53	31	2.13
Free movement of services, freedom to provide	3.05	0.29	1	2.56
Information and communications in general	2.99	16.18	55	2.29
Free movement of goods	2.84	0	0	2.78
Development cooperation	2.72	1.18	5	2
Economic growth	2.66	0	0	2.42
Citizen's rights	2.66	0.59	3	2.44
Monetary union	2.30	0.29	1	1.83
Taxation	2.20	0.59	2	2.12
Judicial cooperation	1.92	0	0	2
Fundamental rights in the EU, Charter	1.87	1.47	6	2.15
Competition	1.66	0	0	2.31
Cooperation between administrations	1.49	0.29	1	2.53
Enlargement of the Union	1.41	0.29	2	1.38
Education, vocational training and youth	1.41	27.35	95	1.93
Revision of the Treaties, intergovernmental conferences	1.25	0	0	1.40
EU law	1.13	0	0	2.16
Common cultural area, cultural diversity	0.81	1.18	4	2.22
Global economy and globalisation	0.77	0.29	2	1.79
Treaties in general	0.67	0.29	2	1.22
Free movement of persons	0.34	0	0	2
Emergency, food, humanitarian aid, aid to refugees, Emergency Aid Reserve	0.28	1.47	5	1.79
Tourism	0.23	0.29	1	1.14
European statistical legislation	0.22	0	0	1.43
Free movement of workers	0.13	0	0	2.86
Justice and home affairs	0.09	0	0	2
Civil protection	0.08	0.29	1	1.25

Notes: Share of votes by procedure subject in Column 1. Column 2 shows the share of legislators who previously worked for an interest group, and for which the subject is considered to be relevant, and Column 3 shows the total number of them. Column 4 displays the average number of subjects each procedure classified with a particular subject is accompanied by. The sample used is the same as in the main analysis, namely only votes with a rapporteur and cast by legislators identified as non leader in alphabetically organized groups with peers satisfying the same requirements.

Table A4: Votes and Topics of Expertise by Procedure Subject

Vote Subjects	Share votes	Share Expertise Topics	Num. MEPs
Budget of the Union	16.52	0	0
Environmental policy	12.08	5.42	71
Social policy, social charter and protocol	10.24	9.55	125
Employment policy, action to combat unemployment	8.81	8.33	109
Agricultural policy and economies	8.58	8.63	113
Industrial policy	7.75	11.15	146
Institutions of the Union	6.80	7.33	96
Consumers' protection in general	6.76	1.07	14
Common commercial policy in general	6.73	7.26	95
Transport policy in general	6.22	4.74	62
Common foreign and security policy	5.30	17.27	226
Energy policy	5.22	5.04	66
Police, judicial and customs cooperation in general	4.87	4.74	62
Relations with third countries	4.81	12.76	167
Research and technological development and space	4.12	15.05	197
Enterprise policy, inter-company cooperation	3.70	6.42	84
Fisheries policy	3.67	0.76	10
Public health	3.60	11.54	151
Free movement and integration of third-country nationals	3.50	2.83	37
Regional policy	3.35	4.05	53
Economic union	3.19	5.35	70
Free movement of capital	3.08	9.85	129
Free movement of services, freedom to provide	3.05	0	0
Information and communications in general	2.99	19.86	260
Free movement of goods	2.84	0.46	6
Development cooperation	2.72	2.44	32
Economic growth	2.66	20.93	274
Citizen's rights	2.66	0.99	13
Monetary union	2.30	5.35	70
Taxation	2.20	4.97	65
Judicial cooperation	1.92	3.06	40
Fundamental rights in the EU, Charter	1.87	0.31	4
Competition	1.66	1.07	14
Cooperation between administrations	1.49	0	0
Enlargement of the Union	1.41	7.79	102
Education, vocational training and youth	1.41	32.85	430
Revision of the Treaties, intergovernmental conferences	1.25	4.66	61
EU law	1.13	7.18	94
Common cultural area, cultural diversity	0.81	6.49	85
Global economy and globalisation	0.77	21.01	275
Treaties in general	0.67	6.34	83
Free movement of persons	0.34	0.15	2
Emergency, food, humanitarian aid, aid to refuges, Emergency Aid Reserve	0.28	1.60	21
Tourism	0.23	3.59	47
European statistical legislation	0.22	0.53	7
Free movement of workers	0.13	1.45	19
Justice and home affairs	0.09	3.06	40
Civil protection	0.08	0.31	4

Notes: Share of votes by procedure subject in Column 1. Column 2 shows the share of legislators with expertise in the subject under consideration, and Column 3 shows the total number of them. The sample used is the same as in the main analysis, namely only votes with a rapporteur and cast by legislators identified as non leader in alphabetically organized groups with peers satisfying the same requirements.

Table A5: AVERAGE EFFECT OF REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS CONNECTIONS ON VOTE COINCIDENCE USING DIFFERENT CLUSTERING LEVELS

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0050	0.0050	0.0050	0.0050
	(0.0049)	(0.0033)	(0.0035)	(0.0034)
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)	0.0083**	0.0083**	0.0083**	0.0083**
	(0.0039)	(0.0034)	(0.0032)	(0.0035)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean of Dependent Var.	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value	0.025	0.003	0.003	0.006

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2) using different clustering levels. All columns mimic Column 6 in Table 4, with differences in the clustering level, i) Column 1 clusters at the legislator level, ii) Column 2 clusters at the legislator and plenary session levels, iii) Column 3 clusters at the row and plenary session level, and iv) Column 4 clusters at the EPG and plenary session level. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the name adjacency to a legislator with previous interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group. A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6: Average Effect of Reverse Revolving Doors Connections on Vote Coincidence Persistence by Voting Days

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0050	0.0036	0.0027	
	(0.0049)	(0.0067)	(0.0067)	
Name Peers (IG x Relevant)	0.0083**	0.0083**	0.0174***	
	(0.0039)	(0.0039)	(0.0065)	
Vote days name adjacent	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	
Name Peers IG x Vote days name adjacent		0.0000	0.0000	
		(0.0001)	(0.0001)	
Name Peers (IG x Relevant) x Vote days name adjacent			-0.0001	
			(0.0001)	
Peers IG				0.0038
				(0.0093)
Peers (IG x Relevant)				0.0239***
				(0.0089)
Vote days seat adjacent				-0.0000
				(0.0001)
Peers IG x Vote days seat adjacent				0.0001
				(0.0001)
Peers (IG x Relevant) x Vote days seat adjacent				-0.0002*
				(0.0001)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value		0.125	0.0297	0.0299
F-stat (KP)				172

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2) adding as regressors the number of previous voting days in which each legislator has been assigned to sit adjacent to the same two other legislators, as well as the interactions with *Peers IG* and *Peers IG * Relevant*, and their correspondent instruments. We denote as joint p-value the test on the joint significance of all the variables displayed in the table (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix B for further information on the controls included. The reported F Statistics has been calculated following Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

B   Description of Controls Used for Focal and Peer Legislators

This section presents the variables used as control in our main analysis, both for focal and peer legislators. We classify them into *Name controls*, *Focal MEP controls* and *Peers controls*.

i) *Name controls*: Owing to the possibility that surnames may represent the individuals, observable and unobservable, characteristics, such as socioeconomic background or family ties, in the spirit of Harmon, Fisman and Kamenica (2019), we control by the fraction of focal and individuals in the same group of peers sharing the same surname, and by the absolute alphabetic rank across EPGs and terms.

ii) *Focal MEP controls*: We characterize legislators using a wide set of controls. As for the legislators' personal characteristics, we control for their age, gender, national party, country of origin and whether they attended a top 500 university. As for the legislators' professional characteristics, we control for their years of professional experience before entering parliament, the total number of working positions, whether they have a managerial profile, whether their professional experience was conducted in the public, private, or academic sector, and their number of professional spells. We also control their topics of expertise and the number of those topics, as well as whether they previously worked for an interest group and if the topic is relevant for their previous employers. Regarding their previous interest groups' characteristics, we control by whether they have their headquarters in Brussels, and by their average reported EU lobbying budget. As for the legislator's in parliament characteristics, we control for their freshman status, their share of previous dates absent, their role at their EPG, whether they are part of the alphabetically seated leader sector in ALDE, whether they are the rapporteur or shadow rapporteur in the specific procedure voted, whether their EPG had one of these figures, whether the procedure refers to their own country, and whether they were at the responsible and opinion committees of the procedure voted on. We further control by whether the motion voted upon was a final vote or an amendment.

iii) *Peers controls*: We characterize connections, i.e., adjacent (left and right) siting peers, by expanding the above mentioned variables. We include as controls the fraction of the adjacent peers in the same EPG as the focal, the fraction in the same national party as the focal, the fraction from the same country as the focal, the fraction with the same EPG role as the focal, the fraction with the same profession profile as the focal, the fraction with the same managerial profile as the focal, the fraction with the same freshman status as the focal, the fraction with the same gender

as the focal, the fraction having the same "Top 500" education as the focal, and the fraction of the peers in the same committee as the focal. We also use peer controls that are irrespective of the focal characteristics such as the fraction of peers with freshman status, the fraction of female peers, the fraction of peers with a Top 500 education, the fraction of peers with a managerial profile, the fraction of rapporteur and shadow rapporteur peers, the fraction of peers in the committee responsible or committee of opinion for the procedure voted on, the fraction of peers with expertise in the topics voted on, the fraction of the peers for which the procedure voted on is of national relevance, the number of peers (from 1 to 2), the average absenteeism rate of the peers, the average number of topics of expertise of the peers, as well as, the fraction of peers with an interest group based in Brussels, and the average EU lobbying budget of these interest groups. Additionally, using information from peers and focal legislators, we control for the standard deviation in their age, professional experience, number of positions at the European Parliament, number of working positions, number of topics of expertise, and absenteeism rate.

Table B1: SUMMARY STATISTICS

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Agree	0.71	0.38	0	1	6769158
Absention	0.02	0.14	0	1	6769158
Reverse Revolver	0.28	0.45	0	1	6769158
Ratio Relevant Topic (not political) (main)	0.01	0.07	0	1	6769158
Peers IG	0.28	0.33	0	1	6769158
Peers (IG * Relevant)	0.03	0.16	0	1	6769158
Name Peers IG	0.28	0.33	0	1	6769158
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)	0.03	0.17	0	1	6769158
Reverse Revolver x Relevant	0.01	0.12	0	1	6769158
IG - Brussels HQ	0.05	0.20	0	1	6769158
IG - EU Lobbying budget	127225.71	447488.67	0	5002500	6769158
Final vote	0.23	0.42	0	1	6769158
Expertise	0.11	0.32	0	1	6769158
Age	53.42	10.68	26	86	6769158
Rapporteur	0.00	0.04	0	1	6769158
Shadow Rapporteur	0.00	0.06	0	1	6769158
Part of the responsible committee	0.01	0.08	0	1	6769158
Part of the opinion committee	0.00	0.07	0	1	6769158
National law	0.00	0.01	0	1	6769158
National party	241.47	129.08	2	453	6769158
Country	16.07	7.85	1	28	6769158
EPG Role	4.87	0.50	2	5	6769158
Female	0.37	0.48	0	1	6769158
Part of the ALDE leader section	0.05	0.22	0	1	6769158
Freshman status	0.58	0.49	0	1	6769158
Number of professional positions	4.95	1.24	0	12	6769158
Rapporteur in the EPG	0.70	0.46	0	1	6769158
Top 500 education	0.31	0.46	0	1	6769158
Previous sector of activity	1.34	0.54	1	3	6769158
Professional experience	24.68	10.97	1	56	6769158
Managerial profile	0.27	0.45	0	1	6769158
Number of working spells	12.19	9.84	1	87	6769158
Share previous days absent	0.13	0.11	0	1	6769158
Number of expertise topics	3.30	3.00	0	21	6769158
National law (peers)	0.00	0.01	0	1	6769158
Freshman (peers)	0.58	0.37	0	1	6769158
Female (peers)	0.37	0.36	0	1	6769158
Managerial profile (peers)	0.27	0.33	0	1	6769158
Top 500 education (peers)	0.31	0.34	0	1	6769158
Rapporteur (peers)	0.00	0.03	0	1	6769158
Shadow Rapporteur (peers)	0.00	0.04	0	1	6769158
Part of the responsible committee (peers)	0.01	0.06	0	1	6769158
Part of the opinion committee (peers)	0.00	0.05	0	1	6769158
Number of peers	1.91	0.29	1	2	6769158
Expertise (peers)	0.11	0.24	0	1	6769158
Share previous days absent (peers)	0.13	0.08	0	1	6769158
IG - Brussels HQ (peers)	0.04	0.14	0	1	6769158
IG - EU Lobbying budget (peers)	129037.00	335771.72	0	5002500	6769158
Number of expertise topics (peers)	3.30	2.20	0	21	6769158
Same gender (peers)	0.53	0.38	0	1	6769158
Same EPG (peers)	0.96	0.14	0	1	6769158
Same national party (peers)	0.08	0.21	0	1	6769158
Same country (peers)	0.10	0.23	0	1	6769158
Same EPG role (peers)	0.93	0.21	0	1	6769158
Same freshman status (peers)	0.51	0.38	0	1	6769158
Same previous sector of activity (peers)	0.57	0.40	0	1	6769158
Same managerial profile (peers)	0.61	0.38	0	1	6769158
Same Top 500 education (peers)	0.57	0.39	0	1	6769158
Same position at the same committee (peers)	0.20	0.30	0	1	6769158
Age SD (peers)	9.43	4.98	0	34	6769158
Professional experience SD (peers)	9.73	5.14	0	33	6769158
Number of professional positions SD (peers)	1.03	0.65	0	6	6769158
Share previous days absent SD (peers)	0.08	0.06	0	1	6769158
Number of working spells SD (peers)	7.39	6.42	0	60	6769158
Number of Expertise Topics SD (peers)	2.43	1.76	0	14	6769158

Notes: Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value for every variable used in the baseline regression. For further information, see Appendix B.

C Online Appendix

Table C1: REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS CONNECTIONS AND VOTE COINCIDENCE -
RAPPORTEURS' AND NATIONAL PARTY'S INFLUENCE

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0058	0.0050	
	(0.0049)	(0.0049)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)		0.0083**	
		(0.0039)	
Peers IG			0.0068
			(0.0066)
Peers (IG * Relevant)			0.0104**
			(0.0049)
Rapporteur	0.0779***	0.0779***	0.0779***
	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)
Shadow Rapporteur	0.0312***	0.0311***	0.0313***
	(0.0085)	(0.0085)	(0.0085)
Peer Rapporteur	0.0844***	0.0842***	0.0842***
	(0.0184)	(0.0184)	(0.0184)
Peer Shadow Rapporteur	0.0308**	0.0305**	0.0305**
	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.0123)
Same National party	0.0404**	0.0403**	0.0406**
	(0.0200)	(0.0200)	(0.0200)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value		0.0232	0.0255
F-stat 1			1043
F-stat 2			1288

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2). It is analogous to the
Columns 5, 6, and 7, in Table 4, respectively. Joint p-value of a test on the joint
significance of the adjacency to a legislator with background in an interest group, and
when the topic is relevant for such interest group. A comprehensive set of controls of
the focal and peer legislators is used, see Appendix B for further information on the
controls included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the legislator level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C2: FIRST STAGE ESTIMATES OF NAME ADJACENCY ON SEATING ADJACENCY

	(1) OLS Peers IG	(2) OLS Peers (IG × Relevant)
Name Peers IG	0.7481***	-0.0078***
	(0.0164)	(0.0020)
Name Peers (IG x Relevant)	0.0030	0.7975***
	(0.0052)	(0.0157)
EPG × Term FEs	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158

Notes: This table presents the estimates for the baseline first stage regressions. A comprehensive set of controls of the focal and peer legislators is used, see Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C3: REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS CONNECTION AND VOTE COINCIDENCE
MEP FIXED EFFECTS

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0350*** (0.0076)	0.0087 (0.0094)	0.0096 (0.0092)	
Name Peers (IG x Relevant)			0.0101*** (0.0037)	
Peers IG				0.0163 (0.0150)
Peers (IG x Relevant)				0.0128*** (0.0047)
MEP × Term FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value			0.0414	0.0625
F-stat 1				430.9
F-stat 2				1317

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2). We denote as joint p-value the test on the the joint significance of being adjacent to reverse revolvers when the topic is relevant for any of their interest groups (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls of the focal and peer legislators is used. See Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C4: REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS CONNECTIONS AND VOTE COINCIDENCE BY NAME DISTANCE

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree	(5) OLS Agree
Name Peers IG dist. 1	0.0041	0.0034	0.0035	0.0038	0.0033
	(0.0048)	(0.0048)	(0.0048)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)
Name Peers IG × Relevant dist. 1	0.0090**	0.0091**	0.0090**	0.0089**	0.0086**
	(0.0039)	(0.0039)	(0.0039)	(0.0039)	(0.0039)
Name Peers IG dist. 2	0.0011	0.0011	0.0006	0.0007	-0.0000
	(0.0047)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)
Name Peers IG × Relevant dist. 2	0.0088**	0.0084**	0.0084**	0.0084**	0.0085**
	(0.0038)	(0.0038)	(0.0038)	(0.0038)	(0.0038)
Name Peers IG dist. 3		0.0036	0.0041	0.0030	0.0028
		(0.0041)	(0.0042)	(0.0042)	(0.0042)
Name Peers IG × Relevant dist. 3		0.0079**	0.0074**	0.0077**	0.0078**
		(0.0036)	(0.0036)	(0.0036)	(0.0036)
Name Peers IG dist. 4			-0.0017	-0.0010	-0.0017
			(0.0050)	(0.0050)	(0.0050)
Name Peers IG × Relevant dist. 4			0.0080*	0.0083**	0.0090**
			(0.0042)	(0.0042)	(0.0042)
Name Peers IG dist. 5				0.0018	0.0020
				(0.0040)	(0.0040)
Name Peers IG × Relevant dist. 5				0.0029	0.0023
				(0.0037)	(0.0037)
Name Peers IG dist. 6					0.0002
					(0.0038)
Name Peers IG × Relevant dist. 6					0.0047
					(0.0038)
EPG × Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,900,146	6,855,549	6,810,311	6,757,297	6,694,541
Mean Agree	0.705	0.705	0.705	0.705	0.705
p-value, all coef. = zero	0.0041	0.0019	0.0009	0.0013	0.0014
p-value, coef. dist. 1 = dist. 2	0.690	0.712	0.670	0.653	0.681
p-value, coef. dist. 1 = dist. 3	-	0.900	0.900	0.799	0.875
p-value, coef. dist. 1 = dist. 4	-	-	0.505	0.556	0.626
p-value, coef. dist. 1 = dist. 5	-	-	-	0.297	0.327
p-value, coef. dist. 1 = dist. 6	-	-	-	-	0.355

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating how name adjacency to legislators with interest group background affect their probability of voting alike at different distance levels. Joint p-value of a test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with background in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group. A comprehensive set of controls of the focal and peer legislators is used, see Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C5: Reverse Revolving Doors Connections and Vote Coincidence - Row-Level Analysis

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree
Num. IG members	0.0836** (0.0339)	0.0509** (0.0225)	0.0512** (0.0227)	0.0403* (0.0225)
Num. IG members × Relevant				0.0718*** (0.0211)
EPG × Term FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
MEP controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	638,461	638,455	638,455	638,455
Mean Agree	0.704	0.704	0.704	0.704
Joint p-value				0.0002
Joint p-value				0.0005

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Equation (2) collapsed at the row by aisle level. It tests whether the presence of more legislators with interest group background in a given chamber row affects the row voting agreement. Joint p-value of a test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with background in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group. A comprehensive set of controls of the focal and peer legislators collapsed at the row level is used, see Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the plenary session times the row-by-aisle level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C6: Reverse Revolving Doors Connections and Vote Coincidence with Multiple Topics of Interest

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree	(5) OLS Agree	(6) OLS Agree	(7) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0350*** (0.0076)	0.0206*** (0.0067)	0.0205*** (0.0067)	0.0127** (0.0053)	0.0058 (0.0049)	0.0046 (0.0050)	
Name Peers (IG × Relevant)						0.0055* (0.0029)	
Peers IG							0.0063 (0.0066)
Peers (IG × Relevant)							0.0068* (0.0036)
EPG × Term FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value						0.058	0.063
F-stat 1							1042
F-stat 2							2005

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Equation (2). Joint p-value of a test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with background in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group. A comprehensive set of controls of the focal and peer legislators is used, see Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C7: Reverse Revolving Doors Connections and Vote Coincidence in Cross-EPG

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree	(5) OLS Agree	(6) OLS Agree
Peer IG	-0.0009 (0.0118)	-0.0026 (0.0088)	-0.0018 (0.0087)	0.0028 (0.0074)	-0.0020 (0.0075)	-0.0021 (0.0076)
Peer (IG × Relevant)						0.0027 (0.0129)
EPG x Term FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	584,011	584,011	584,011	584,011	584,011	584,011
Mean Agree	0.655	0.655	0.655	0.655	0.655	0.655
Joint p-value						0.967

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2) using only those legislators with adjacent colleagues from a different European group. *Peer IG* takes a value of 1 if the peer who was part of an interest group is from a different party, and a value of 0 if no peer was part of an interest group. Joint p-value of a test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with background in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group. A comprehensive set of controls of the focal and peer legislators is used, see Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C8: AVERAGE EFFECT OF REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS CONNECTIONS ON VOTE COINCIDENCE BY TIME SINCE IG EMPLOYMENT

	(1) 2SLS - Overall Agree	(2) 2SLS - [0-2] Agree	(3) 2SLS - [2-4] Agree	(4) 2SLS - [4-6] Agree	(5) 2SLS - [6-8] Agree	(6) 2SLS - [8-10] Agree	(7) 2SLS - [>10] Agree
Peers IG	0.0068	0.0137	0.0437**	-0.0218	0.0548	0.0522	0.0037
	(0.0066)	(0.0088)	(0.0214)	(0.0280)	(0.0468)	(0.0352)	(0.0132)
Peers (IG x Relevant)	0.0104**	0.0152*	0.0341	0.0352	0.0307	0.0533	0.0126
	(0.0049)	(0.0088)	(0.0270)	(0.0214)	(0.0334)	(0.0394)	(0.0100)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	4,847,149	3,992,025	3,967,572	3,881,674	3,880,420	4,571,108
Mean Agree	0.707	0.705	0.700	0.699	0.700	0.702	0.702
Joint p-value	0.0255	0.0122	0.0268	0.669	0.141	0.0460	0.323
F-stat (KP)	1038	399	39	42	16	30	194

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2), using in each regression a subsample of the reverse revolvers according to the number of years since they left their interest group. We denote as joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with background in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group. A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C9: AVERAGE EFFECT OF REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS CONNECTIONS ON VOTE COINCIDENCE BY EXPERIENCE IN AN INTEREST GROUP

	(1) 2SLS - Overall Agree	(2) 2SLS - [0-2] Agree	(3) 2SLS - [2-4] Agree	(4) 2SLS - [4-6] Agree	(5) 2SLS - [6-8] Agree	(6) 2SLS - [8-10] Agree	(7) 2SLS - [>10] Agree
Peers IG	0.0068	0.0265	-0.0099	0.0160	0.0519*	0.0133	0.0141
	(0.0066)	(0.0173)	(0.0199)	(0.0226)	(0.0315)	(0.0196)	(0.0091)
Peers (IG x Relevant)	0.0104**	0.0300*	0.0253	0.0351	0.0446*	0.0178	0.0081
	(0.0049)	(0.0178)	(0.0166)	(0.0285)	(0.0236)	(0.0195)	(0.0083)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	4,256,623	4,150,362	4,022,571	3,956,855	3,987,406	4,766,131
Mean Agree	0.707	0.702	0.698	0.702	0.703	0.699	0.706
Joint p-value	0.0255	0.0212	0.519	0.177	0.0127	0.268	0.0437
F-stat (KP)	1038	92	89	45	30	63	367

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2), using in each regression a subsample of the reverse revolvers according to the number of years they worked for their interest groups. We denote as joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with background in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group. A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix B for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C10: AVERAGE EFFECT OF REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS CONNECTIONS ON VOTE COINCIDENCE BY MARGINS OF VICTORY

	(1) 2SLS - Overall Agree	(2) 2SLS - Margin 1% Agree	(3) 2SLS - Margin 5% Agree	(4) 2SLS - Margin 10% Agree
Peers IG	0.0068	0.0073	0.0090	0.0108
	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)
Peers (IG x Relevant)	0.0104**	0.0106**	0.0118**	0.0123***
	(0.0049)	(0.0049)	(0.0048)	(0.0048)
Peers IG x Winning Margin X		-0.0248***	-0.0231***	-0.0226***
		(0.0079)	(0.0067)	(0.0063)
Peers (IG x Relevant) x Winning Margin X		-0.0078	-0.0101	-0.0081
		(0.0097)	(0.0074)	(0.0068)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value	0.026	-	-	-
< XX% Joint p-value	-	0.316	0.331	0.524
> XX% Joint p-value	-	0.020	0.006	0.002
< % vs. > XX%: p-value	-	0.005	0.001	0.001
F-stat (KP)	1038	519	519	519

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2) interacting *Peers IG* and *Peers IG* x *Relevant* and their correspondent instruments by an indicator variable with the vote wining margin indicated at the top of each column. We denote as joint p-value[a] the test on the adjacency to a reverse revolver in a vote for a relevant topic when the endogenous variables are interacted with our trait of interest, [b] on the adjacency to a reverse revolver in a vote for a relevant topic when the endogenous variables are not interacted with our trait of interest, and (c) the difference between (a) and (b). The interacted variable in columns 2, 3, and 4 refers to whether a motion was won by a margin lower than a 1, 5, and 10% margin of victory, respectively. A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis, see Appendix B for further information on the controls included. The reported F Statistics has been calculated following Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C11: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on vote coincidence by personal characteristics

	(1) 2SLS Agree	(2) 2SLS Agree	(3) 2SLS Agree	(4) 2SLS Agree	(5) 2SLS Agree	(6) 2SLS Agree
Peers IG	0.0068 (0.0066)	0.0060 (0.0076)	0.0034 (0.0086)	0.0067 (0.0066)	0.0061 (0.0070)	0.0075 (0.0075)
Peers (IG x Relevant)	0.0104** (0.0049)	0.0051 (0.0063)	0.0100 (0.0077)	0.0101** (0.0049)	0.0096* (0.0055)	0.0146** (0.0058)
Peers IG x Female		0.0018 (0.0108)				
Peers (IG x Relevant) x Female		0.0146 (0.0096)				
Female		0.0063 (0.0049)				
Peers IG x Freshperson			0.0060 (0.0103)			
Peers (IG x Relevant) x Freshperson			0.0007 (0.0096)			
Freshperson			-0.0017 (0.0045)			
Peers IG x Drafting Member				0.0114 (0.0250)		
Peers (IG x Relevant) x Drafting Member				0.0386 (0.0304)		
Drafting Member				0.0005 (0.0090)		
Peers IG x Manager					0.0029 (0.0121)	
Peers (IG x Relevant) x Manager					0.0029 (0.0113)	
Manager					-0.0023 (0.0053)	
Peers IG x IG						-0.0030 (0.0115)
Peers (IG x Relevant) x IG						-0.0150 (0.0104)
IG						0.0009 (0.0054)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value[a]	0.0255	0.00112	0.0467	0.0260	0.152	0.677
Joint p-value[b]	-	0.220	0.212	0.0282	0.0565	0.0107
Joint p-value[c]	-	0.047	0.667	0.086	0.799	0.182
F-stat (KP)	1038	501	538	524	548	472

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2) interacting *Peers IG* and *Peers IG x Relevant* and their correspondent instruments by personal characteristics of the focal legislator. We denote as joint p-value[a] as the joint significance test of all the variables displayed in each column, b on the adjacency to a reverse revolver in a vote for a relevant topic when the endogenous variables are not interacted with our trait of interest, and (c) the difference between (a) and (b). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis, see Appendix B for further information on the controls included. The reported F Statistics has been calculated following Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C12: AVERAGE EFFECT OF REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS CONNECTIONS ON VOTE COINCIDENCE BY PEERS' PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

	(1) 2SLS Agree	(2) 2SLS Agree	(3) 2SLS Agree	(4) 2SLS Agree	(5) 2SLS Agree
Peers IG	0.0068	-0.0021	0.0080	0.0069	0.0079
	(0.0066)	(0.0095)	(0.0145)	(0.0066)	(0.0083)
Peers (IG x Relevant)	0.0104**	0.0059	0.0139	0.0108**	0.0137*
	(0.0049)	(0.0086)	(0.0118)	(0.0049)	(0.0074)
Peers (IG x Female)		0.0144			
		(0.0120)			
Peers (IG x Relevant x Female)		0.0064			
		(0.0107)			
Female Peer		0.0034			
		(0.0050)			
Peers IG x Freshperson Peer			-0.0015		
			(0.0156)		
Peers (IG x Relevant) x Freshperson Peer			-0.0043		
			(0.0132)		
Freshperson Peer			-0.0030		
			(0.0070)		
Peers IG x Drafting Member Peer				-0.0114	
				(0.0202)	
Peers (IG x Relevant) x Drafting Member Peer				-0.0194	
				(0.0284)	
Drafting Member Peer				-0.0005	
				(0.0078)	
Peers IG x Manager Peer					-0.0022
					(0.0112)
Peers (IG x Relevant) x Manager Peer					-0.0065
					(0.0105)
Manager Peer					-0.0032
					(0.0049)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value[a]	0.026	0.002	0.181	0.655	0.318
Joint p-value[b]	-	0.757	0.213	0.021	0.039
Joint p-value[c]	-	0.074	0.581	0.288	0.337
F-stat (KP)	1038	442	115	88	280

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2) interacting *Peers IG* and *Peers IG* x *Relevant* and their correspondent instruments by personal characteristics of the peer legislator. We denote as joint p-value[a] as the joint significance test of all the variables displayed in each column, [b] on the adjacency to a reverse revolver in a vote for a relevant topic when the endogenous variables are not interacted with our trait of interest, and ([c]) the difference between ([a]) and ([b]). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis, see Appendix B for further information on the controls included. The reported F Statistics has been calculated following Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table C13: AVERAGE EFFECT OF REVERSE REVOLVING DOORS CONNECTIONS ON VOTE COINCIDENCE BY INTEREST GROUP'S CHARACTERISTICS

	(1) 2SLS Agree	(2) 2SLS Agree	(3) 2SLS Agree	(4) 2SLS Agree	(5) 2SLS Agree	(6) 2SLS Agree
Peers IG	0.0068	0.0079	0.0031	0.0034	0.0140*	0.0054
	(0.0066)	(0.0100)	(0.0068)	(0.0069)	(0.0075)	(0.0071)
Peers (IG x Relevant)	0.0104**	0.0019	0.0171***	0.0245***	0.0158**	0.0101
	(0.0049)	(0.0090)	(0.0064)	(0.0080)	(0.0078)	(0.0071)
Peers (IG x Public IG)		-0.0238				
		(0.0182)				
Peers (IG x Relevant x Public IG)		0.0117				
		(0.0111)				
Peer Public IG		0.0132				
		(0.0099)				
Peers (IG x Regulated IG)			0.0103			
			(0.0234)			
Peers (IG x Relevant x Regulated IG)			-0.0179*			
			(0.0102)			
Peers Regulated IG			-0.0084			
			(0.0162)			
Peers (IG x Brussels HQ)				-0.0080		
				(0.0336)		
Peers (IG x Relevant x Brussels HQ)				-0.0396**		
				(0.0180)		
Peers Brussels HQ				0.0051		
				(0.0216)		
Peers (IG x Large Lobbying Spending)					-0.0348*	
					(0.0196)	
Peers (IG x Relevant x Large Lobbying Spending)					-0.0069	
					(0.0103)	
Peers Large Lobbying Spending					0.0129	
					(0.0124)	
Peers (IG x Manager at IG)						0.0022
						(0.0210)
Peers (IG x Relevant x Manager at IG)						0.0012
						(0.0097)
Peers Manager at IG						-0.0053
						(0.0137)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158	6,769,158
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value[a]	0.0255	0.193	0.712	0.411	0.921	0.166
Joint p-value[b]	-	0.459	0.0160	0.00520	0.00363	0.108
Joint p-value[c]	-	0.942	0.241	0.0645	0.0292	0.878
F-stat (KP)	1038	251	116	55	150	145

Notes: This table shows the results of estimating Equation (2) interacting *Peers IG* and *Peers IG x Relevant* and their correspondent instruments by Interest Group characteristics. We denote as joint p-value[a] as the joint significance test of all the variables displayed in each column, [b] on the adjacency to a reverse revolver in a vote for a relevant topic when the endogenous variables are not interacted with our trait of interest, and (c) the difference between (a) and (b). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis, see Appendix B for further information on the controls included. The reported F Statistics has been calculated following Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.